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The impact of the partition crisis on Cavan and Monaghan, 1914-1926.
The aim o f this thesis is to illustrate the impact o f partition on the border 
counties o f Cavan and M onaghan in the period 1914 to 1926. Partition had a profound 
impact on this region in political, economic and social terms. People from all walks o f 
life in the region were adversely affected by the partition o f Ireland which was brought 
about by the Government o f Ireland A ct o f December 1920. The period 1914-1920 which 
witnessed the imposition o f partition was extremely fraught in Cavan and M onaghan as 
tensions m ounted between nationalists and unionists over the regions future. This work 
examines these tensions and shows how sectarian animosities built up in the region. The 
reactions o f different sections o f the community to the partition settlement is also 
examined.
The final imposition o f partition ushered in an immensely turbulent period 
for the region as it coincided w ith the outbreak o f the W ar o f Independence. Sectarian 
tensions mounted and by 1920 open sectarian hostilities engulfed the region. These 
animosities in tandem with the Belfast Boycott created deep sectarian divisions.
Another period o f  violence followed for residents o f the region. This time, 
however, this violence took the form o f border warfare. This work examines the open 
warfare which broke out between rival forces operating on either side o f the borderline 
and its implications for Cavan and Monaghan.
The final section o f this thesis explores the economic and social 
ramifications o f partition in depth. The final period under consideration, i.e. 1923-1925, 
witnessed the creation o f fiscal seperation between North and South. The impact o f this 
economic partition and the concurrent closure o f border roads is analyized. Specific 
attention is given to the border towns which suffered the most from the creation o f the 
customs posts. This work concludes w ith an examination o f the changes which the 
Boundary Commission recommended for the region and the effect these changes would 
have had on the region.
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INTRODUCTION.
The partition o f Ireland was the most cataclysmic event to have occured in 
the twentieth century history o f the island. Even today the implications o f partition are all 
too clearly visible throughout the length and breadth o f the island. For this reason, 
partition is an extremely difficult subject to broach without getting caught up in the 
arguments o f old, about the rights and wrongs o f  partition, and where to lay the blame for 
this 'intolerable situation' as it is seen by traditional nationalist w riters.1
This work will not get caught up in this argument but will present an 
objective account o f the events which led up to partition. Specifically the thesis examines 
the effects o f partition on the border counties o f Cavan and Monaghan in the period 
1914-1926. For the purpose o f this work partition is treated as an historical fact which 
occured in Decem ber 1920, by the passing o f the Government o f Ireland Act, which set 
up the northern state comprising six o f the nine counties o f the historic province o f 
Ulster, that is Deny, Down, Antrim, Tyrone, Armagh and Fermanagh.
It is necessary as a background to the subject to study the events which led 
up to the Government o f  Ireland Act, and this will be done as succinctly as possible. 
Following on from this the effects o f partition on the border counties o f Cavan and 
Monaghan will be analysed at length.
The history o f  Northern Ireland since the Government o f Ireland Act of 
1920 and the background to this legislation have been the subject o f innumerable works. 
However most historians have tended to neglect the fact that the historic province o f 
Ulster contains nine counties, and not just the six counites which constitute Northern 
Ireland. This study is unique because it is the first study to consider the effects o f partition 
on Free State Ulster. The study will therefore help to redress the imbalance o f historical 
writing on the subject o f partition by exam ining its impact on Cavan and Monaghan.
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It is important at this point to state that Donegal is not part o f  the subject 
matter o f this current study for a number o f reasons. To begin with Donegal is unique, as 
regards partition, in that the city o f Derry played a massive role in the history o f Donegal 
in both social and economic terms. Moreover the counties o f Cavan and Monaghan have 
many links, primary among these being a geographical one. To include Donegal in this 
study would have fragmented the study o f the effects o f  partition on this homogenous 
region.
As well as examining the political history' o f the events which occured 
between 1914 and 1926. the thesis will also chart the social and economic effects of 
partition on the region and assess the ways in which the border impacted on the lives of 
people living in this region. Partition left a deep scar on the region in political, economic 
and social terms and by 1926 these scars had not fully healed. The problems caused by 
partition during this period haunted the region for many years afterwards. It can be argued 
that economically Cavan and M onaghan never recovered from partition. This is why this 
is a subject which deserves an in depth study.
Chapter one is concerned with the period from 1914 to 1919. This period 
covers the proposal to introduce partition in a bid to solve the home rule crisis. This 
chapter illustrates how partition was brought about and the reaction o f the different 
sections o f the community o f Cavan and Monaghan to this process. Chapter two is 
concerned with the period 1919 to 1921 which saw the final imposition o f  the partition 
settlement and the creation o f  a border in the region. This was a great period o f unrest in 
the region as sectarian tensions mounted. By mid 1920 much of the Cavan and Monaghan 
region witnessed open sectarian hostilities between nationalists and unionists. This was 
an immensely violent period in the history o f  the region. The divisions which were 
created during this period left a deep scar on the region.
The focus in chapter three is placed on the Belfast boycott which lasted in 
various forms from 1920 until 1922. The Belfast boycott was a crucial event as it was one
of the first m anifestations o f partition, ironically carried out by the provisional 
government o f the Irish Republic, which was so opposed to any form o f partition. The 
boycott had a serious effect on Cavan and M onaghan due to the close economic ties o f 
the region with Belfast and North East Ulster. The boycott also served to deepen 
anomisitics between the Catholic and Protestant communities.
Chapter four consists o f a study o f another dramatic period for the Cavan 
and Monaghan region, namely the period o f the so-called 'border wars’. There was a 
violent backlash against the border and more specifically the new northern state by 
members o f the I.R.A. The implications o f the 'border wars' for the region are analiysed. It 
is ironic that it was the outbreak o f civil war that brought a large measure o f relief to this 
much beleagured region, as the focus o f attention turned away from Northern Ireland. The 
impact o f civil war on partition will also be considered.
Chapter five focuses on a new form o f partition which started with the 
setting up o f a custom s barrier between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. This 
was initiated by the Free State when it set up the first customs post on 1 April 1923. This 
step introduced a new form o f partition and thus created a whole new set o f problems for 
the border region. W ith the customs posts came fiscal seperation between the two states, 
and for the first time people in the border region were restricted in their movements 
across the frontier. The problems caused by this new form o f partition to border towns 
such as Clones, Belturbet and Swanlinbar will receive special attention. Up to late 1925 
partition was still perceived as a temporary measure by most people living in the border 
region. With the ending ot the Boundary Commission and the subsequent agreement o f 
December 1925 to leave the border as it was, partition was finalised. Chapter five also 
considers this and looks at the changes to the boundary of Cavan and M onaghan which 
were recommended by the Boundary Commission.
Primary sources on this subject are plentiful and rich in content. As with
any study o f  local history the first crucial source to be examined are the relevant
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contemporary local and national newspapers.The Irish Times, consulted on microfilm in 
John Paul II library in M aynooth. is essential for an overview o f happenings on the 
broader national scale, in the period under consideration. Local newspapers are an unique 
watermark o f public opinion for the period under study. The local newspapers also 
contain a wealth o f information on County Council meetings, as well as reports o f  local 
incidents relating to the border. In the period after partition, local newspapers provide 
invaluable accounts o f court proceedings against people caught in violation o f the 
customs act. Three newspapers need to be considered for the Cavan and M onaghan area. 
The Anglo-Cell, as the only newspaper in circulation in Cavan, which was printed in 
Cavan, at the time provides the principal source for Cavan. This was consulted on 
microfilm in Cavan County library. For M onaghan the Northern Standard is an essential 
guide. However this newspaper had a pro-unionist slant which was offset by examining 
the Dundalk Democrat. which despite its title had a wide readership among nationalists in 
the region, especially in south M onaghan.2
The Colonial Office Dublin Castle records provide another invaluable 
source for cataloguing the strength o f various organisations, such as the Irish Volunteers 
and the Ulster Volunteers during the period up to 1921.3 The Inspector General and 
County Inspector's monthly reports on the state o f each county during the period up to 
1921 are absolutely crucial for building a picture o f  how each county changed from 
month to month. The Dail Eireann ministry and cabinet minutes available in the National 
Archives. Dublin are essential for Irish government opinion and policy on partition before 
the civil war. The Dail Eireann files are also essential for the records o f  the Belfast 
Boycott Committee, which was set up by the first Dail. The treaty debates are also crucial 
for the government's attitude to the form o f partition espoused in the treaty. The records 
o f the Department o f  Taoiseach contain a great wealth o f information on the border 
question, including government policy on partition, correspondence with the northern 
government on border incidents, and reports o f violence in the border region. The work o f
the North East Boundary Bureau, including its weekly bulletins, is also contained in the 
Department o f Taoiseach records. The North East Boundary Bureau, headed by Kevin O' 
Shiel was set up by the Irish governm ent as a propaganda machine to present the case o f 
the Irish people as regards partition, to the Boundary' Commission. The D epartm ent o f 
Justice files also contain a great deal o f  valuable information on crimes and breaches in 
the border region. Amongst these files are records o f smuggling and the blocking o f  roads 
on the border, which caused great restrictions on the residents o f the area.
Much information on the impact o f partition can be found in the 
departmental and cabinet records o f the Northern government, held in the Public Records 
office of Northern Ireland. However, a problem exists with these records, in that a portion 
o f them are closed for 75 years.4 That material which is available, however, is extremely 
useful, and this is especially true o f  the Ministry o f Home Affairs files. Included in these 
files is information on border outrages on both sides, and also information on blocking o f 
roads by the Special Constabulary.
The Boundary Com m ission papers, consulted on microfilm in the National 
Library in Dublin give an invaluable insight into the workings o f the border in the first 
years of its existence. Interviews were carried out with residents o f the border regions 
likely to be affected by any realignment o f the boundary. The representations made by the 
residents o f  the border regions paint a unique picture o f the daily problems encountered 
by the people living along the border. The representations made by numerous businesses 
and traders serves to illustrate the economic effects o f partition.
The printed sources used in this work are supplemented by interviews held 
witth people who lived near the border in Cavan and Monaghan in the nineteen twenties. 
Oral sources are o f particular value on subjects about which there is little printed 
material, such as smuggling.
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ENDNOTES:
1. Gwynn, Denis, The History o f  par/i7/ow(Dublin, 1950), p. 10.
2. Consulted on microfilm in N.L.I. and M onaghan County Library.
3. Colonial Office, Dublin Castle Records, CO 904 Part IV- VI, Consulted on m icrofilm  
in N.L.I. and John Paul II Library, NUI Maynooth.
4. The following records were unavailable. CUS/1/7/1: Registry o f Seizures, CUS/1/7/2: 
Reports o f the Surveyor /  Enniskillen, C U S /1/7/3: Land Boundary with Eire. C U S /1/4/7: 
Confidential letter book relating to staff, disciplinary matters etc, CUS/1/9/3: 'The 
Northern Ireland Boundary with Eire'.
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE PARTITION QUESTION, 1912 - 1919.
The period 1912 to 1919 was an immensely turbulent period for Ireland. It 
was a period o f great upheaval, uncertainty and revolution. It was also a period o f  great 
change and division. 'In 1911 Irishmen o f all political opinions would have been amazed 
if they could have foreseen the division o f Ireland into two seperate states ten years 
later.'1 Nowhere was this immense upheaval and transformation felt more than in Cavan 
and Monaghan. In 1911 Cavan and M onaghan formed an integral part o f the United 
Kingdom. The nationalists o f  both counties, comprising almost 74% and 81% o f the 
population, respectively were looking forward to the prospect o f home rule.- Unionists o f 
the area looked towards Belfast and were confident o f their positions in unionist Ulster.
The G overnment o f Ireland Act o f December 1920 changed all this. Cavan 
and M onaghan became part o f  a border region on the edge o f  nationalist southern 
Ireland. This region had become a hiatus or no-mans land between north and south, 
unsure o f it own future. More importantly it had no control over the Boundary 
Comm ission which brought the possibility o f a shifting o f the frontier, in which direction 
no one could say for sure.
The partition o f  Ireland was by no means an overnight phenomenon, rather 
it can be seen as the consequence, or a by product o f events on a global, as well as a local 
and national scale. Partition came about as a solution to the long and protracted political 
wranglings over the home rule bill and more specifically unionist opposition to home 
rule. Opposition to home rule was mostly confined to north east Ulster.
At the time it seemed that an exclusion o f certain counties of Ulster which 
contained unionist majorities totally opposed to any breaking o f the Act o f Union was the 
only possible solution acceptable to both sides. It was not an ideal solution to any side but 
both Edward Carson, leader o f  the Ulster Unionist Party and John Redmond, leader o f 
Irish nationalists in W estm inster, had accepted some form o f partition as a compromise 
solution by 1914. W hat proved to be a more significant stumbling block was the area to 
be excluded and the duration o f any exclusion.
A number o f events influenced this settlement and transformed the 
political scene. Foremost among these was the outbreak o f the first world war when home 
rule for Ireland, with certain concessions for north east Ulster, seemed inevitable. The 
outbreak o f war postponed the implementation o f home rule until hostilities ceased, by 
which time the Irish political scene had been transformed. The Easter rising o f 1916 and 
the subsequent execution o f the rising leaders precipitated the rise o f Sinn Fein. This 
heralded the demise o f Redmond's party. Horne rule was no longer enough to satisfy Irish 
people and anything short o f a republic would be seen as unacceptable to the Irish nation. 
Britain also witnessed a change in political scene and emerged from the war with a strong 
government no longer reliant on Irish support to stay in power. Following Sinn Fein's 
decision to abstain from W estminster, Britain was now free to frame policies in the 
House o f Comm ons with the unionists as the only Irish representatives.
Traditional unionist thinking on partition has maintained that Ulster has
been seperate from the rest o f  Ireland since time immemorial. Some unionist historians
such as Ronald Me Neill and William A. Carson have traced Ulster's unique seperate
identity back to mythological times.3 W hile these traditional unionist views have been
considerably revised, notably by the works o f A.T.Q. Stewart and Patrick Buckland, there
is a strong element o f truth in the notion o f Ulster's seperate identity. The uniqueness o f
Ulster can be traced back to the early seventeenth century and the plantation o f  Ulster
during the reign o f James I. This plantation was far and away the m ost successful attempt
at colonising Ireland. U lster was soon replanted with hundreds o f Scots and English
settlers. This policy o f redistribution o f  land in Ulster was aided by the flight o f the earls
o f Tyrone and Tyrconnell with nearly one hundred chieftains in 1607.5 Another factor
which was to have a huge bearing on the success o f the Ulster plantation was the
proximity o f  Ulster to Scotland. Scots came over in great numbers and proved themselves
in some ways the more efficent colonists. They were more willing than the English to
sink labour and capital in tillage. W ithin a generation a large part o f counties Antrim and
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Down had been transformed in population and way o f life into a sort o f extension o f the 
Scottish lowlands.6
This was the beginning o f a strong and cohesive protestant ascendancy in 
Ulster and this colony grew stronger as the decades passed. Ulster was now seen as a 
strongly loyal and protestant area and Ulster's distinctivess was exacerbated by the rapid 
growth o f  industrialisation which was focused on Belfast throughout the nineteenth 
century. This growth was based around the linen, engineering and shipbuilding industries. 
In the words o f  Michael Laffan 'in economic terms Belfast was an anomaly, a British 
outpost in agrarian Ireland.'7 The might o f Ulster was perpetuated by unionist myths. 
Protestant Ulster with its booming industries and efficency was seen in contrast to 
backward, rural, agrarian, catholic, southern Ireland. This image grew in the Ulster mind 
and it seemed as if Ulster's survival was dependent on the maintenance o f the union. A 
Dublin government with its emphasis on tarrif autonomy and protectionism would ruin all 
that Ulster had built up in the previous century.
It is fair to say that the counties o f Cavan and M onaghan although a 
constituent part o f the historical province o f Ulster were more closely aligned to southern 
Ireland in both religious and economic terms. Both counties had a sizeable protestant 
minority which throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries monopolised both 
local power and land ownership. However the industrialisation o f the north east never 
really influenced Cavan or Monaghan. Therefore it was a lot easier to break down 
unionist domination. As the region had a considerable nationalist majority it soon became 
obvious that unionists could not dominate the land or politics forever. A number o f events 
turned the tide o f protestant control in both political circles and land ownership in favour 
o f nationalists in both Cavan and M onaghan. Gladstone's Land Acts o f 1870, 1881 and 
1885 precipitated a change in land ownership which was continued by the Tory policy o f 
'killing home rule with kindness', which resulted in catholics owning more land in the 
region.8
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Another crucial event was the passing o f the Local Government Act in 
1898 which replaced the traditional grand jury system and for the first time gave 
nationalists power in both counties. Monaghan and Cavan were therefore different from 
north east Ulster which had a majority o f people in control at local government level and 
in the controllers of industry, opposed to home rule. This urban industrial power base was 
not as easy to displace as unionist power in Cavan and Monaghan. Having sketched the 
motivations behind unionist demands for seperate treatment and the reasons for unionist 
opposition to home rule the political background to partition will now be examined.
Some historians trace the 'Ulster question which led to partition back to 
the times o f  Daniel O Connell and the repeal o f the Union.9 However, for the puposes o f 
this study 1886 and Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill is taken as the starting point 
politically o f  the Ulster question. 10 Protestants joined together to oppose any form o f 
home rule and found allies among the conservative party notably in this instance Lord 
Randolph Churchill. Ulster protestants were to have the support o f conservatives 
throughout the home rule crisis. This led to much bitterness among Irish nationalists and 
led to the misinformed view that it was part o f a British policy of'd iv ide and rule.'
The enforced partition o f Ireland appears so obviously as a 
direct application o f that policy, that many people in Ireland 
take it for granted that partition was deliberately devised by 
English politicians as a means o f retaining a grip on Irish 
territory which could at any time be expanded.11
Gladstone relying on the support o f the Irish nationalists introduced a 
second Home Rule Bill in 1893. This time it passed through the House o f Commons but 
was defeated by the House o f  Lords. Home rule at this point seemed a very distant 
possibility especially with the return to power o f the pro-unionist conservative party in 
1895. The conservatives remained in power for the following ten years and there was a
11
marked decline in public interest in home rule in Ireland. The conservative policy o f 
'killing home rule with kindness1 was a conciliatory measure to give Ireland a number o f 
important concessions.
The policy had its desired effect and home rule took a back seat. There 
was also a growth in awareness o f a distinctive Irish identity which manifested itself 
under the agency o f the Gaelic League. This also contributed to the demise o f  the home 
rule issue in popular opinion. The Irish Parliamentary Party was weak and had suffered 
badly from the Pamell - Kitty O Shea divorce scandal and divisions in party ranks. 
Therefore at the turn o f the century home rule was relegated to a position o f less 
prominence in public opinion. However the general election o f 1906 brought a sweeping 
victory for the liberal party and gave another glimmer o f hope to the Irish party. However 
the liberal party did not at this point need to rely on Irish nationalist support. The liberals 
did subscribe to a piecemeal approach to home rule to appease the Irish party. Home rule 
was, after a lapse o f twenty years, dramatically put to the top o f the agenda as a result o f a 
change in the balance o f power in the House o f Commons. This was brought about by the 
rejection o f David Lloyd George's 1909 budget following the conservatives use o f 
blocking tactics in the house o f  lords.12
Two general elections followed in quick succession with almost identical
results. The December election left the liberals along with a labour alliance with a
majority o f fifty nine seats over the conservatives. With eighty four home rulers Redmond
now held the balance o f pow er.13 Redmond could jo in  with the conservatives to
overthrow the government but once again joined with the liberal party. This was done
after Redmond got assurances o f  Herbert H. Asquith that home rule would be top o f  the
governments agenda. What convinced Redmond in his decision was the determination o f
Asquith to curb the power o f  the House o f  Lords and end their power to veto bills. This
Parliament Act o f 1911 was crucial to the cause o f home rule as the House o f Lords could
no longer veto home rule but could only delay its passage for two years. The third home
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rule bill was finally introduced by Asquith on 11 April 1912. It now seemed as if home 
rule was virtually assured and all the House o f Lords could do was was delay it coming 
into law until 1914.
It was at this stage that Ulster Unionists made a concerted effort to act 
against home rule. Unionists had always been opposed to home rule for a number o f very 
important reasons but now it seemed as if  home rule would become a reality. Unionists 
feared that as a minority under a Dublin government they would be oppressed. They 
especially feared that a Dublin government would merely be a puppet o f the catholic 
hierarchy. This belief was summed up in the slogan 'home rule is Rome rule'. Unionists 
also feared the economic reprecussions o f  coming under a protectionist Irish government.
Under the leadership o f  Sir Edward Carson Ulster unionists formed a 
cohesive force willing to fight home rule by whatever means necessary. In September 
1911a huge meeting o f the Ulster U nionist Council was held and 'four hundred delegates 
unanimously agreed upon a policy to resist the establishment o f a home rule parliament, 
and appointed a committee to subm it a constitution for a provisional government to 
operate when the third home rule bill passed through parliam ent.'14 Tension was now rife 
in Belfast and this was m anifested in a number o f sectarian attacks. Catholics were 
expelled from the ship yards. As civil disorder became more and more likely Ulster 
unionists decided on a show o f force to illustrate to the government that they were totally 
opposed to home rule. This show o f foce took the form o f the Solemn League and 
Covenant. The twenty eight o f  September, Covenant day, was declared a public holiday. 
The Solemn League and Covenant was signed by three quarters o f all protestant 
Ulstermen over the age o f sixteen, a total o f nearly 250,000 signatories.15 More than
5,000 Monaghan protestants and a similar number o f Cavan protestants signed the 
Solemn League and C ovenant.16
To show their determ ination and willingness to resist home rule an active
army would be needed to defend Ulster if  home rule was imposed. In January 1912 plans
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were afoot for such a force and 'some U lster unionists had begun openly to raise and drill 
a military force, keeping within the letter o f the law' by applying for and obtaining the 
sanction o f local m agistrates.17 In late 1912 these different units were brought together to 
form a united front against home rule and on 31 January 1913 the Ulster Volunteers were 
formed under the leadership o f Sir George Richardson.
It was now clear at a parliamentary level that some from o f compromise 
would need to be formulated if home rule were to be peacefully passed in Ireland. It also 
became increasingly clear that any com prom ise would take the form o f some form o f 
exclusion o f certain parts o f north east U lster from the Home Rule Bill. An amendment 
was first moved by a liberal backbencher. Agar Robartes. that the four mainly protestant 
counties o f Antrim, Down, Derry and Armagh should be excluded from the Home Rule 
Bill. This move was backed by some unionist M .P.’s but Redmond was totally opposed to 
this move. Carson however stated that he would not consider giving up Fermanagh and 
Tyrone. Despite this the first tentative steps towards a compromise had been taken.
The home rule bill introduced in April 1912 passed its third reading in the 
Comm ons on 16 January 1913 but as expected was rejected by the House o f Lords.18 By 
1914 however it was clear that home rule was on its way. At this stage Ulster was on the 
brink o f  civil war. In September 1913 the Ulster Unionist Council announced publicly its 
plans for the formation o f a new government in Ulster if home rule was passed.19 
Another ominous sign o f the looming crisis in Ireland was seen in the setting up o f the 
Irish volunteers on 25 November with Eoin Mac Neill as president. What was most 
sinister about this development was the infiltration into the provisional committee o f the 
volunteers by members o f the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Padraig Perase. The 
I.R.B. were a direct link with the fenian movement of the nineteenth century and had 
already advocated direct action against British rule. Pearse was also a known extremist 
who admired the idea o f a glorious blood sacrifice to gain Irish freedom.
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At the start o f 1914 it was clear that a critical point had been reached in 
Irish history and partition now appeared to be the only practical solution o f the problem. 
It became increasingly clear that the counties o f Cavan and Monaghan, along with 
Donegal would become the focus o f attention over what area was to be excluded.
The area o f Cavan and Monaghan was particularly tense as unionists and 
nationalists squared up to each other over the forthcoming home rule bill. People on both 
sides o f the religious divide were anxious about the area to be excluded. Unionists in both 
counties were adamant that they should be included in the excluded area. The Dublin 
Castle Intelligence Notes for the year report that there was increasing unrest in both 
counties due to the political situation. The Ulster Volunteers set up a camp on the estate 
o f the leading figure in Cavan unionism, Lord Farnham.20 This camp was seen as a 
training ground for volunteers ' who have been nominated as likely to become efficent as 
non com m issioned officers'.21 Dublin castle recorded a number o f incidents which 
heightened tensions. In January an attempt was made to ambush Lord Farnham by 
blaocking the road he was travelling on his return from a drill o f the Ulster Volunteers.22 
In February and March the national volunteer movement was started in the region. By 
May the National Volunteers had grown rapidly and numbered 2,279 in M onaghan and
2.000 strong in Cavan, and with 3,000 Ulster Volunteers in Cavan alone at this time the 
high level o f tensions in the area is vividly illustrated.23 Numerous rallies were held by- 
unionists throughout both counties to reiterate their opposition to home rule. Unionist 
leaders stated their total opposition to being left out o f any excluded area. One example o f 
such is the following resolution passed at the annual general meeting o f Monaghan 
Unionist Club on 16 February 1914.
We the members o f M onaghan Unionist Club... desire to 
make it plain to the government that no suggestion of 
settlement which does not provide for the total exclusion of 
Ulster will be accepted by us, and that we are still 
determined to remain true to our covenant, and if necessary
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to go to the greatest extremes to carry out its provisions and 
the protection o f  our civil and religious liberties.24
Nationalists were in no mood for conciliation and were fearful for the 
future o f the area if it was to be included in a partitioned nine county Ulster. The clearest 
statement o f  nationalist opposition in the two counties to inclusion in a partioned Ulster 
was published in the Anglo Celt. This paper reacted violently to the idea o f  Cavan and 
Monaghan being included under an Ulster parliament.
within a week the rest o f Ulster would call upon the 
counties o f  Ireland to aid them in starving out Belfast. In 
the first place county meetings would be called at which a 
solemn covenant would be entered into that no goods were 
to be purchased in the local shops that dealt with the north 
east corner. Traders would exhibit in their shop windows a 
recognised sign that no goods from the obnxoious quarter 
were sold there. Here at a comparitively small expense you 
would hold up the north o f Ireland. There is one thing that 
all parties rest assured o f  - that if the pace is forced it will 
be war to a finish to kill the trade o f the north east.25
It is clear from this that tension was high and feelings were running very high in the area. 
Neither party were in any mood to compromise and the threat o f 'war to a finish' was to be 
heard at many rallies throughout the area in the early months o f 1914. There was a great 
deal o f  uncertainty about the future but although tensions were running extremely high 
both areas were quite peaceful and the prevailing tension did not cause any open physical 
hostilities between the rival parties.
A lthough it had become increasingly obvious to Asquith and the 
government that some form o f exclusion would have to be put forward as a compromise 
to placate unionists. Asquith waited until the Home Rule Bill was before parliament in 
March 1914 before suggesting an amendment to the bill after pressure from the
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conservative and unionist opposition in Westminster. In his speech in the house o f 
commons on 9 March on the third reading o f the home rule bill. Asquith put forward the 
following proposal.
Between the date o f the passage o f the home rule bill and the 
actual setting up o f the Dublin parliament, each o f the 
counties o f Ulster (including the county boroughs) may vote 
upon the question o f exclusion for a period of six years, and 
any self excluded county, at the end o f that period, may only 
be forced to come within the administration o f the Dublin 
parliament with the consent o f the electoral o f the United 
Kingdom.26
He added that in the course o f the six years o f exclusion at least two general elections
would be held. 'Asquith made it clear that the cabinet had investigated every other
possible proposal for a settlement o f  the Irish question, ultimately deciding upon the
course they have chosen to pursue simply because they believed that, even if it fails to
provide a lasting settlement, it will afford a garuntee against civil turm oil.'27 The leader o f
the opposition Andrew Bonar Law refused to accept these proposals unless exclusion was
provided for all o f Ulster. Carson refused to consider the am mendment while there was a
time limit attached to exclusion. He would not accept 'a sentence o f  death with stay o f
execution for six years.'28 This rejection prompted the Ulster volunteers and the U.U.C
into threats o f  action and statements o f  their readiness to defend 'the rights o f  Ulster'. At
this point the government resolved on a policy o f getting tough with the unionists.
Although there was no attempts to supress the volunteers or arrest any leaders, orders
were given to the army to strengthen the position o f the crown forces in U lster.29
This move had disastrous consequences and talk in the press abounded o f
the 'Curragh mutiny'. There was no mutiny as such as at no time did any o f the army
officers refuse to obey orders. W hat did happen was that orders were confused and a
num ber o f misunderstandings occured between the war office and General Paget, the
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commander in chief in Ireland. The war office was aware that it would be impossible to 
force the army, which was known to have strong unionist sympathies, to move against the 
volunteers. T he  army authority decided that officers whose homes were in Ulster need 
not be involved in any measure which might result in their fighting friends and relatives, 
but that they would be allowed to 'disappear' for the course o f any operations.'30 Paget 
however gave these instructions misleadingly and implied that those who could not claim 
Ulster residence had a choice between obeying an order to move against Ulster or else be 
dismissed.
The crisis was eventually difused and the misunderstandings were cleared 
up but the incident had two important and far reaching reprecussions. Firstly it indicated 
to both the British government and to unionists the sympathies o f the army for Ulster. 
Secondly it seemed to confirm  nationalist feeling that the unionists or army could not be 
trusted. Nationalists in Cavan and M onaghan saw this as a sinister last attempt by Carson 
to avert home rule.
Every move to impede the passage o f the Home Rule Bill 
has ended in failure for the unionists, the last attempt 
proving the most appalingly disastrous o f all. It was nothing 
else than enlisting the assistance o f the officers o f the 
British army in the political campaign with which 
Carsonism is identified.31
Nationalists in the region were still confident o f the passing o f home rule 
while unionists in the region were prepared to fight to the last to defend the union. A 
problem for the volunteers up to this point was a lack o f arms and ammunition but with 
the Larne gun running in April 1914 the volunteers brought in about 25,000 firearms and 
three million rounds o f am m unition.32 Rifles were widely distributed in north Monaghan 
in Clones, Newbliss, Scotshouse, Smithborough and Drum and in Cootehill and Redhills
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in County Cavan. The rifles were brought in by motor car from Armagh.33 The volunteers 
were now a well armed force and now constituted a considerable challenge to the 
government.
The third reading o f  the home rule bill was passed by a majority o f  77 in 
the Commons on 26 May 1914. The ammending bill allowing for each county o f  Ulster 
to vote themselves out o f the home rule bill for six years was introduced into the House 
o f Lords on 23 June 1914. The lords returned the bill with the ammendment changed to 
an exclusion o f all nine counties o f U lster from home rule permanently. This was o f 
course unacceptable to Redmond but at least there was room for negotiation. Carson had 
as it were stated his minimum terms for negotiation. It is important to remember that the 
House o f Lords contained a conservative and unionist majority and therefore Carson had 
a lot o f influence. With the view prevailing that any compromise would be based on 
partition Asquith agreed to a conference on the issue between the main political leaders.
In the House o f Comm ons on 20 July instead o f proceeding with the 
second reading o f the Government o f Ireland Ammendment Bill, Asqutih announced to 
the Commons th a t ' in view if  the grave situation which had arisen the King had thought it 
right to summon representatives o f parties, both British and Irish, to a conference at 
Buckingham Palace, with the object o f discussing the outstanding points in relation to the 
problem o f Irish government.'34 Despite the best efforts of the King no progress was 
made at the conference. Almost immediately the conference floundered as the parties 
could not agree on procedure, what was to be discussed, what area was to be excluded, or 
the time limit o f any such exclusion. It was very difficult to expect agreement at this 
conference as both Carson and Redm ond were under enormous pressure from their 
followers. Carson was demanding a clean cut of Ulster permanently, as unionists in 
Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal demanded exclusion from home rule. Redmond had little 
room to manoeuvre and could only accept exclusion by county option.35
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While the conference was in sitting the country was on the brink o f  civil 
war and Cavan and Monaghan were no exception. At the time o f the conference in Cavan 
the Ulster Volunteers were reported to be 3,461 strong and the National Volunteers 6,366. 
In Monaghan the Ulster Volunteers had 2,188 members in two batallions and the 
National Volunteer's membership was 5 ,019.36 Both sides participated in numerous 
parades, mobilizations and shows o f force but no confrontations occured between the 
rival factions.
With this backdrop it was perhaps inevitable that the conference would be 
a failure and after three days the conference broke down. The following statement was
issued to the press to explain the failure o f  the conference.
The conference held meetings on the 21, 22, 23 and 24 July 
respectively. The possibility o f defining an area to be 
excluded from the Government o f Ireland Bill was 
considered. The conference being unable to agree either in 
principle or in detail upon such an area brought its meetings 
to a conclusion.37
The height o f  the crisis had now been reached. Parliament was due to end its session in 
August and home rule would have to be dealt with definitely by then. 'Asquith decided on 
a final compromise. He would repeat his offer o f county option but allow for continued 
exclusion after the end o f the six year period.38
Outside events however dispersed the crisis when the first world war 
broke out on 4 August 1914. The outbreak o f war had a number o f effects on the crisis.
The foremost o f these was the fact that the war unified all the parties as a united national 
front had to be presented to ensure a successful war effort. Both British parliamentary 
parties called a truce and both Carson and Redmond gave full support to the government. 
They also pledged the support o f the respective volunteers to the war effort. Asquith 
seemed only too relieved and delighted to take the opportunity to shelve the Irish problem
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but extensive lobbying from both Redmond and Carson ensured that this would not be 
possible. The home rule bill was enacted in September 1914 and on the following day 
Asquith introduced an amending bill with the provision that the home rule bill would not 
become law until the war was over and special provision had been made for Ulster.
The outbreak o f war allowed for home rule to be passed and thus satisfy 
Redmond and the nationalists. The amending bill went some way towards placating 
Carson and the Ulster unionists. Both parties now tried to outdo each other by showing 
loyalty to the King by aiding the effort. Little outward signs o f celebration were seen in 
counties Cavan and M onaghan where the war had managed to relieve political tension. 
'Much o f the bitterness existing between unionists and nationalists was obliterated and all 
danger o f collision between the rival parties disappeared.'39 There was some celebrating 
and rejoicing at the placing o f home rule on the statute books but the occassion was seen 
by many to be an anticlimax due to the fact that home rule would not come into operation 
until the conclusion o f the war.
The im portance o f the first world war and its effect on the subsequent 
course o f Irish history cannot be overestimated. Although Ireland played no direct role in 
the war it changed Irish history in a number o f  far reaching ways. A t the outbreak o f war 
home rule was put on hold and this worked to the advantage o f Asquith and the British 
government. The war diffused the issue o f home rule and had the immediate impact of 
uniting all parties in the Commons for the war effort. Redmond had much reason to be 
content. He had just won for Ireland what Butt and Parnell before him had failed to 
achieve. Home rule was now on the statute books and would be implemented upon the 
cessation o f  hostilities in Europe. Carson too could be satisfied after winning from 
Asquith a special provision for Ulster in any settlement. Asquith and his government 
could now justifiably turn their attention from negotiations on Ulster and focus on the 
more pressing matter o f European war.
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It can be argued that the war initially had a calming influence on the 
partition question. It had helped to diffuse tensions and had taken Ireland from the brink 
o f civil war. It was also hoped that war would unite Irishmen in a common struggle. This 
was Redmond's great hope and he offered 'full Irish support for the war effort, and 
suggested that all troops be withdrawn for active service leaving Ireland to be guarded by 
the volunteers, north and south'.40 The war also had a positive effect on the Irish 
economy, 'there was soon plenty o f money in circulation, and the farmers had never been 
so prosperous. Nationalist Ireland as a whole seemed quite happy to wait for peace to 
bring home rule, and in the meantime to enjoy the profits o f war.'41
In both Cavan and M onaghan the outbreak o f war also had a positive 
effect in drawing the region back from the brink o f civil unrest. As reported in the 
Intelligence Notes for the year 1914, 'on the outbreak o f war the political tension was at 
once relieved.' and 'much o f  the bitterness existing between unionists and nationalists was 
obliterated and all danger o f collosion between the rival parties disappeared.'42 Both 
volunteeer forces scaled activities down considerably and the tensions which had 
accumulated in the previous months had now been diffused.43 All would change shortly 
however. The initial benefits which can be attributed to the war were soon overshadowed 
by the changes afoot in all realms o f Irish political thought. The lull brought about by the 
war created a void which was soon filled by the growth o f a revolutionary nationalistic 
and republican movement. To quote W.B. Yeats soon everything had changed, 'changed 
utterly', and Ireland was once again on the brink o f revolution.44
The start o f  the first world war marks a significant turning point in the
struggle for home rule. Until 1914 the struggle for home rule was focused on the
constitutional and parliamentary methods o f the Irish party. This process had reached its
climax at the outset o f war. Redmond seemed lost in the political lull which followed the
outbreak o f war. His party had no issues to fight and therefore lost its raison d'etre. 'In
mid 1915 Redmond told Asquith that since the outbreak o f war he had not made one
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political speech in Ireland.'45 Redmond was becoming increasingly alienated from the 
opinions o f the masses o f  Irish people who grew impatient with the lack o f results o f the 
parliamentary party. He did not help him self with his policy o f supporting the British war 
effort. Redmond grieviously miscalculated the feelings o f the majority o f  Irish people. He 
dug his own political grave with his speeches calling for Irish recruits for the British war 
effort. The most disastrous o f  the recruitment drives occured at W oodenbridge, Co. 
Wicklow on 20 September 1914, when according to Foster 'here he pledged the Irish 
volunteers to support the war effort wherever needed, rather than defending Ireland 
alongside their northern brethern, they were to be consigned to Flanders as British canon 
fodder.'46
It was this speech that led to the splitting o f the volunteers. Those w'ho 
wished to remain with Redmond became known as the 'National Volunteers'. They 
compromised a majority o f 150,000. Although in the minority those volunteers who split 
from Redmond , numbering between 3,000 and 10,000 soon became the focus o f 
revolutionary change in Ireland. Led by Eoin Mac Neill these Irish volunteers quickly 
aligned with the republican ideas o f Sinn Fein. The volunteer ranks were soon infiltrated 
with the radical and revolutionary ideas o f Padraig Pearse and the I.R.B. It was this group 
that organised the rising o f Easter 1916, which precipitated the ultimate collapse o f the 
Irish parliamentary party and confirmed the superiority o f Sinn Fein among the Irish 
electorate.
The outbreak o f war also facilitated a major change in British political
circles. The liberals who were traditional allies o f Irish causes suffered a major downturn
in fortunes. The conservative party on the other hand went from strength to strength in
the coalition government formed after the collapse o f the liberal government in May
1915. After the elections o f December 1916 and December 1918 the conservatives
'became first the senior and then the dominant force in the government.'47 Irish
nationalists had now lost their main ally in the House o f Commons. After the general
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election o f November 1918 owing to the abstentionist policy o f Sinn Fein Irish 
nationalists had no voice in Westminster.
It was the U lster unionists who benefitted from the changes in both the 
Irish and British balance o f  power. The conservative party, long seen as the friends of 
Ulster emerged from the war as the strongest party in the House o f Commons. The fact 
that Sinn Fein refused to take its seats in the House o f Commons meant that the Unionists 
were the only Irish party present in W estminster. Thus it was the views o f Carson and 
Craig which shaped government policy towards Ireland in the aftermath o f the war. The 
war at a national level at any rate was kind to unionists who won many allies after their 
'supreme sacrifice' at the Somme. They were the sole Irish voice influencing the shaping 
o f  government policy in W estminster after the general election o f 1918.
This however was not the case for unionists in the Cavan - Monaghan 
region in the period during and immediately following the great war. The monumental 
work on unionism in county M onaghan undertaken by Terence Dooley clearly illustrates 
the decline o f the unionist ascendancy in county Monaghan as a direct result o f the war.48 
World war I had stripped unionism in the region af many o f its leaders. The 'big houses' 
or homes o f the gentry were emptied o f  many o f the men o f fighting age who had 
traditionally shown the necessary leadership qualities in organising local unionist clubs 
and the Ulster volunteers. Even those who remained at home concentrated on the war 
effort to the exclusion o f unionist activities.49 The inability o f the leaders o f  unionism in 
Cavan and Monaghan, notably M.E. Knight and Lord Farnham, to have the area included 
in excluded Ulster had a detrimental effect on unionism in the region.50
The change afoot in Ireland from the outbreak o f the first world war
manifested itself in the Easter rising o f 1916. The rising was not a rising of the masses but
instead organised by extremists such as Padraig Pearse. The proclamation o f the Irish
Republic read by Pearse and his comrades from the steps o f the G.P.O. on Easter Monday
1916 was met by at most curiosity on the parts o f the people o f Dublin. The rising was
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almost exclusively Dublin based and was quickly suppressed by the military. The rising 
was planned by fanatics from the I.R.B. and had little support among the people ot the 
country. It was the response o f  the British government to the rising that made the rising 
into a celebration o f  Irish martyrdom. The reaction o f  the British government to the 
perpertrators of the insurrection, against the judgement of their advisors, such as Bernard 
Shaw, can be traced back to the wartime policy they took on Irish affairs.
The major player in British rule over Ireland was the chief secretary 
Augustine Birell, a man widely regarded as incompetent in his duties.51 He did not take a 
great deal of interest in Irish affairs at Westminster. As chief secretary in wartime Ireland 
he was happy to maintain a policy o f  laissez faire  towards the Irish situation and 
especially the growth o f  Sinn Fein, He seemed oblivious to the menace posed by the
I.R.B. leaders who were planning the rising. This is despite the fact that it is widely 
recognised that the British authorities, through their vast network of infiltrators, had 
ample knowledge o f  the plans being laid for an insurrection. He gravely underestimated 
the strength of the volunteer movement and believed that it would be folly to try to 
supress the volunteers. Birrell resigned shortly after the rising and the British authorities 
were determined to bring tougher control to Ireland. The war however was at a critical 
juncture and Britain could not focus its attention on Irish problems. The cabinet made the 
fatal mistake o f  passing control o f  the country to the military. Martial law had been 
proclaimed at the outbreak o f  the rising, and the captured rebel leaders were tried by court 
martial between 3 May and 12 May. Fifteen including all the signatories o f  the republican 
proclamation were executed.52
Public opinion in Ireland was outraged and the leaders o f  the rising who
upon their arrest had been jeered by Irish people now became national heroes. The rising
thus became the final nail in the Irish Parliamentary Party's coffin as Sinn Fein became
the party of the masses. In one fatal error of judgement the British cabinet had
transformed the Irish political scene. People were stirred from their political slumber as
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the masses backed Sinn Fein. Another British political blunder confirmed the mass appeal 
o f  Sinn Fein, after efforts to enforce conscription in Ireland. The elections o f  November 
1918 which Sinn Fein fought on an anti-conscription manifesto confirmed their position 
as the only significant political voice in post war Ireland.
The Easter rising had the effect o f  refocusing attention on the Irish 
question which had been put on hold at the outbreak of war in 1914. Asquith undertook a 
brief tour o f  Ireland to assess the situation and when he returned from his trip, he 
informed the House of Commons in a speech on May 11 that.
The government has come to the conclusion that the system 
under which Ireland has been governed has completely 
broken down. The only satisfactory alternative, in their 
judgement, is the creation at the earliest possible moment, 
o f  an Irish government responsible to the Irish people.53
It was of vital significance to Asquith and the government that the Irish question was 
satisfactorily dealt with as American opinion needed to be appeased. Britain was waiting 
for America to enter the war and therefore needed to quickly address the Irish question, in 
order to appease the considerable Irish - American lobby in Washington. At first the signs 
were encouraging as by the end o f  May Asquith had selected Lloyd George as the man to 
bring together the two Irish parties. All sides were willing to negotiate and Britain was 
now eager to bring about a lasting solution and Lloyd George seemed the most likely man 
to do this. Redmond was desperate to gain some immediate results and was encouraged 
by signs that the government were willing to grant immediate home rule for Ireland. 
Carson believed that the disloyalty shown by the insurgents o f  Easter week could only 
mean a more favourable settlement for Ulster.
A veteran o f  the Buckingham palace conference Lloyd George decided on 
a new approach to negotiations between the two sides. Lloyd George at no time brought 
the two parties together in a round table discussion. Instead he met the rival leaders,
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Redmond and Carson, individually pressing on them the need for an urgent solution to 
the problem. Lloyd George's solution was destined to failure as he made vastly different 
promises to Redmond and Carson. He led Redmond to believe that any exclusion would 
be a temporary measure which would be concluded on the ending of the war. Carson 
however had a written agreement with Lloyd George that Ulster would not 'whether she 
wills it or not, merge in the rest o f  Ireland.'54
What is crucial in regard to these proposals was not the insurmountable 
problem of  the duration a f  any exclusion. What is however of vital significance is that 
Lloyd George got both parties to agree on the area o f  exclusion. This was a significant 
victory for Cason as he had won by these negotiations that which in 1914 he had been 
prepared to go to war over. Carson had long preferred a six county Ulster as it would 
contain a safer majority o f  unionists as opposed to a nine county Ulster which could only 
guarantee a slight unionist majority. On 6 June Carson put these proposals before the 
U.U.C. which unanimously accepted these proposals. It was a hard decision for the 
council to make to abandon their fellow unionists in Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan. 
After much soul searching and anguish unionists members from these three counties 
stated that 'if the unionists o f  the six north eastern counties considered the safety o f  the 
empire to be dependant on the continuance o f  the negotiations proposed by the 
government, then they would abide by their decision.'55 Carson was delighted with this 
and 'he believed that they would find in the long run that they had established themselves 
in an impregnable position, and through the sacrifice o f  the three counties led by Lord 
Farnham would have attained a position o f  which no man need feel ashamed.'56
While Carson had marked the area which he would fight for and could
now feel justified in celebrating his achievement these negotiations were a disaster for
Redmond. Redmond in sheer desperation for his political career was willing to sacrifice
nationalists in Derry City, Tyrone and Fermanagh in order to gain immediate home rule.
Already losing popularity among the Irish people he had difficulty convincing his own
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parly o f  the benefit o f  accepting Lloyd George's proposals. He was also facing a backlash 
from the press and the general public as well as northern nationalists and even more 
worryingly for Redmond, the catholic church. 'Cardinal Logue declared it would be better 
remain under English rule for fifty years to come than to accept the Lloyd George 
scheme.'57
Local nationalist opinion in Cavan and Monaghan voiced through the 
newspapers was suspicious o f  the moves being made between Redmond and Lloyd 
George from an early stage. The Anglo Celt at an early stage in negotiations believed that 
it was 'inconceivable that Mr. Lloyd George will not keep at the business in hand until 
there is some arrangement arrived at, without including any portion o f  the conscription 
programme which he has aided in such a prominent manner to have extended to 
England.'58 However even at this point nationalists in the area believed that any excluded 
area would only include the four north eastern counties. The proposals accepted by 
Redmond were seen in no uncertain terms by nationalists in the region as 'merely a 
repetition o f  the well known demands o f  the covenanters o f  the north east of Ulster and 
not at all the statesmanlike effort which we were led to expect.'59
Redmond did eventually secure acceptance of Lloyd George proposals by 
a margin of 475 votes to 265 at a conference of nationalists in Belfast on 23 June 1916. 
Agreement on the surface at any rate was reached thanks to Lloyd George's skilful 
manoevures and negotiations. The proposals were never implemented as when it came to 
light that Lloyd George had offered vastly differing terms to both parties the agreements 
were repudiated. The negotiations do however mark a significant turning point in the 
history o f  partition. Redmond, to the further detriment o f  his reputation had agreed on a 
six county excluded area. Lloyd George had brought the parties together on this point and 
Carson had got this passed by the U.U.C.. He was now free to wash his hands of the three 
counties of Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal.
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Nationalists in the region were relieved that negotiations had broken
down. Cavan Urban Council passed a resolution in early July demanding an all Ireland
conference 'before they vote or commit the Irish people to an expidency measure, which 
might have most damaging results on the future permanent government o f  the country.'60 
There was much genuine concern in the border region among the various local 
representative bodies about the future o f  Cavan and Monaghan following partition.
Take it from us, representing the people in the Gap of the 
North, that there is no one, unionist or nationalist in favour 
of a division of Ireland...61
The question seemed to him to be, were the Ulster
nationalists in favour o f  the proposals o f  Lloyd George but
people in Cavan were not consulted, although they had 
believed that they were living in Ulster. Where were they 
now?
Chairman - In No-man's land...62
The terminology used in reference to the future of the region following parttion vividly 
conveys the concerns held by nationalists as well as unionists about the future of the area.
The failure o f  these negotiations to find a solution to the Irish question 
forced Lloyd George to take another approach to the problem. Lloyd George had become 
British prime minister in December 1916 and still needed to deal with the Irish Question. 
He still had to appease and conciliate Irish - American feeling in the Unites States, which 
was an ally o f  Britiain in the war effort. The approach taken by Lloyd George was to 
convene an Irish Convention of the Irish parliamentary party, southern unionists and the 
Ulster Unionist party. Sinn Fein which was by now far and way the dominant party in 
Irish political life, boycotted the convention. The convention because of this fatal flaw 
was doomed to failure. It was also doomed as Ulster unionists had no real interest in 
negotiating the position they had won following the discussions o f  1916.
29
The convention met at Trinity College Dublin from 25 July 1917 until
March 1918 but had virtually no historical impact. To quote R.B. Me Dowell 'The
convention which met in 1917 was one o f  the most striking failures in Irish history.
Indeed if the intellectual calibre o f  many o f  its members is taken into account, it may
reasonably be called a brilliant failure.'61 The conventions report was made on 5 April
1918 but had no practical function. It was soon forgotten as a new crisis was to break in
Ireland, with the introduction o f  a Military Service Bill with a clause extending
conscription to Ireland.
It was this crisis over conscription that finally confirmed the death o f  the
Irish parliamentary party, now led by John Dillon after the death of Redmond in March
1918. The crisis was another victory for Sinn Fein, 'It provided the final legitimisation of
Sinn Fein as a national political party, and the culmination of the wartime governments
record of disastrous Irish decisions.' 64
Even while the Irish Convention was in session public attention was firmly
focused on Sinn Fein as Arthur Griffith stood aside to let de Valera become leader of
Sinn Fein. At the Ard Fheis o f  October 1917 Sinn Fein clearly stated their policies. The
first o f  these was abstention from Westminster, their second being to have Ireland
recognised as an independent republic based on democratic principles. The Irish
volunteers were also growing in numbers as new recruits flooded in. The steady build up
of  support for Sinn Fein was converted into an avalanche o f  support.
The Military Service Bill which envisaged conscription for Ireland was
introduced on 9 April 1918 in the House o f  Commons. It was introduced to compensate
for the appalling losses suffered by the allied forces on the western front in March 1918.
Since virtually the first month o f  the war there was a stalemate on the western front. The
Germans had however made a major breakthrough in March 1918 pushing the allies back
a considerable distance. The allies were now suffering appalling losses and desperately
needed new recruits for the front. Lloyd George amongst others warned against the
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introduction o f  the bill due to the effect it would have in Ireland and the controversy it 
would arouse. All these arguments were put aside as the cabinet grew more desperate for 
Irish recruits. The Military Service Bill became law on 18 April 1918. again illustrating 
the powerlessness o f  the Irish nationalists in Westminster.
Nationalist Ireland was united in indignation against the act. The Irish 
party followed the policy o f  Sinn Fein and withdrew from Westminster in protest against 
conscription. A convention was called in the mansion house by the lord mayor of Dublin, 
which stated that the proposal was 'a declaration of war on the Irish nation.'65 The 
catholic bishops condemned the attempts to bring conscription 'by all means that are 
consonant with the laws o f  God.'66 A one day strike was held on 23 April 1918 to show 
opposition to the bill. The pledge which was approved by Sinn Fein was signed by 
hundreds o f  thousand Irish people outside the church gates after Sunday mass. The 
support o f  the catholic hierarchy for Sinn Fein was crucial in the parties rise in public 
opinion. Irish political persuasion could still be controlled from the pulpit. It was 
therefore a massive boost for Sinn Fein to be seen to be working in tandem with the 
catholic bishops. Flowever the role o f  the church in the conscription crisis also had the 
effect of furthering the distance between north and south. One could sympathise with the 
unionist viewpoint that 'home rule was Rome rule.'
The British government was surprised and alarmed by the united 
opposition it encountered and abandoned the idea of forcing conscription on Ireland. The 
British administration in Dublin Castle were determined to act against Sinn Fein and the 
volunteers. The castle invented a 'German plot' as pretext for arresting republican leaders. 
Among the chief figures to be arrested were de Valera. Griffith as well as Ernest Blythe, a 
future T.D. for north Monaghan. This plot also backfired on the British administration 
and in June Arthur Griffith won a by-election in East Cavan. This was after Sinn Fein, the 
volunteers, the Gaelic League and Cumann na mBan were declared illegal.
31
The war finally ended in allied victory in November 1918 and parliament 
was dissolved on 25 December 1918. The general election o f  December 1918 was a 
resounding endorsement o f  Sinn Fein policies as they won seventy three seats while the 
Irish pary only won six. As expected the Unionist party swept the board in Ulster. 
Partition o f  the country was thus confirmed. The intervention o f  Cardinal Logue to secure 
an election pact between Sinn Fein and the Irish party to not oppose each other in 
nationalist areas o f  Ulster seemed to confirm unionist suspicions o f  a Vatican led plot 
against Ulster. In Cavan both constituencies returned Sinn Feiners unopposed, Peter Paul 
Galligan in west Cavan and in east Cavan Arthur Griffith.65 Monaghan also returned two 
Sinn Feiners, Ernest Blythe with a convincing majority of 2,245 votes won the seat for 
north Monaghan over M.E. Knight, the unionist candidate. In south Monaghan Sean Mac 
Entee also won a convincing majority of 3,111 votes over the Irish parliamentary party 
candidate, Thomas Campbell.66
The Sinn Fein policy o f  abstention from Westminster led to the party 
setting up their own parliament, Dail Eireann, in January 1919. This was to mark a 
violent and bloody period o f  Irish history and nowhere was this more deeply felt than in 
Cavan and Monaghan. This period was to leave a deep scar on the region for many years 
to come and will be illustrated in chapter two.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE IMPOSITION OF PARTITION AND SECTARIAN 
WARFARE, 1919-1921.
The political importance o f  the period 1919-1921 which is examined in 
this chapter is immesurable. It was without doubt the most important and significant 
period in the history o f  Cavan and Monaghan. On the political stage it was the period 
which saw the final imposition o f  the partition settlement and the creation o f  a border in 
the region. This period also witnessed the first ramifications o f  partition which were 
manifest in the outbreak o f  sectarian violence and hostilities in the region. Its implications 
were to be far reaching and profound. The attacks on unionists and the crow'n forces by 
the I.R.A from 1920 seemed to confirm all the deep seated unionists fears o f  living under 
a Dublin parliament. It was a disastrous period for all those living in Cavan and 
Mongahan. The imposition o f  the border led to violence and hostility as the region 
became embroiled in border warfare between the I.R.A operating on the Free State side 
and the U.V.F. and specials on the six county side.
Secondary sources on the period o f  sectarian violence in the Cavan - 
Monaghan region are extremely sparse. Nothing at all has been written about the Cavan 
region during this period. For Monaghan two works in particular provide good 
background material for the period. The first o f  these was published by the Clogher 
Historical Society entitled The war o f  Independence in Monaghan. This work uses good 
primary sources, including recollections of those involved in the I.R.A. during the period 
1919 - 1921.1 Edward Micheau’s article entitled Sectarian Conflict in Monaghan is also a 
good study o f  life in Monaghan during this period.- The work of Terence Dooley is also 
extremely useful.3
Secondary sources for events on the national scale are more widespread.
Works on the crisis within unionism and the decision to accept a six county northern
parliament include the work o f  Jonathon Bardon and Patrick Buckland.4 The work of
Patrick Buckland in particular is indispensible for the crisis within the U.U.C. and the
decision to accept a six county state. The final imposition o f  the partition settlement has
been examined by numerous historians. The best and most reliable accounts however are
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given by Michael Laffan and David Fitzpatrick.5 Primary sources on the period for the 
Cavan - Monaghan region are abundant. Again the local newspapers are indispensible. 
The information found in the local papers is supplemented by the Dublin Castle Colonial 
Office records.6 These records give a month by month account o f  the state o f  each 
county.
This period is bewildering and confusing in many aspects as a number of 
different processes occur in conjunction. Political direction came from either Dublin or 
Westminster depending on political affiliation, although at most stages no direction came 
from either government. In the period under examination two police forces and judicial 
systems were in operation. It was therefore an immensely complex period. This chapter 
draws a vivid picture o f  the intimidation, fear and desperation felt by both catholics and 
protestants in the region.
The first period which is examined is the period 1919 - 1920 when the 
region witnessed little overt violence between nationalist and unionist camps as both were 
deeply divided internally. Despite the impression conveyed by the results o f  the 1918 
general election, in which Sinn Fein won all four seats in each county, Sinn Fein did not 
have the full support of nationalists in the Cavan - Monaghan region. Unionism was also 
suffering from divisions as it became increasingly obvious that the unionists o f  Cavan and 
Monaghan would be cast adrift from any northern state.
The decision o f  Sinn Fein to set up Dail Eireann, a parliament for Ireland, 
in the Mansion house on 21 January 1919 did not meet with universal approval among 
nationalists in the area. The Dundalk Democrat which was to become the political organ 
for the Nationalist party denounced the setting up of the Dail : 'No practical man believes 
in the possibility o f  anything but trouble resulting from an attempt to set up a parliament 
in Ireland without the authority o f  a majority of the Irish peop le / '  Supporters o f  the old 
Nationalist party in the region were very bitter about the victory o f  Sinn Fein. In a speech
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made to supporters o f  the Nationalist party in Carrickmacross, made by T.J. Campbell, 
the tension which was building in nationalist ranks is vividly protrayed.
At the next election south Monaghan [will] wipe the slate 
clean o f  the policy o f  Sinn Fein. The Nationalists of 
Monaghan had fought as they never fought before, but he 
had been beaten by a neglected register, by imported mobs, 
by misrepresentation and lying the most gross, and 
intimidation the most widespread. On the polling day the 
election in certain districts was the mockery o f  a free 
election. The new ascendancy with which the nationalists 
were threatened promised to be worse than the old 
ascendancy in its intolerance and persecution.8
Nationalists who were bitter about their alienation from political power 
quickly joined the ranks o f  the Ancient Order o f  Hibernians(A.O.H.) and the Gaelic 
League in large numbers. Tables one and two show the number o f  members in political 
associations in both Cavan and Monaghan in January 1919.
Both areas were relatively peaceful, according to the county inspector but 
one outrage reported in Monaghan illustrated the tensions brewing and internal conflict 
among nationalists. This was the breaking in to an A.O.H hall by a Sinn Feiner, damaging 
the building and a banner and removing some of the band instruments.9 Throughout the 
year demonstrations denouncing one another were held in the region as their was a 
palatable tension among nationalists. National leaders o f  high profile on both sides spoke 
in the region during 1919, reminding people of their duty to the cause. Arthur Griffith 
spoke in Cootehill in April, to a large crowd of Sinn Feiners.10 Over 5,000 people took 
part in a parade in Carrickmacross to mark the anniversary o f  Redmond's death .11 Two 
incidents in particular highlighted the growing tensions between Sinn Fein and the 
Nationalist party.The first o f  these occured in Gowna on 6 March when 'three men, two 
dressed as policemen and the third dressed as a soldier knocked at the door o f  the house
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o f  Thomas Me Kieman, J.P.. Govvna subdistrict, and when he opened the door, presented 
a paper purporting to be signed by the county inspector demanding arms.'1- According to 
the county inspector Me Kieman was a member of the A.O.H and was opposed to Sinn 
Fein.' Relations between the Ancient Order o f  Hibernians and Sinn Fein were particularly 
fraught in Castleblayney and came to a head on 15 August, when upon the return o f  the 
Nationalist band from a demonstration in Dundalk, it was attacked’ by a crowd o f  local 
Sinn Fein rowdies with stones.'13 'Stone throwing between the two parties continued for a 
considerable time, until eventually two police men came on the scene and succeeded in 
getting between the two sections. However the crowds again came in close contact and 
free fights took place, sticks and band instruments being freely used as weapons.' Sinn 
Feiners later attacked the A.O.H hall with stones and also attacked the houses o f  several 
prominent local nationalists.14
There was also divisions among unionists ranks, but these were o f  a 
different nature, as illustrated in the last chapter. Unionists in Cavan and Monaghan 
became increasingly aware that they would be excluded from any partitioned northern 
unionist state. They were in a weak and vulnerable position throughout 1919, but were at 
least spared from attack by Sinn Fein and the I.R.A., as they seemed content to fight it out 
with the Nationalist party and the A.O.H. This however was not to last indefinitely and 
from late 1919 an increasingly violent polarization of the two communities, unionist and 
nationalist, manifested itself. This brought an end to the relative peacefulness and lack o f  
tension between unionists and nationalists which had been evident from late 1918. A 
number of reasons can be put forward for the lack o f  sectarian tensions in the Cavan and 
Monaghan region for much o f  1919. Primary among these was the tensions among 
nationalist ranks examined above. Another crucial reason for the less hostile relationship 
between unionists and nationalists was the stalemate in political activity, as both Dublin 
and Westminster, for vastly different reasons awaited the outcome o f  the Versailles peace 
conference.
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Upon the opening of the first Dail in January 1919 and the outbreak o f  the 
War o f  Independence which commenced the same day. the Dail put all its faith in its 
'Message to the free nations o f  the world', and an appeal to the Paris peace conference 
which had opened the previous day.15 Sinn Fein had no policies or plans for northeast 
Ulster, and had no policy on partition, save ignorance o f  it. In putting forward its 
proposals to the peace conference under the arbitration o f  President Wilson. Sinn Fein 
ignored the reality o f  unionist opposition to an all - Ireland parliament. It was a trait of 
Sinn Fein which was to last through the Treaty debates and through successive 
governments during the twenties and thirties. As the Versailles conference did not 
conclude its deliberations until June 1919 Dail Eireann had no real relevance for the main 
problem which was affecting the Cavan Monaghan region, that o f  partition. From a 
unionist perspective partition was not to the forefront o f  political consciousness either, as 
the 'Ulster question' would not be dealt with until wartime was over. Wartime was 
interpreted as including the peace conference .^  Therefore as there was no activity on the 
Ulster question, Cavan and Monaghan were relatively peaceful throughout the first half of 
1919 and the region was spared the widespread violence which was frequent in much of 
the rest of Ireland as the war o f  independence swept the country.
After the signing o f  the Versailles treaty in June 1919, the wartime period 
was officially at an end and it became clear that the British government, after a reprieve 
o f  five years, would have to turn their attention once again to the Ulster question. As 
stated by Churchill:
Great empires have been overturned. The whole map of 
Europe has been changed., but as the deluge subsides and 
the waters fall we see the dreary steeples o f  Fermanagh and 
Tyrone emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel 
is one o f  the few institutions that have been unaltered in the 
cataclysm which has swept the world.17
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However, a number o f  things had changed notably in the balance o f  power 
in Westminster and nationalists no longer had any influence in the making o f  policies in 
Westminster. With the abstention o f  Sinn Fein from Westminster Irish nationalism had 
no voice in Westminster, where like it or not the legislation to settle the Ulster question 
would be drafted. The unionists on the other hand were in a very strong position as the 
sole Irish voice advising cabinet policies on Ulster. Craig and the other unionists in 
government on the backbenches were the only voices to be heard as the settlement o f  the 
Ulster question was thrashed out. It was in October 1919 that the Cabinet selected a 
committee to draft the fourth home rule bill. Unionists had every reason to feel confident 
about the outcome o f this committees deliberations on the bill as it was chaired by Sir 
Walter Long, erstwhile leader o f  the Ulster Unionists.
Exclusion was the only viable policy, according to this committee and two 
parliaments were proposed for Ireland. This bill became known as the Government of 
Ireland Bill and was formally introduced into the House of commons on 25 February 
1920.18 Indeed it was not in the House o f  Commons that the area to be excluded was 
debated, but rather amongst the chambers of the Ulster Unionist Council.Carson had 
always argued that a six county split was more viable and had a safer majority and was 
thus easier to control than a nine county Ulster. The delegates of the U.U.C argued that an 
extra 260,000 catholics from the three counties o f  Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal would 
only leave a very precarious majority.
The unionists o f  Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal felt bitterly betrayed and 
published a pamphlet entitled ' Ulster and Home Rule, No partition o f  Ulster', in early 
1920 outlining their objections to the six county split. ^  Their arguments were based on 
economics and geography. It was stated that partition on a six county basis would be 
disastrous for the economies o f  Cavan and Monaghan.
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Belfast is the commercial capital of Ulster. All our trade, 
business and railways are connected with it. The G.N.R 
runs direct from the town o f  Cavan through the county of 
Monaghan. If a barrier is to be erected between our counties
and Belfast it will be injurious to all.—0
On 10 March the U.U.C accepted the Government o f  Ireland Bill for a six 
county northern parliament. The two leaders o f  unionism in Cavan and Monaghan. Lord 
Famham and M.E. Knight, made one last effort to have the council accept a nine county 
split by putting forward the motion:
That this council abiding by its covenant refuses to accept 
any form o f  government which does not include the whole 
geographical province of Ulster and calls upon its 
parliamentary leaders to take such steps as may be
necessary to see that the term Northern Ireland in the
permanent bill is altered to include the whole province of 
Ulster.21
On 9 April the Monaghan and Cavan delegates resigned from the Ulster 
Unionist Council.22 They had every reason to feel angry and betrayed. They also felt 
increasingly threatened by a series o f  sectarian attacks which were taking place in the 
region from late 1919.
It was from about June 1919 that ancient hatreds began to rear their ugly 
heads in Cavan and Monaghan. Initially it was along predictable lines o f  removing flags 
and taunting such as the case o f  Mr. William Martin, who lodged a claim with Monaghan 
Urban District Council for damages amounting to £5 5s for malicious injury to a union 
j a c k . 2 3  in September Ballybay town court dealt with the case o f  William Thompson 
whose house was pelted with stones. A witness gave evidence that Thompson caused a
lot o f  trouble in the area by ' cursing the pope and priests. This cursing o f  the pope by
Thompson was at the root o f  the trouble on peace day and on other o c c a s s i o n s . ' 2 4  In
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Figure  One
S o u rce : Colonial Office, Dublin Castle Records, CO 904. (N.L.I.)
December William Me Kenna was charged, after an incident in which he attacked Mary
Cairns 'a mother o f  one of the rebels. '25
This bickering was also in evidence in the political sphere, and one
incident in particular vividly illustrates this. Monaghan County Council, which was by
now controlled by Sinn Fein, 'invited the commission of Inquiry, which was appointed by
Dail Eireann to meet in Monaghan and appear before the council.On the agenda was the
item: -'to receive deputation from Sinn Fein Commission of Inquiry'.26 Two unionists,
William Martin and M.E. Knight objected to this, by writing to the Monaghan unionist
organ the Northern Standard. They declined to take part in the proceedings o f  the council
on account o f  this item being on the agenda. Sinn Fein accused the unionists of trying to
obstruct the business of the council, and being against the economic development of the
county. According to the report in the Irish Times, 'the meeting then broke up, and
snatches o f  the soldiers song were heard, as well as cries of up Dublin.' 27
Sectarian conflicts began to appear in all aspects of life and from June
incidents of attacks on unionists and searches for arms became commomplace in the
region. Figure One shows the marked increases in outrages reported in the region. At
midnight on 2 June in the Cavan district Robert Carson, a protestant was entering his
house when shots were fired at him. Three masked men followed him into his house and
searched for arms, three guns, a revolver and about sixteen sporting catridges were
carried o f  by the men.28 It was widely known to the I.R.A. that the homes o f  unionists
contained arms, dating back to the days o f  the U.V.F. in 1914 and from the first world
war. Numerous searches were carried out on the homes o f  unionists throughout the
second half o f  1919. As well as raiding protestant homes, from about October the I.R.A.
began to attack the local R.I.C., who were long seen as the defenders o f  the unionist
community in the region. Intimidation o f  the police first appeared in November when the
inspector general reported t h a t ' D.I. Allen received a letter warning him that he would be
killed unless he left C a v a n 2 9 . '  On 9 December while cycling near Castleblayney
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Constable Fox was attacked and overpowered by 5 men who robbed him of his carbine, 
sword bayonet and ammunition.'30
The Irish Times reported that as a consequence o f  this incident 300 
military and about 100 police were drafted into Castleblayney. They proceeded to make a 
systematic search of all the houses of prominent Sinn Feiners. Numerous searches of the 
houses of prominent Sinn Feiners occured during the closing months o f  1919. These raids 
served only to antagonise the I.R.A even further and to increase attacks on unionists and 
their protectors, the police and military. After the arrest of a prominent Sinn Feiner in 
Belturbet a crowd gathered on the streets in preparation for an attack on the police 
barracks. The crowd were only dispersed when they were baton c h a r g e d . 3 1
The start o f  1920 saw a more concerted effort by the I.R.A. in their attacks 
on unionists and the police force. This was especially true in county Monaghan where the 
volunteers were led by General Eoin O'Duffy, who was later to become commissioner of 
the Garda Siochana. In early 1920 he was joined in Monaghan by Ernie O Malley. It was 
O Duffy along with O Malley that planned a spectacular attack on Shantonagh military 
barracks in February 1920. This was an intricately planned and well coordinated atack. 
Shantonagh was a small village on the borders o f  Cavan and Monaghan. It originated as a 
raid for arms and vividly illustrated the strength o f  the I.R.A in the region. The raid 
occurred on the night o f  15 February about 50 men surrounded the barracks and 
demanded its surrender. When this was not forthcoming the barracks was blown up and 
the I.R.A entered the barracks and secured the arms and ammunition therein. As the 
I.R.A. continued their attacks on military barracks unionists felt more and more isolated 
and threatened. It was not until later in the year, however, that unionists started to fight 
back and defend themselves from intimidation, as in March political events came to the 
fore. These political events temporarily united nationalists and unionists in their 
opposition to partition.
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In February 1920 the cabinet committee chaired by Sir Walter Long 
submitted to the government its deliberations on the future of Ulster. It recommended that 
the whole province o f  Ulster be excluded as this would facilitate ultimate reunion. This 
advice was rejected by the government which took Craigs advice that only six counties 
should form the new northern s t a t e . T h e  Government of Ireland Bill was introduced 
into the House o f  Commons on 25 February with provision for two Irish parliaments, one 
for southern Ireland, and one for the six counties which would comprise Northern Ireland. 
Craig who at first oppossed to the bill, eventually came round to the idea and decided not
to oppose it. On 31 March the bill was passed by 348 votes for it as oppossed to 94 votes
against.33 Leading Ulster unionists had decided that a six county split was the best 
option. This increased the sense o f  isolation and betrayal felt by unionists in Cavan and 
Monaghan.
The hardest part of the decision to accept was the fact that they had been 
betrayed by their fellow covenanters. The editorial column of the Northern Standard  fully 
conveyed the furstration felt by Cavan and Monaghan unionists who were left to deal 
with life as a minority in an increasingly hostile southern 'catholic' state.
We deplore the decision o f  the Ulster Unionist Council to 
accept a parliament for six o f  the Ulster counties instead of 
the whole o f  the province. Taking everything into
consideration, we cannot regard it otherwise than a 
deliberate betrayal o f  the Unionists o f  Monaghan, Cavan 
and Donegal... The one argument that ought to have
prevailed is that the Ulster Covenant is still as binding upon 
them as when it was signed..But it seems that the Covenant 
was a mere 'scrap o f  paper'. That is a harsh term to use, but 
it seems to us that the selfish policy decided upon in Belfast 
deserves nothing more flattering. 'We have done our best 
for you' the council says in effect 'and in future you will 
have to look after yourselves.34
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The D undalk Democrat, the mouthpiece o f  moderate nationalist opinion in 
the Cavan / Monaghan region sympathised with unionists in the region. In an editorial on 
13 March 1920 it stated that:
We for quite a different reason from that influencing the 
Monaghan and Cavan unionists, favour the 'All Ulster' 
scheme as against the 'clean cut1 o f  the six alleged 
protestant counties. We think either proposal unwise and 
unpatriotic. We believe partition to be a calamity whose 
evil effects will very likely be felt for generations to come. 
But, as promising a local parliament more evenly balanced, 
and as giving hope o f  an earlier union o f  the two parts o f  
Ireland, we should much prefer to see ' Northern Ireland' 
include the nine counties o f  Ulster rather than the six 
counties as proposed.
The signs for the future were ominous and as stated by the Democrat 'the 
bill does not satisfy even moderate opinion in Ireland. It does not please any political 
party. It seems to promise only new trouble for this sufficiently troubled c o u n t r y . T h e  
Anglo Celt was equally oppossed to the bill, saying that 'nobody in Ireland has said a good 
word for the bill. Indeed the greater number have not given it the smallest 
consideration.'36 Public bodies in the region were also quick to voice their opposition to 
the proposed partitioning o f  the province. Cavan County Council on the motion o f  the 
chairman adopted a resolution 'emphatically protesting against the proposed partition of 
Ireland, to which the people o f  county Cavan would never submit.'-5^  Monaghan County 
Council also passed a resolution against the partition of Ulster:
We the elected representatives of a population consisting 
entirely o f  Ulstermen, emphatically as Irishmen, protest 
against any scheme o f  severing our country and people 
from our fellow countrymen o f  the south and west. We are 
Irishmen, and inside Ireland we know of but one nation 
inhabiting it. We, as Ulstermen, though proud o f  our 
province, recognise no Ulster nation any more than we
46
recognise a Munster nation. The division o f  a whole people 
o f  the bidding o f  a small minority of zealots and political 
wire pullers is at once unnational and unnatural, and we
pledge ourselves and our constituents never to submit to
it . '«
This same resolution was passed by Cavan Urban Council, Clones Urban 
Council and Monaghan District Council. It became increasingly clear that nationalists in 
the region would ignore the bill and fight for the republic proclaimed by Sinn Fein. Even 
the United Irish League traditionally a moderate voice o f  Irish nationalism, aligned to the 
A.O.H denounced the new bill. They referred to the six counties as the 'Orange Free State' 
and at a rally in south Monaghan, J.P. Convery the U.I.L organiser for Ne wry 'came to 
take counsel with the good and true men o f  Monaghan and to renew with them 'a solemn 
league and covenant' never to lower the banner o f  green till a broad measure o f  legislature 
had been granted to Ireland, one and indivisable. It is up to us to use every means at our 
disposal to fire out this coalition government that seeks to perpetuate strife and discord in 
this country.'39
On 30 March a meeting o f  the County Cavan Unionist Association was 
held in Cavan. Here a resolution was unanimously passed 'protesting against the breach of 
the Ulster Covenant by the Ulster Unionist Council in deserting their fellow covenanters 
in the three counties o f  Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan, and calling on the delegates from 
the Cavan Unionist Association to the Ulster Council to resign their membership o f  the 
last mentioned body.'40 The Irish party at Westminster withdrew from the House of 
Commons in protest against the bill, and thus there was now no nationalist voice to 
protest against the bill or to offer any amendments to the bill.
At any rate it was clear that Sinn Fein paid scant regard to Westminster 
policy and lawlessness intensified from June. While it is fair to say that government 
policies from Westminster had little impact on the region from June 1920 the influence
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of Dail Eireann increased rapidly. Elections for local government were held in June and 
this resulted in large Sinn Fein majorities. The inspector general for both Cavan and 
Monaghan attributed the victory o f  Sinn Fein to 'good organization and 
intimidation'.41 There is much evidence o f  this fact and one report in the Irish Times 
shows how a nationalist candidate. Mr Philip Magee, Inniskeen, was forced to withdraw 
from the elections:
Mr. Magee was about retiring the night when a knock came 
to the door. Advancing outwards he was suddenly caught by 
the arms and hustled by other men towards the centre of the 
roadway. The leader o f  the party called upon Mr. Magee for 
a promise that he would withdraw his candidature next day.
Realisng his position, the required promise was given. Mr 
Magee called upon the returning officer yesterday and 
withdrew his name 42
Sinn Fein swept the board in Cavan winning 20 o f  the 21 seats on the 
county council, the other seat going to a nationalist.43 In Monaghan Sinn Fein also won a 
majority, but the presence o f  unionists in the council meant that the bickering between 
nationalists and unionists in the region would continue in the council chambers. A 
resolution was passed recognising the authority o f  Dail Eireann as the lawful and elected 
government of the country.44 Almost immediately an argument broke out about a Sinn 
Fein flag which had been hoisted on the courthouse. Colonel Madden, a unionist objected 
to the Sinn Fein flag and stated that:
His view was that Ireland would be far better to remain in 
the Union, just as they were now. Just because he and 
others held those views he hoped that they would not have 
their work on the council made more difficult, and have all 
sorts of slights thrown at them, such as having Sinn Fein 
flags flown over the courthouse when the council was 
sitting. 45
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There was much heated debates and insults traded between the unionist and Sinn Fein 
members o f  the council.
On 29 June Dail Eireann decreed the establishment o f  courts o f  justice and 
equity throughout the land. Cavan and Monaghan, in line with the rest of the country had 
Dail Eireann courts set up and these quickly replaced the British system in the area. The 
new courts were given a good deal o f  respectibility among nationalists by their 
organisation along church and parish lines, but this only increased unionist suspicions of 
the courts. The Anglu-Celt reported that at a convention held in north Monaghan to select 
arbitrators there were priests present from every parish in the constituency.46
The courts owed much o f  their sucess to the system of  policing offered by 
the I.R.A. who enforced penalties passed out by the courts. The county inspector for 
Monaghan complained in July that attempts were being made to form Sinn Fein courts 
and to oust the ordinary law o f  the land.47 The I.R.A. also made sure that the Sinn Fein 
courts would be well patronized by attacking the British system. In Cavan about 15 
magistrates were obliged, mainly by intimidation to resign their commissions and the 
county inspector complained that the I.R.A. were active in preventing persons from 
taking their cases to the petty sessions.48
The importance o f  the court system introduced by Sinn Fein cannot be 
overemphasised. Its success gave a great deal o f  credibility to Sinn Fein and as time went 
by the courts gained the respect of most o f  the inhabitants and they gained a reputation for 
fairmindedness. On a national scale even unionists gave respect to the courts as they were 
seen as a way o f  controlling the lawlessness which was rampant in the country as a whole. 
David Fitzpatrick proffers the view that 'this achievement [of controlling lawlessness] 
was widely praised even by the remaining resident gentry, whose disgust at the collapse 
o f  civil administration sometimes outweighed their political aversion to republicanism.'49
As their popularity increased the British system became obsolete and the
Dundalk Democrat reported in October 1920 that the petty sessions had not been held in
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Castleblayney for six weeks. Orders made by the I.R.A in regards to policing and 
especially on the matter o f  consumption o f  alcohol were adhered to. Notices such as the 
following were regularly posted on the doors o f  public houses.
Irish Republican Army ( Co. Monaghan). Headquarters 51*1 
Batallion, Castleblayney. Take notice that you are hereby 
forbidden to serve any drink whatever to any persons o f  the 
tramp class from today. Non compliance with this order 
will be severely dealt with. Signed Competent Military 
Authority.
Dated 7 August 1920.50
The Dundalk Democrat reported that no breaches o f  this order by local publicans was 
known. However in the deeply divided Cavan - Monaghan region, where sectarian 
animosities had reached an all time high unionists often felt agrieved by the arbitration 
courts and often complained to the military when they were called before the Dail courts.
An arbitration court about to be held in Shercock was 
interupted by the military. It appears that the door was burst 
in and the arbitrators made their escape by the rear, no 
arrests being made. The story goes that a Sinn Feiner and a 
unionist, both women, had a battle o f  tongues one day 
previously and the Sinn Fein woman summoned the 
unionist for too free use o f  the womans weapon. There 
upon the latter showed the summons to the police, and 
hence the raid as the court was about to begin.51
It was not just the justice system that the I.R.A. tried to undermine, but 
also the R.I.C themselves by attacking barracks both occupied and unoccupied. These 
attacks were carried out with the intention of clearing the region of the R.I.C., as this 
would make it easier for the I.R.A to control the region. Such attacks had begun at an 
early stage o f  the troubles in Cavan and Monaghan. The attack on Shantonagh barracks in 
February was the first o f  a series o f  attacks on barracks in the area. As early as March
1920 it was reported that when Newbliss barracks was closed that with the exception o f  
Stranooden, there was not another rural police barracks in the county Monaghan that had 
not been shut up.5- The inspector general complanied that the forces of the crown in 
Cavan were 'wholly inadequate to cope with the situation and that the British government 
was gradually being ousted from any semblance o f  control.'53 When the R.I.C vacated a 
barracks it was soon burned to ensure that the military' could not regain it.
Attacks on occupied barracks were well planned and co ordinated 
exercises with the greatest precautions being taken to ensure success. The first attack on 
an occupied barracks in Cavan occured at Arva in September 1920. The usual precautions 
were taken by the raiders, blocking all roads into the town so as to completely isolate the 
barracks. The raiders surrounded the barracks and the garrison, which consisted o f  eight 
constables and two sergeants, was soon overpowered. The barracks was set on fire and 
completely gutted.54 Cavan was soon without a rural barracks and the I.R.A. were free to 
patrol without threat from the military. Aligned to these attacks on police barracks a new 
trend o f  ambushing police on patrol soon became apparent in the region from mid 1920. 
These led to a marked decrease in police patrols. In July the number of attacks on police 
patrols increased markedly. On 22 July as sergeants Conroy and Mara and constables 
McNicholas and Lynch were returning off patrol duty at Stackhall railway bridge a shot 
was fired wounding sergeant Conroy in the left hand, and a second bullet passed through 
his cape and uniform.55
The I.R.A also carried out a systematic policy o f  ostracizing the police
force by ordering people to boycott them. In Swanlinbar locals were warned not to supply
the police with meat or turf. A further series of campaigns were carried out against the
families o f  R.I.C men, which struck terror into the hearts o f  protestants in the region, as
the great majority o f  R.I.C men were seen as protectors of their community. What
alarmed the protestant population even more was the fact that their attackers were well
known to them. In Crosserlough, county Cavan nine men were arrested after Mrs Mary
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Boylan identified them as the masked men who threatened her. The incident occured 
when late one night the men surrounded her house telling her to take her son home from 
the R.I.C.56
On a national scale the intelligence network which was masterminded by 
Michael Collins and his squad was crucial in the sucess o f  the I.R.A in gaining control of 
administration networks. This was no different in the Cavan - Monaghan region. The 
robbing o f  the mails had become a very effective weapon to disrupte the communications 
network throughout the country. By stopping and intercepting the mails the I.R.A could 
gain a useful source o f  revenue, but could also find out the names of people giving 
evidence against them. Therefore it was very difficult for protestants in the region to 
report intimidation or other crimes against them to Dublin Castle. The I.R.A even had 
agents working in the post office as confirmed by Dr. Conn Ward, an intelligence officer 
for the I.R.A, who had agents in Monaghan post office who intercepted messages, letters 
and telegrams and passed them on to him for decoding.57
The effectiveness o f  the intelligence system was a crucial factor in the 
success o f  the I.R.A. in crippling the British system in Ireland. The effectiveness o f  this 
intelligence netwok is vividly illustrated by the following account given by an 
intelligence officer in Monaghan.
The day after the shooting in Ballybay a coded telegram was 
intercepted. It was from the Belfast H.Q to the R.I.C in 
Monaghan. I had great difficulty in decoding it due to errors 
in the code, but finally succeeded. It read 'apprehend at once 
and bring to Victoria Barracks, Packie Coyle o f  Ballybay 
and Anthony Daly o f  Drumskelt.1 The two men were alerted 
immediately The following day we intercepted a telegram 
from the R.I.C in Monaghan. 'Please repeat message'. Later 
that day we intercepted the repeated message which was the 
same as the first one but without errors. It means that in this 
instance, we had the message almost two days before the 
R.I.C had it.'58
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By the summer o f  1920 the l.R.A. was in almost complete control o f  the 
region. It was the volunteers who were policing the region, the British judicial system had 
ceased to function and the intelligence system employed meant that they were always one 
step ahead o f  the police. A further method employed to cripple the British administration 
was the burning o f  records o f  the key local authorities. On 13 May Ballymachugh excise 
office, Kilnaleck was raided and all books and records were destroyed.59 In the same 
week Cootehill excise office was broken into and all income tax, excise and estate duty 
records, except old age pensions taken.60 The l.R.A. were also able to further hinder the 
work o f  the R.I.C by denying them a supply of ammunition by stopping and searching 
trains coming to Cavan and Monaghan from Dublin and Belfast. When a train was 
stopped the driver was taken into 'custody' and if no arms were found the train was 
allowed to proceed, 'the officials being made to promise not to work in future on any train 
carrying arms or ammunition.'61
The strength o f  the l.R.A in the region reached its zenith in August 1920 
and proportional to this was the depth o f  fear and intimidation felt in the area. It was 
during August that a boycott o f  Belfast goods commenced in the region which further 
polarized the two communities. Eoin O Duffy, following a period of imprisonment in 
Crumlin road jail returned to Monaghan in August. Upon his return he set about 
organising a widespread raid on unionists homes in the Monaghan region. This move was 
to have a disastrous effect on protestant catholic relations in Monaghan for many years to 
come. On the night o f  Tuesday 31 August O Duffy coordinated the raids with the 
intention of gaining arms for the volunteers in the county.
Raids were carried out in Kilnadrain, Monaghan town. Stranooden,
Carrickmacross, Castleblayney, Newbliss, Clones and Ballybay. In north Monaghan,
where there was a considerable unionist population a fierce resistance was put up to the
raiders. Three volunteers, Marron, Reilly and Me Kenna died outright and a fourth Owen
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Kennan lived only a few weeks. Many more were also wounded.62 A number o f  gun 
battles and confrontations took place between unionists and the I.R.A. At Kilnadrain, near 
Monaghan town the house o f  John Hazlett was raided. Hazlett resisted the raiders and 
was shot in the neck. The raiders were also fired on at the residence of Me Clean brothers, 
horse dealers from Tattindronagh and a man named Nesbitt shot a raider in his home.63 
The sister o f  a prominent Monaghan unionist John Beresford Madden, who lived near 
Clones was accidentally shot by raiders when resistance was offered to them.64 The 
raiders only procured a small number o f  arms and small amounts o f  ammunition. The 
raids however had far reaching effects and heralded a period of open sectarian conflict in 
the region. The raids could be directly attributed to the murder on 1 October of Michael 
Kelly, who was murdered by a group o f  unionists on his journey from Enniskillen to 
Monaghan near Tydavnet.65
Tensions between nationalist and unionists were now at their highest 
point as unionists fought back against the terror and intimidation they suffered at the 
hands o f  the I.R.A. It was the twelfth o f  July meetings in the area which spurred unionists 
to unite and attempt to overcome the difficulties of their situation. The unionists o f  the 
area were up to this point virtually inactive in unionists clubs or the orange lodges as their 
raison d'etre had been taken away, after their 'betrayal' by the Ulster Unionist Council. 
The Ulster volunteers were also inactive and unionists received little direction or cause 
for optimism from leaders since their resignation from the U.U.C in March. The twelfth 
o f  July had always been the focal point in the calendar of Unionism and a day when 
unionists turned out in their masses to recieve messages from their leaders. The twelfth of 
July 1920 was no different for unionists in Cavan and Monaghan. Mass demonstrations 
were held in Clones, Ballybay. Killeshandra and Derrylane. The largest demonstration, 
however, was held at Drum in county Monaghan and was a united demonstration o f  the 
orangemen o f  Cavan and Monaghan,66
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The importance o f  these meetings cannot be underestimated in the 
understanding o f  the revival o f  unionism and the Ulster volunteers in Cavan and 
Monaghan in the second half o f  1920. In Clones the demonstration was officiated by the 
county Grand Master M.E. Knight who stressed the need for unionists in the region to 
stand united
never in the history o f  this institution has there been a 
greater need to stand together and resist by every means in 
their power any attempt to encroach on their rights and 
privileges. They in Monaghan together with their brethern in 
Cavan, were dependant absolutely on themselves opposed 
not alone by those who had always opposed them but it was 
with a sad heart he said it, deserted by those whom they 
should call their friends.67
It was obvious that unionists in the area were ready to accept the fact that they would not 
remain part o f  the union. They were even willing to accept a southern parliament if  they 
could be assured o f  their future.
Should a southern parliament be started I would say we 
should all owe allegiance to it and do our part to help in 
every way we can to carry on the business o f  the country and 
this county. We must not presume that there will be 
oppression. We must not presume that wrong will be done to 
any one. It looks as if  the British parliament is determined to 
pass the home rule bill and we must act the part o f  good 
citizens and hope that all will be for the best. Yet if 
oppression and wrong come we must stand up against it like 
men and help will surely come to us.68
The message espoused by unionist leaders was clear, they were willing to turn their back 
on their erstwhile comrades in the six counties who had betrayed them. They realised the 
difficulties o f  their position and were willing to embrace a southern parliament if  they 
were not oppressed or persecuted. However it was made clear that unionists would react
to any oppression and intimidation. This intimidation manifested itself in the widespread 
raids on the homes o f  unionists on the night o f  31 August 1920, and the determination o f  
unionists to resist these hostilities was clearly seen in the resistance offered to the raiders. 
The deaths o f  four volunteers bears testimony to unionists readiness to defend themselves 
and fightback. On 17 September a large meeting of Monaghan unionists was held at the 
canal field. The tone of the meeting was set by the fact that those attending the meeting 
marched in formation from the local orange hall to the place of meeting.69
The meeting saw the passing o f  a series o f  crucial resolutions. The meeting 
condemned the violence in Monaghan as well as the growing violence in Belfast and 
Lisburn. The Belfast boycott was also condemned as were the attacks on protestants 
throughout the region. Unionists were now determined to protect their community and in 
this regard the following resolution was passed.
That this meeting is o f  the opinion that matters have now 
come to such a pass, that it is incumbent upon the loyal 
inhabitants o f  the county to take all necessary steps to 
protect themselves and their families from these attacks, 
and this meeting now decides to appoint committees with 
authority to take such steps as may be necessary for that 
purpose.70
On the same date, 17 September the Northern Standard  recorded the 
setting up o f  a town guard in Drum 'for the sole purpose o f  defending our homes and our 
property against the marauding bands o f  ruffians who, under the guise o f  a political 
organisation, are robbing and terrorising the peaceful inhabitants'.71 A meeting held in 
Smithborough saw the formation of a Defence Association for the county of Monaghan to 
safeguard the interests o f  loyalists.'72 The county inspector for Monaghan reported that 
party feeling continues to run very high and little provocation from either side may cause 
a serious outbreak at any moment.73 Attempts were made to form protection committees
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in Cavan but these failed due to intimidation by the I.R.A. Defence Associations were 
unsuccessful in Cavan and south Monaghan due to the dispersed nature o f  the unionist 
population. North Monaghan, on the other hand contained large concentrations of 
unionists and this explains the success o f  the Defence associations in this region.
Sectarian tensions increased further with the shooting of a protestant 
farmer. Thomas Hill, in Carrickmacross. This occurred on 2 October, and was part o f  a 
pattern o f  attacks on protestants who were isolated, living in catholic areas. In Cavan on 
27 October another protestant was singled out, this time the victim was a 26 year old 
protestant woman who worked as a temporary organist in Cavan protestant church. These 
attacks brought an influx o f  the military into the region and as can be seen from Figure 
One this did bring some respite to the area for a short while. About 100 extra troops 
arrived in Cavan in October and conducted wide spread searches of the houses o f  I.R.A 
suspects. A party o f  Auxiliaries also arrived in Monaghan during October, carrying out a 
number o f  searches and several arrests were made.74 The month o f  October also saw the 
arrival of the Black and Tans in the region.
The Ulster Volunteer Force was also becoming more active and this was
an ominous sign for the region as the period from January 1921 until the truce would see
numerous battles between the I.R.A. and the Black and Tans. In strongly protestant
regions such as north Monaghan the U.V.F became openly active and assisted the military
and operated like a fifth column. This acted to transfer the terror and intimidation from
protestants to catholics, as in some regions the U.V.F openly patrolled and policed areas
which the I.R.A had previously terrorised. In north Monaghan a 'curfew' was imposed by
members o f  the U.V.F.. Protestants in the region received a private notice o f  the curfew
so that 'none but nationalists may be the victims of it1.75 The circular stated that 'motorists
out after a certain hour are to be fired at without warning or challenge'.76 Widespread
raids on the homes o f  prominent nationalists were now carried out as the Black and Tans
and military spread widespread terror throughout the region. The Ulster volunteers now
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accompained the military in searches o f  nationalist homes. Numerous allegations were 
made by catholics that property was carried off during these searches. After one such
series o f  searches in the district of Rockcorry the owners o f  the houses alleged that the
military' carried away turkeys and eggs, while a lamp in another case was missed.77 These 
raids caused futher bitterness between the two communities.
The Auxiliaries aligned with the Black and Tans and the U.V.F also
began to search and confiscate the records o f  Dail Eireann courts and the county council
offices. On 20 November the I.R.A fired on the Black and Tans in Monaghan. The Black 
and Tans set out to reprise the attack and on the following night the house o f  James Me 
Mahon, chairman o f  the Poor Law Guardians was visited, and on Monday 22 November 
the County council offices were seached.
The border regions o f  Cavan and Monaghan had from November 1920, 
another new force to contend with. Churchill decided to form the Ulster Special 
Constabulary to maintain law and order in the six counties. The Specials were seen by 
many catholics in the border region as a very menancing force, being almost exclusively 
protestant. Recruitment for the specials began in November and was very much based on 
the U.V.F. The Special Constabulary were divided into three categories: Class A; 
Permament police, uniformed and paid like the R.I.C; Class B; part time, uniformed and 
unpaid they were by far the largest category, numbering 19,500. Finally the C class 
specials were an unpaid reserve force to be used in emergencies.78 The B Specials were 
especially hated by nationalists along the border in Cavan and Monaghan especially after 
their frequent excursions into the south, and were the focus of frequent attacks by the 
I.R.A.
The existence o f  these well armed and highly organised groups lined up
against each other caused much friction in the area, and the region was to see a marked
increase in the number o f  outrages from November 1920 until the truce o f  July 1921.
December was a particularly violent month in county Cavan with the number o f  outrages
58
reported increasing from 15 in November to 22 in December. In Svvanlinbar a police 
patrol was ambushed and a constable was killed and a sergeant injured. The county 
inspector reported that vast areas in west Cavan along the Fermanagh border were devoid 
o f  policing especially around Ballyconnell and Arva. The I.R.A. and the U.V.F were 
active throughout the whole county.79 The murder of constable Shannon in Swanlinbar 
brought much condemnation from the public in the region and prompted much 
condemnation from the catholic clergy. The church had up to this point kept relatively 
quiet about the violence which was widespread in the region. The Bishop of Kilmore, Dr. 
Finegan, recognizing the alarming growth of sectarian violence and its concurrent 
sectarian hatred spoke out against the murder. He condemned the attacks on the military 
and police, he also described the war being waged in the region as unjust and unlawful.
And if it be unlwaful, as it is. every life taken in pursuance 
o f  it is murder. Those deluded young men, who took the life 
of a constable in Swanlinbar committed a murderous act.
Those who in the same place ordered out constables from 
their houses and ruthlessly fired at them committed an act of 
attempted murder. The many young men over the county 
who on Friday night felled trees and tore up roads that these 
crimes might be with more security and safety committed in 
Swanlinbar and other intended places, were, in a degree, 
according to the amount o f  the co operation, aiders and 
abettors in murder..80
The local parish priest in Swanlinbar also openly condemned the reign o f  
terror being waged in the area. The priest stated that neither the murderers nor their 
relatives could expect any luck either in this world or in the next. The voice from the 
pulpit was certainly the most highly regarded voice among catholics in Ireland at this time 
and especiallly so in this district. The denouncement of the murderers, who were well 
known in the area as the two Leonard brothers who went on the run after the incident, had 
a great impact on the state o f  the region. The inspector general's report for May 1921
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stated that Swanlinbar was comparitively quiet owing to a strange coincident. Shortly 
after the murder of Shannon the Leonard brothers left the area. The brothers had lived 
with their two sisters up to the time o f the ambush. In the space of two months 'the sisters 
who up to the time o f  the ambush had been perfectly healthy pined away and died. The 
father and mother were also stricken down with serious illness and were not expected to 
recover.81 This was attributed by people in the locality to the priests warning. The sudden 
wiping out o f  the entire family save for the two brothers was attributed to 'Acts of 
vengeance from on high for the murder and ambush o f  the police'.8- This was a serious 
blow to the morale of the I.R.A in the region, and Swanlinbar was relatively free from 
outrage over the next few months.
Monaghan was also in a much disturbed condition throughout December, 
the military here were more active though and had some success. A number o f  I.R.A men 
on the run in the Brogan mountains in north Monaghan were apprehended by the military.
The new year started on much the same note. Tensions between the I.R.A. 
and the Black and Tans increased. On new years day sixteen volunteers ambushed a 
patrol o f  four men on the main street in Ballybay. One constable named Malone was shot 
dead, along with a passer by named Somerville, a protestant who came out to alert the 
police o f  the ambush. A gun battle broke out sending by passers fleeing from the town. 
The next morning Black and Tan reinforcements arrived in the town. A number o f  shots 
were fired by the tans and one house was burned down by them. On Sunday many 
catholics and protestants fled from the town fearing reprisals. 'Men and women with large 
families left their homes and fled to the houses o f  friends in the relative safety o f  the 
countryside.'83
On the following night the Black and Tans caused much fear when they
terrorised the village of Newbliss. While passing through the village they fired several
shots into the catholic club, narrowly missing the caretaker. They also demanded drink
form some publicans in the village and in one case 'the publican was dragged across the
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counter, marched into the street and made stand there with his hands up.'84 Numerous 
other shops were raided and a number o f  people on the street were held up with revolvers. 
Incidents like these caused much hatred and fear among catholics in the region. A number 
o f  premises o f  catholic business men were burnt throughout the region, including the flax 
mills o f  a Mr O Reilly in Virginia. On 2 January' the Black and Tans stopped a hearse in 
Bailieborough and opened the coffin to satisfy themselves that no it contained no arms.85
On 24 January two policemen were murdered at Stranooden, about four 
miles from Monaghan. Sectarian animosity continued throughout the entire region and a 
threatening notice was posted to a Sinn Fein sympathiser in Cavan, giving him twenty 
four hours to leave the area. There was further division and tension in Belturbet over the 
flying of flags on the town hall. The town hall had been closed for some time owing to 
the District Council's refusal to remove a republican flag and the slogan 'vote for 
Galligan. an Irish Republic and freedom' from the town hall. On 23 January this was 
removed and the republican flag replaced by a skull and crossbones. A union jack was 
also hoisted on the clock tower.86
As the sectarian war intensified throughout the region in late 1920 and
1921, partition was imposed in Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act, passed in
December 1920, established two parliaments in Ireland, one for the twenty six counties
and one for the six counties o f  Derry, Antrim, Armagh, Tyrone, Down and Fermanagh.
Thus the fate of Cavan and Monaghan was sealed as a border region on the edge o f  a
much troubled six county state. The passing o f  the act which brought a border to the area
was condemned throughout the region. The actual imposition o f  the border had little
immediate impact on the region on a political, social or economic level, due mainly to the
lack o f  law and order or semblance o f  normality in the region. The imposition o f  an
artificial border on the doorstep o f  Cavan and Monaghan did however have the effect of
increasing levels of violence in the border regions o f  the two counties. Numerous
incursions were made by the specials into the new southern state. These were followed, in
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a by now familiar pattern, o f  reprisals carried out by the I.R.A on the specials and the 
protestant population living in the six counties.
One such incursion o f  the specials into county Monaghan resulted in the 
death of special constable Me Cullagh in Clones. Ironically he was shot dead by the 
R.I.C. The incident occurred on 23 January', when a platoon o f  A specials based in 
Newtownbutler in Co. Fermanagh arrived in Clones and raided the public house o f  John 
O Reilly in Fermangh street. The specials proceeded to raid and loot the pub, the landlord 
having fled in fear. The R.I.C in Clones were alerted by the landlord and presuming the 
raiders to be members o f  the I.R.A., proceeded to the scene and when the raiders refused 
to surrender, the R.I.C opened fire killing special constable Me Cullagh. The affair was a 
deeply embarassing one for the British government, as the men were suppossed to be 
patrolling the new frontier from incursions. The Specials were already faced with much 
allegations o f  indiscipline and attacks on nationalists in the six counties. The platoon was 
subsequently disbanded and orders were issued for stern disciplinary action.87
In Ballinagh on 5 February an auxiliary policeman constable Stanfield was 
shot. An hour later several shots were fired throughout the village and the premises o f  
catholics fired into. The house of Peter Finnegan, of Gortahurk was burned to the ground, 
the occupants only narrowly escaping.88
The deep divisions caused by the growing sectarian animosities and the
partition o f  Ulster are vividly conveyed by the events which occured in the village of
Rosslea on the Monaghan-Fermanagh border in March 1921. One month previous to the
incident catholic homes in the region had been burned by the specials. Protestants in the
area had been living in fear waiting for the expected reprisals. These reprisals duly came
in mid March 1921, in the form of extensive terrorising and burning of protestant homes.
One protestant died in the incident and on the 22 March four houses occupied by
unionists in the adjoining district o f  Clones, were visited by the I.R.A. Fire was opened
on the houses and in two instances the fire was returned, resulting in gun battles between
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the two sides.89 The Irish Times reported on the same day that the village o f  Rosslea was 
virtually deserted following the attacks. 'The village last night was as silent as the grave, 
save for the tread o f  crown forces on guard, as almost every resident had cleared out of 
the place during the afternoon.’90
The attacks on Rosslea received much condemnation and the Dundalk 
Democrat spoke out against the arming o f  rival nationalist and unionist population. In its 
editorial of 26 March it spoke o f  the significance o f  the Rosslea attacks.
The recent history of the village o f  Rosslea proves the folly 
o f  arming opposing sections o f  a people so bitterly divided 
as are those o f  Ulster, where old hatreds and rivalries have 
been so carefully nurtured and where an inflammable 
people are too prone to respond to the zealots call to arms...
It this thing spreads which God forbid nothing can save 
Ireland from a hideous war o f  extermination in which 
catholic and protestant will suffer as have those of 
Rosslea.91
Two more sectarian murders followed on 30 March when the I.R.A visited 
the home o f  a protestant farmer in Castleblayney and demanded him to surrender to the 
I.R.A. He refused and his house was set on fire. The farmer W.J Fleming finally 
surrendered with his son, and was asked where he kept his arms and bombs. When he 
stated that he had none the farmer and his son were marched to the road, and directed to 
stand against a ditch. As they did so shots were fired at them. The son was killed outright, 
and his father was badly wounded and subsequently died.92 The following day another 
protestant, this time Hugh Duffy, an army pensioner who was a post office messenger 
was shot dead in Clones.93
The violence in the region reached its climax by May and attacks were 
now more and more confined to the border areas, and many signs abounded that people in 
the region were longing for an end to hostilities. The nationalist population especially
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were now bearing the brunt o f  violence as the Black and Tans were carrying out a more 
concerted and ruthless policy of reprisals and curfews. The Black and Tans unorthodox 
method o f  policing was effective in confining violence by the I.R.A to isolated attacks.
Following threats on the lives of the military and unionists in the 
Carrickmacross, this message was pined up in the town for everyone to read as they went 
to do their daily business in the town.
The twenty Black and Tans of Carrickmacross hereby 
challenge the whole stength of the Carrickmacross brigade, 
to name a day, place and time to meet them. All Sinn Fein 
members and persons having Sinn Fein Sympathies in this 
district are well known to the Black and Tans, who have
respected them and their property, but upon the I.R.A threat
being carried out, or even attempted, we the said Black and 
Tans, are determined to carry out the just punishment that 
will be due for such outrages.
Signed Black and Tans, Carrickmacross.94
Public opinion was rapidly turning against the I.R.A, especially after the
I.R.A, in an attempt to curtail informers, began a campaign of terror on anyone suspected
of  giving information to the crown forces. The first o f  these attacks was the murder o f  a
forty year old, protestant single woman, Kate Carroll in Aughameena, county Monaghan.
She was shot dead and left on the side o f  a public road and a card pinned to her clothing
reading 'Spies and informers beware. Tried, convicted and executed by the I.R.A'.95 A
similar incident occured in Mullahoran, county Cavan when a sixty year old shoemaker
Patrick Briody, who was suspected o f  giving information to the R.I.C was taken out and
shot by the I.R.A.. A similar warning was placed on the body which was left on a public
road.96 The brutality o f  these attacks and the scant regard shown for the bodies o f  the
dead caused much repulsion in the region.
As with all times of war and violence there was a significant economic fall
out in the Cavan - Monaghan region. Farmers and business men were especially hard hit
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as normal day to day life in the region became impossible. There was also significant 
economic ramifications from the sectarian nature o f  the violence in the region. Catholics 
by and large refused to do business with protcstant merchants. People in the region were 
finding it virtually impossible to carry out normal everyday life. Indeed the situation 
became so bad that by June 1921 it was reported by the inspector general that Cavan was 
approaching bankruptcy if the violence continued. He believed that it was quite apparent 
that should murder and destruction o f  property continue much longer, the great majority 
o f  decent people will have to sell out and quit the county.97 Most people were anxious for 
peace and a return to normality. With this in mind a new spirit was noticeable at a peace 
conference held in Clones to bring about co operation between the two warring 
communities. The conference was well represented by members o f  the clergy on both 
sides. The conference held on 1 April 1921, 'pledged to use their best efforts to preserve 
the peace in the respective districts, and to prevent everything calculated to lead either to 
loss o f  life or to destruction o f  property1.98
Knowing that the tide o f  public support in the region was turning against
them, the I.R.A went on the run, hiding out in border regions. The military were by now
gaining the upper hand. In early June an extensive concentration of the military and R.I.C
assembled in north Monaghan and carried out searches of the mountaineous areas of
north Monaghan. It was known that a flying squad of the I.R.A had been on the run and
were hiding out in the area. The combined crown forces o f  specials, Auxiliaries, Black
and Tans and R.I.C surrounded the mountains and carried out a sweep o f  the area. About
12 people were arrested in this sweep and it brought much relief to this troubled area.99 A
similar operation was launched in the south Monaghan / east Cavan region on 13 June.
All the male inhabitants of the region stretching from Cootehill in Cavan, to Ballybay,
Castleblayney and Carrickmacross were said to have been questioned and about 50 - 60
men were brought to the Auxiliary police headquarters at Castleblayney.100 Sweeps by
the military were also carried out in June in the Shercock district. Another large operation
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involving forty military lorries attempted to sweep out the Corlough and Swanlinbar area 
o f  west Cavan, bordering on county Fermanagh.
Although this chapter has focused on events on a regional scale, these 
events were not entirely divorced from events on a national scale. At a national level, 
events were also leading to peace. Elections were held in May for the two seperate 
parliaments constituted under the Government o f  Ireland Act. In the new northern state 
unionists won 40 out o f  the 52 seats. The new northern parliament forged ahead with the 
creation of a seperate state and the new parliament was opened on 22 June 1921. The 
Government o f  Ireland Act was ignored in the twenty six counties, but the elections were 
held and a new Dail was elected. On a national scale Sinn Fein won 124 out o f  the 128 
seats. Sinn Fein won all the seats in the Cavan and Monaghan region. The southern 
parliament envisaged under the Government of Ireland act never operated. Partition, 
however, was imposed and was a fact o f  life for the people of Cavan and Monaghan.
The northern parliament was opened by King George V in Belfast on 22
June 1921. He made a strong plea for peace in Ireland. Hurried negotiations for peace
began between Lloyd George and de Valera. People throughout the country were anxious
for peace and a return to normality. I.R.A. morale was at an all time low in Cavan and
Monaghan, owing to the success o f  military operations against them. They were further
ostracized by the people o f  Cavan, after the murder of the 79 year old retired protestant
Dean o f  Leighin, John Finlay in Bawnboy. The Dean was taken out o f  his home on 12
June by masked men and shot dead. It was a particularly gruesome murder, and 'after
being shot he was beaten around the head with a blunt object.'101 Public opinion on all
sides was outraged by this murder and was condemned on all sides. Shops and business
places in Swanlinbar, Bawnboy and Ballyconnell closed for an hour on the occassion of
the Deans funeral, as a mark o f  respect. It was somewhat ironic that it was a crime such as
this that united the two communities in their determination to end sectarian violence. In
the House of Commons, the chief secretary for Ireland said ' it was difficult to suggest a
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motive for the murder as deceased was intensely popular in the district and a generous 
friend o f  the poor.'102
De Valera and Lloyd George agreed to hold negotiations upon the 
cessation o f  violence in Ireland. A truce was called and it was to commence on 11 July 
1921 at noon. It was perhaps fitting that the inspector general reported that the last shot in 
the Anglo Irish war was fired at five minutes before noon at two policemen on duty in 
Kingscourt, Co. Cavan. The truce was greated with much joy and relief in the Cavan and 
Monaghan region. It brought an end to a deeply disturbing period in the history o f  the 
region. It would take a long time for the region to recover from the deep sectarian 
divisions that had opened between unionists and nationalists.
The truce was generally upheld in the region. During a fact finding mission to Ulster, the 
Dail Eireann liasion officer with the nine Ulster counties, Eoin 0  Duffy, encountered 'not 
a single breach o f  the truce.'103 However the truce would only provide a brief respite for 
the region, as the I.R.A soon turned their attention to attacking the new boundary with 
Ulster. Chapter three considers the Belfast boycott, which lasted from August 1920 to 
February 1922. This was a event which served to further sectarian animosities in the 
region, and deserves special attention.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE BELFAST BOYCOTT AND THE TREATY,
1920- 1922.
In tandem with the unravelling o f  the sectarian animosities and hostilities 
in Cavan and Monaghan, a highly significant episode occurred which was to have serious 
ramifications, namely the ’Belfast boycott'. As the name suggests it consisted o f  a boycott 
of goods manufactured in or originating from Belfast. The boycott commenced in August 
1920 and continued until mid - January 1922 when it was officially terminated by the first 
Craig - Collins pact. This boycott had a serious impact on the Cavan and Monaghan 
region for a number o f  reasons. The first was that it gave the people o f  Cavan and 
Monaghan their first taste o f  the economic impact of partition. National the boycott futher 
polarized north-south relations and reinforced partition.
On a purely economic basis the boycott was disastrous for the Cavan and 
Monaghan region, which suffered more than any other area of the country as a result of 
the boycott. The importance o f  Belfast in the economies of Cavan and Monaghan had 
been clearly stated by Unionists in the region in the pamphlet, 'Ulster and Home rule; No 
partition o f  Ulster.'
Belfast is the commercial capital of Ulster. All our trade, 
business and railways are connected with it. The G.N.R 
runs direct from the town o f Cavan through the county of 
Monaghan. If a barrier is to be erected between our counties
and Belfast it will be injurious to all.1
It was somewhat ironic that this barrier was initially erected by Dail Eireann. The third
and, most serious, implication o f  the Belfast boycott for the region, was the fact that it 
furthered animosities between the already deeply divided Catholic and Protestant 
communities.
The boycott originated as a protest against the expulsion o f  catholic
workers from the shipyards and the increased growth o f  violence against catholics in
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Belfast and Lisburn. It also had another motive and this was 'to illustrate the importance 
o f  the south as a market for northern goods and thereby to demonstrate the folly o f  the 
division o f  the country. - The Belfast boycott was first brought up in the Dail by Sean 
McEntee. T.D. for south Monaghan, in August 1920 when he read out a 'petition by four 
Sinn Fein members o f  Belfast Corporation and other prominent catholics in the city. They 
appealed for help in 'the war o f  extermination being waged against us, and called for a 
boycott o f  goods from Belfast and a withdrawal o f  funds from Belfast based banks by 
people in the rest o f  Ireland.'3 Me Entee further moved the motion that:
it be and is hereby declared that an embargo be laid, upon 
the manufactures of the aforesaid city o f  Belfast; that all 
trade and commerce with it by citizens o f  the Irish Republic 
be forbidden and that the government o f  the republic calls 
upon all its loyal citizens to rigorously enforce the
provision o f  this decree.4
The motion was seconded by Cavan west T.D. Paul Galligan. It was 
another delegate from the region, Monaghan protestant Ernest Blythe, who spoke out 
against the motion. He was 'entirely opposed to a blockade against Belfast.' He believed 
th a t ' to declare an economic blockade o f  Belfast would be the worst possible step to take. 
If  it were taken it would destroy for ever the possibility of any union.'5
Blythe eventually succeeded in getting an amendment added to the motion 
that 'the ministry be directed to consider what action can be taken by way o f  a commercial 
embargo against individuals responsible for inciting the recent pogroms in Belfast.'6 The 
boycott commenced soon after as violence in Belfast worsened. Indeed on 17 September 
1920 in the acting president's opening statement to the cabinet he stated that:
The general boycott instituted against Belfast was being 
stringently felt, especially by the banks... In order that [the
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boycott] might be properly carried out it was essential to 
place a man in charge o f  operations in Dublin.7
The Belfast boycott committee, which was set up was a well coordinated 
body, which maintained good contact with local boycott committees. The records o f  this 
committee, which are held in the National Archives, are a vital source in studying the 
boycott.8
The boycott was taken up with much enthusiasm in the Cavan and 
Monaghan region. Indeed the Dundalk Democrat in its editorial column o f 7 August 
1920, even before the Dail ratified a boycott o f  Belfast goods, was urging traders o f  the 
region to boycott Belfast goods. Following the imposition of the boycott, Monaghan 
County Council passed a resolution in support of the boycott.
That as An Dail has declared the imposition o f  religious or 
political tests for industrial employment in Ireland, illegal,
we call upon the people o f  county Monaghan to refuse to
have any dealings with the firms in Belfast or any other part 
o f  Ireland which are guilty o f  this illegality, that the attention 
o f  all public bodies in the county is particularly directed to
this matter when considering tenders for supplies.9
Local bodies throughout the region also passed resolutions in support o f  
the boycott. In late August a large meeting o f  Cavan traders was held in the town hall, to 
discuss what action should be taken in support of the boycott. It was attended by both 
catholic and protestant traders and it seemed as if the boycott initiative could be kept free 
o f  any sectarian animosities in the region. Mr. P. Galligan, a member o f  the county 
council, said he was delighted to welcome their non catholic townsmen as a sign o f  the 
friendly feelings that existed in Cavan, 'there was not, he felt certain, a right thinking
protestant in the town who did not object to the course being taken in Belfast.'10 In
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Killeshandra the traders passed a resolution condemning 'the barbarous treatment o f  the 
Belfast workers on account o f  their religion and politics.'11
It was also hoped that the boycott campaign could be kept free from sectarian 
animosities in Monaghan. This was always likely to be more difficult in north Monaghan 
where unionists owned a considerable amount of businesses. Any hopes o f  keeping the 
boycott campaign free from sectarian animosities in the region quickly evaporated over 
an argument between catholic and unionist traders in Monaghan. The Northern 
Standard's editorial column o f  28 August 1920. mirrored the alarm in the county when it 
stated that the situation was most grave.
It may be that we are on the eve of a series of events which
will have far reaching and calamitous results. The catholic
traders have regretted that religious rancour should be stirred 
up - they are not alone. It is regretted by all and, catholic and 
protestant, we may shortly regret it more.1-
Tensions between catholic and protestant traders began over a series of 
resolutions passed by the rival trading associations. Catholics felt much agrieved when 
the unionist traders decided not to adhere to the Belfast boycott. The reason given by the 
unionist traders for this course of action was that, 'we cannot see our way to sign any 
undertaking in reference to the conduct o f  our business which would limit our capacity to 
buy in the best markets, and which would indirectly punish those as innocent of 
persecution as we are ourselves.'13 It is interesting that unionists in Monaghan oppossed 
the boycott on these two grounds. On the first ground, that is economic, it is fair to say
that unionists had every justification in not supporting the boycott. Unionist traders in
Monaghan had already suffered a significant loss in business during the sectarian violence 
that had engulfed the region. They were a minority whose position was already extremely 
precarious and it would have been foolhardy for them to further disadvantage themselves
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by not buying in the best markets. Secondly, loyalty to their co-religionists was to be 
expected from unionists in Monaghan. The wording o f  their reply is significant. To take 
the second part o f  this 'which would indirectly punish those as innocent o f  persecution as 
we are ourselves.' It was not just unionists who had voiced reservations about imposing a 
boycott on Belfast goods. It was argued by many opponents o f  the boycott including 
Ernest Blythe, T.D. for north Monaghan, that many nationalists would suffer indirectly 
from it. It was also recognised that it was extremely naive for people to expect the boycott 
to exclusively punish those responsible for the attrocities in Belfast. In any case unionists 
in Monaghan themselves suffered from their fair share of sectarian hostilities. Therefore 
their position was totally justified.
This decision however incensed the catholic traders and brought the 
following response from the catholic traders who believed they were,
now reluctantly compelled to take all measures within their 
power to prevent the sale o f  Belfast goods in this town...
They deeply deplore the religious rancour, but consider that 
their proposal, which was the product of moderate men and 
meant to avoid trouble should have had a more favourable 
response and they will therefore accept no responsibility for 
subsequent happenings.14
The veiled threat in this response was an ominous sign for the region as it became 
increasingly clear, even at this early stage of the boycott, that in areas with a significant 
protestant population, the boycott would cause serious sectarian hostilities. In Newbliss. 
in north Monaghan, unionists took action against the boycotting of protestant premises. 
After the refusal o f  unionist shopkeepers to sign a document prohibiting dealings with 
Belfast firms, the local branch ot the I.T.G.W.U. picketed protestant shops, and prevented 
catholics from entering these premises. Protestants in the region were encouraged not to 
trade with catholic businesses. On 23 August a meeting of protestants was held in
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Newbliss. which decided to obtain a supply o f  bread from Belfast for protestant residents 
o f  Newbliss. To safeguard the delivery of the bread about 50 Ulster volunteers turned out 
to escort carts of Belfast bread to the protestant shopkeepers of the village.15 This 
incident caused much distrust and animosity between catholics and protestants in 
Newbliss.
While, at this early stage o f  the boycott, their was little organization on a 
national scale, and initiative for the boycott came from local bodies, it was already 
causing significant hardship in the region. A Cavan newspaper The Irish Post, was forced 
to go out o f  business as a result o f  the boycott. Fairs in the region also suffered from a 
dearth of goods and it was reported by the Northern Standard  on 28 August that 'not 
within memory has there been a fair in Clones deficient in general demand. The unhappy 
taboo of Belfast buyers and the effect such a proceeding left many sellers careless of 
whether they took stock out or not.' The boycott was also causing much hardship in the 
region owing to a shortage o f  bread, which formerly came from Belfast, and had now to 
be sent from Dublin. This difficulty was discussed by a committee in Cavan which also 
stated that ' the price of the 21b loaf is from a penny to twopence dearer than that formerly 
paid for the Belfast bread. This is a matter which some committee in Dublin should see 
into, as the poor cannot afford the extra money.'16
Without central administration o f  the boycott and lack o f  coherent policy
from Dublin in this early stage o f  the boycott, it was only sporadically enforced in the
period up to January 1921. As early as October it was reported by the county inspector for
Monaghan that the boycott was showing signs of weakening.17 The Northern Standard
also reported a similar occurence stating that 'the picketing of the protestant traders shops
in Monaghan was not so completely carried out during the past week as heretofore.'1^
Where pickets were still earned out they were not openly enforced.19 A similar situation
was reported in county Cavan, where the boycotts imposition was based on local
initiative, and 'no cases o f  intimidation in connection with it were reported.'-0
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The boycott was still causing economic hardship in the region, and it was 
still difficult to obtain goods from Belfast. Trains and lorries carrying goods into the 
region were also stopped regularly by the I.R.A. and searched. One such incident occured 
near Carrickmacross in late November when lorries conveying goods between Dundalk 
and Carrickmacross were held up and searched for Belfast goods. 'Some goods consigned 
from Belfast were, it is stated, removed. It is also stated that a motor which failed to pull 
up was fired on.'21
Coherent administration for the boycott campaign eventually came from 
Dail Eireann in January 1921. This had the effect o f  politicising the campaign as it 
became express government policy. This also had the effect of further alienating the 
protestant community o f  Cavan and Monaghan. It led protestants in the region to believe 
that they could never receive fair treatment under a Dublin government. Thus it would 
now appear that the worst fear o f  Ernest Blythe had been confirmed. Blythe had told the 
Dail in August 1920 that 'to declare a boycott of Belfast would be the worst possible step 
to take as it would destroy for ever the possibility o f  any union. They could not afford to 
range any section of the community against [the government], the basis o f  every trouble 
in the North was sectarian and it was that fact that made possible the fury o f  anti catholic 
forces.'22
This more concerted effort to enforce the boycott coincided with the 
appointment o f  Joseph Mac Donagh as substitute Minister for Labour.23 Mac Donagh 
was keen to effectively organize the boycott from Dublin and to set up regional 
committees, which were inevitably made up exclusively of nationalists. He wanted to
have appointed a boycott committee in every town in 
Ireland. These committees could be composed of merchants, 
shop assistants and transport recorders. Vigilance 
committees would have to be formed to spot goods on 
railway stations to find out if  any shopkeepers are getting
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through other towns and to find out when Belfast travellers 
arrive in town and give him notice to quit.-4
The Belfast boycott committee was also very effective in providing central 
administration for the boycott.-5 The records of the Belfast boycott committee's 
correspondence with the Department o f  Finance show that their was much 
communication between the local boycott committee's and the central committees.-6 
Much information is contained in this correspondence and the committee aimed to 
impress on the local committees the necessity of keeping good records. One example of 
this is a letter sent to the Minister for Finance by the Director o f  the Boycott in November 
1921.
I also enclose cheque for £50 from our Cootehill committee, 
it is accompanied by a sheet showing lists of fines and 
expenses incurred by the committee. This whole thing is 
irregular, but as the fines have been paid for a considerable 
period, we have decided to allow it to pass. The best thing to
do is to issue a receipt to the secretary for £50.~7
An important weapon used by the boycott committee was the issuing of 
'Black lists' o f  firms that were acting as distributors for Belfast goods. The first o f  these 
black lists was issued in February 1921. It included the names o f  firms in Scotland, 
England, Dublin and the six counties. The boycott was being severely felt in Belfast and 
throughout the six counties as is evidenced by a statement issued by the west Belfast 
Unionist club to the loyal traders o f  Belfast.The statement contained a copy o f  the black 
list and admitted that 'in every case it is being rigorously enforced by the terrorist gunmen 
o f  Sinn Fein, who will stop at nothing in carrying out their fell purpose o f  endeavouring 
to injure the trade of Belfast, and spread unemployment throughout the six counties, 
which comprise the northern parliamentary area o f  Ireland. - 8
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The effective and coherent organisation of the boycott had an almost 
instantaneous effect in the Cavan and Monaghan region. In January the county inspector 
for Cavan reported the holding up o f  a goods train between Crossdonev and Cavan and 
that two cases o f  bread were taken out and destroyed.-9 The county inspector for 
Monaghan reported that the 'boycott o f  Belfast goods was hardening' after the relative 
peacefulness o f  the previous months.30 On the night o f  28 January' 1921, a goods train 
was held up near Cavan, by the I.R.A, and its contents were inspected. Goods found to 
have originated from Belfast such as a hamper o f  bread consigned from Messrs. Inglis, 
Belfast were thrown out o f  the train.31
A noticeable trend was discernable in regards to the boycott from January, 
it was now much more coherently organised. Even at a local level it was easy to see that 
there was a structure to the organisation of the boycott, as local committees reported to 
the central committee headquarters in Dublin. The I.R.A. and the republican court system 
were crucial in the effective organisation o f  the boycott. It can be clearly seen that up to 
the time o f  the truce in July 1921 that the boycott was hardening. A number o f  crucial 
methods were used to ensure the effectiveness of the boycott and these will now be 
examined in detail.
The first method used to enforce the boycott was the destruction o f  goods
which arrived in the region from Belfast firms. This was carried out by the I.R.A., who
also intimidated merchants from Belfast who came to the region. Breadvans were
especially targetted by the I.R.A. as certain shopkeepers in the region refused to boycott
Belfast bread, owing to the high price of, and difficulty in obtaining bread from Dublin.
In Monaghan the county inspector reported that on ’four occassions bread vans belonging
to a trader in Monaghan who has refused to submit to the boycott have been burned.3- 1 In
April it was reported that in Cavan 'the Belfast boycott still continues with vigour and
there have been seven cases o f  destruction o f  goods consigned from Belfast.'33 At Cavan
quarter sessions in April Messrs. Inglis and Co., Belfast, made a claim for the burning out
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of two bread vans at Cavan and Killeshandra. Beside one o f  the vans was found the notice 
: 'Your turn next ; clear out - I.R.A.'34 The company was awarded £80 and £55 for the
two vans. This claim was served on Cootehill Urban council, on behalf of the firm. The 
council decided to take no notice of the claim. At Monaghan quarter sessions Me Caldins. 
another bread company, 'who had refused to sign a Belfast boycott paper' were awarded a 
total o f  £2.098 for the burning out of four bread vans in Monaghan. While the quarter 
sessions were proceeding the firm got word that another van had been burned out.3-"'
As well as attacking bread vans the I.R.A also carried out systematic 
searches o f  goods trains entering the region, which were suspected of carrying goods from 
Belfast. The most spectacular o f  these attacks occurred in late April at Glasslough station 
in north Monaghan. The train contained mails and parcels for shopkeepers in Cavan and 
Fermanagh, and when it was found that it contained goods from boycotted firms, it was 
set alight by the I.R.A. Twenty wagons were burned out and it made 'a scene of 
destruction probably never seen before in the north.'36 Another train was raided by armed 
and disguised men at Inniskeen railway station on 14 March. 'They emptied a waggon 
containing sugar, bacon, bread and hardware and burnt the goods after sprinkling them 
with parrafin stolen from some local business premises.'37 A statement made by Dublin 
Castle dated 11 May 1921, stated that 'Cavan is one of the most active centres o f  this 
boycott, and large quantities o f  valuable food stuffs have recently been destroyed by 
armed men in the neighbourhood because they believed the goods to have come from 
Belfast.'38
Premises which were suspected of containing goods obtained from Belfast 
were also targetted by the I.R.A. On 5 March members o f  the I.R.A. visited the houses of 
Mr. Elliot, stationmaster on the Cavan and Leitrim Railway at Bawnboy road. They 
searched the goods store. They obtained three tons of Indian meal from a Belfast firm, 
consigned to a south Leitrim shopkeeper. A note was left stating - 'No partition wanted -
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No Belfast goods'39 In Monaghan the county inspector reported that on the nights o f  4
and 5 June two houses were entered and Belfast goods destroyed.40
Numerous claims were made by Belfast firms to the quarter sessions for
compensation for damage caused in the Cavan and Monaghan region. At Clones quarter
sessions on 18 June 1921 the entire session was taken up by claims made by Belfast firms
for damages suffered due to the boycott. This vividly illustrates the strength of the boycott
in the region and the destruction o f  Belfast goods wrought by the boycott. The most
serious case was the burning o f  a train in Glasslough. The judge gave a decree for rolling
stock amounting to £7,756 and £25 expenses, all levied on county Monaghan.41
While the matters described above did cause much financial and economic
hardship for businesses o f  the region, it was the picketing o f  shops and the impsition of
fines on businesses which dealt with Belfast firms which ensured the sucess o f  the
boycott in the region. From early January 1921 notices were posted by the local boycott
committees to shopkeepers in the region warning them not to deal with certain firms.
Notices were also posted up warning people not to deal with certain shops in the locality.
Any shop which ignored the boycott was picketed by the I.R.A. and this caused much
economic hardship for shopkeepers. The Anglo Celt reported on 29 January that written
notices were received by Cavan shopkeepers, who sold bread, warning them against
selling bread made in Belfast or Portadown. Further notices were posted from Belturbet
in February, reminding traders in Cavan that the boycott was still in force and that failure
to comply with it would involve penalties.4-
'Black lists' o f  merchants to be boycotted, owing to their purchasing of
Belfast goods were widely circulated throughout the region. In March handbills were
distributed and posted in Monaghan, warning people against dealing with persons who
sold Belfast goods.43 A 'Black list' o f  business places in Ballybay, containing the names
of 25 merchants who were trading with Belfast, was served to the public in March 1921.
The D undalk Democrat reported that much confusion abounded in connection with the
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list and that 'it did not appear that all in sundry were taking friendly to the order.'44 
However the following week it was reported that the boycott was now in full force owing 
to the public being well acquainted with the regulations.45 Locals were now also 
encouraged to stop dealing with Belfast banks and numerous cases occured where people 
withdrew their money from these banks. The banks were also targets for attack by the 
I.R.A. and in March it was reported that the Belfast bank in Monaghan was set on fire.46
In north Monaghan the boycott was directed almost exclusively at 
protestant traders and the picketing of protestant shops caused much economic hardship 
for protestants and also further fueled sectarian animosities. One particular flashpoint 
occured in Catleblaynev when a black list was circulated by the local boycott committee 
of merchants alleged to be still dealing with Belfast firms.47 Following this notice being
pinned up in the town, the Anti Belfast Boycott Society pinned up a notice 'warning any
merchant who subscribed to the organiser of the Belfast boycott that he would have his 
goods burned over his head.'48
Notices were pined up throughout the region during the period up to the 
truce and these were successful in ensuring that the boycott continued unabated. 
Numerous pamphlets were also distributed throughout the region reminding people o f  the 
aims o f  the boycott and their duties to aid their co - religionists in Belfast. An example of 
these pamphlets is one intercepted by the R.I.C. in Cavan which was signed 'Parish 
Priest'.
Former boycotts were not successful because the nationalists 
were too tolerant; but I think by this time it must have 
penetrated even the heads o f  the pogramists that Sinn 
Feiners can be quite as stubborn and at least a hundred times 
as clever as these 'dour and hard headed Orangemen'.. To 
make the boycott absolutely successful and permanent all 
people in the west o f  Ireland should take the matter up., the 
screw must not only be kept on but turned ruthlessly until 
these 'latter day saints' squeal for mercy.49
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While pamphlets such as these were in circulation in the region, and 
especially those carrying the signature o f  a parish priest, the boycott was always likely to 
remain to the forefront o f  public opinion. It was also clear that firms in the area were 
feeling the pinch due to the effective enforcement o f  the boycott. Traders were now 
willing to pay the £20 fine for trading with Belfast firms to have their names kept o f  the 
boycott lists. Notices were often sent to traders, and from the numerous accounts of 
money being sent to the central boycott committee in Dublin, it is clear that they were 
more often that not paid. An example o f  these notices was one sent by the West Cavan 
Boycott Committee. This noted stated that 'after fully investigating your case the above 
committee have fined you £20 for trading with firms within the prohibited area. This fine 
must be paid before the 14 October, otherwise your name will again appear on the Black 
list.49 The list o f  fines in table three which were paid by traders in Cavan for breach of 
the Boycott vividly illustrates the effectiveness o f  local committees in imposing and 
collecting fines.
Some traders even resorted to placing advertsienients in the local 
newspapers, claiming to be innocent of breaching the boycott, so that they would not 
loose customers. The following notice, printed in the Anglo Cel! on 2 July 1921, is an 
excellent example o f  this.
APOLOGY:
Having learned that some o f  my wholesale customers have 
been notified not to deal with me owing to my having 
procurred some goods from Belfast, I hereby apologise for 





Thus by the time o f  the truce in July 1921. the boycott was being 
stringently felt throughout the region. The inspector general for Cavan reported that 'the 
boycott o f  Belfast goods and Northern banks still continues but violent acts in connection 
therewith have fallen off.'51
Any hopes o f  the truce bringing an end to the enforcement o f  the boycott 
in the Cavan and Monaghan region, however, were quickly dashed. Even from a 
superficial glance at the records of the boycott central committee, it can be clearly seen 
that fines continued to come into the committee from the Cavan and Monaghan region at 
a brisk pace. In Cavan on the night of 23 July a raid was carried out by the I.R.A. on 
Drumhowna railway station. The keys o f  the store were demanded and two rolls o f  
tobacco, from Belfast, valued at £50 were taken.5- In Monaghan the boycott also 
continued but the county inspector reported that 'no reports o f  action to enforce it have 
come in except in Carrickmacross where a man is said to have been fined 10/- for dealing 
with a northern bank.53 It would appear to be the case that the I.R.A in the region used 
the period immediately after the truce to regroup and reform. The Inspector General 
believed that Sinn Fein was 'taking every advantage afforded by the truce to enforce the 
boycott.'54
By September the boycott was tougher than ever and in Cavan it was so 
bad that, 'at Belturbet, Killeshandra and Bailieboro, that fairs and markets at those places 
have almost died out. The country people find it more convenient to transfer their custom 
to towns where there are fewer shopkeepers on the boycott black list.'55 The small ads 
section o f  the Anglo Celt also saw an increase in the number of apologies sent in by 
traders found to be in breach of the boycott. In the 10 September issue alone, seven 
apologies, o f  which the following is typical, were printed.
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Belfast Boycott:
On looking over my invoices I notice an item of goods 
received from Belfast, for which I apologise and guarantee 
not to accpet any more goods from the above area.
Signed John Kelly.
Main Street, Belturbet.
In Monaghan attempts were also made to harden the boycott, but this only 
served to increase sectarian animosities as 'the anti - boycott of Ireland committee had 
come into the county.'56 Incidents of posting boycott black lists up in north Monaghan 
further incensed protestants. as the lists predominantly named protestant traders. For 
example the black list, contained in Appendix One, pinned up in Castleblayney. 
containined almost exclusively the names of protestant traders, with the exception of 
three,i.e. Michael Me Ardle, F. Carragher and Bernard Lynch. A boycott was also carried 
out on J and J. Pattons Glasslough. It was reported that the boycott had its desired effect, 
with few catholics entering the premises.
While the Belfast boycott continued unabated throughout the period of the 
truce and the period after the signing of the Treaty, the truce was welcomed by all sides in 
the Cavan and Monaghan region. All sides were anxious for peace and a return to 
normality in the region. People were tired of the violence which made day to day life 
extremely hazardous and difficult. Economically the truce was welcomed by all sides, 
especially by the farming community and business classes, who were approaching 
financial ruin. Apart from in relation to the Belfast boycott, discussed above, and the 
continued drilling and setting up of I.R.A camps in the region, the truce was impecably 
maintained throughout the region. This fact was confirmed by the inspector general who 
states that in Cavan 'the great majority is anxious for a settlement and quite willing to 
accept what has been offered.'57 He also reported that in Monaghan, 'there is but one 
prayer amongst all in the county... 'Peace'.'58 People in the region kept themselves well
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informed on negotiations towards a settlement, mainly via the local and national 
newspapers and waited anxiously for peace.
There was a noticeable air o f  resignation in the region about the 
negotiations for peace and the partitioning of Ulster. It is important to emphasis that 
partition was a fact of life for people in the region even before negotiations had begun in 
July between De Valera and Lloyd George. Partition had been imposed by the 
Government of Ireland Act in December. Northern Ireland was already in existence and 
its parliament in operation when De Valera rejected the British proposals for a settlement 
on 20 July 1921. These proposals offered a restricted form of dominion self government 
for the 26 counties, but required 'full recognition of the existing powers and privileges of 
the parliament of Northern Ireland which cannot be abrogated by their own consent.'59 
This met with the predictable Dail reply that 'we cannot admit the right of the British 
government to mutilate our country either in its own interest or at the call of any section 
of our population.'60
Although the Dail refused to accept that the country was already
'mutilated', this fact was accepted, however wrong it was believed to be, by the vast
majority of people in Cavan and Monaghan who were anxious to come to terms with the
problems posed by partition. We can see the nature of these problems by looking at the
local newspapers. It can be clearly seen that despite the Dail's refusal to 'allow any
mutilation of the country', partition was a fact of life in the Cavan and Monaghan region.
One of the first problems to occur was one of a legal nature and occurred at Monaghan
quarter sessions when a breadvan, the property of Messrs. Inglis and Co. Belfast, was
attacked at Edragole, near the Monaghan border, while in transit from Newtownbutler
towards Cavan. The case rose numerous legal difficulties as testified by Major Falls: -
'The attack began first in Co. Fermanagh and ended in Co. Monaghan. Four of the men
arrested were from Co. Monaghan, and the other three from Fermanagh.' The judge
wished to allocate portion of an award on Co. Fermanagh, which produced much legal
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debate. Major Falls believed that the judge could not do this as 'his honors jurisdiction as 
county court judge for southern Ireland did not extend to Northern Ireland.' The judge had 
been at this time county judge for both counties Monaghan and Fermanagh, but it was 
held that the 'jurisdiction of his honour must be in southern Ireland when he is sitting 
there and in Northern Ireland when sitting there.'61
It is clear that partition was by now a fact of life accepted by the people of 
Cavan and Monaghan who were anxious for a peaceful settlement. Statements such as the 
following, made by de Valera, at a public session of Dail Eireann were regarded in the 
region as counterproductive and not conducive to peace.
The geographical fact was that the Almighty had placed this 
island as a unity beside another island. The relations 
between Ireland and Britain constituted a problem which 
was found in daily life, where a strong and powerful person 
wished to encroach on the rights and property of his
neighbour. That was the fundamental problem that had to be 
settled. It was not in the nature of a man to be content as
long as injustice was done to him, and so in the case of a
nation there could be no contentment, happiness, or
prosperity if there was that thorn of injustice continually 
pricking into it.62
Formal negotiations between the British government and plenipotentaries 
appointed by Dail Eireann, did however commence on 11 October 1921. There was a 
very general feeling of relief at de Valera's acceptance of the conference, in the region.63 
The feelings of the vast majority of residents of the region were very aptly appraised in 
the following editorial contained in the Northern Standard of 14 October 1921.
The fateful conference which may decide the future of 
Ireland has at last begun its sittings in Downing Street. In 
regard to its outcome there is a general feeling of pessimism, 
produced to a great extent, by the 'no surrender' manifesto 
issued by the republican leader on the eve of the first
meeting. It is evident that if the Irish representatives go to 
the conference, with a determination to give up nothing, then 
the conference will not last very long. The fact that there is a 
feeling of pessimism amongst men of all shades of opinion 
in Ireland proves that all want peace. Therefore, if the Dail 
delegates wish to represent the views of the country, they 
must go to London prepared to take any reasonable peace 
which is offered them.
These negotiations did finally lead to peace and what is usually referred to 
as 'The Treaty' between Great Britain and Ireland was signed on 6 December 1921. The 
long and protracted negotiations which led to the signing of the treaty are not directly 
relevant to the issues being considered in this thesis. They have been discussed at length 
by other historians, notably by Pakenham.64
The treaty provided for a Free State of Ireland having Dominion status, 
and associated with the Commonwealth of nations known as the British empire.65 The 
position of Ulster was left more ambiguous, giving the six counties the power to enter the 
Free State within a month, or to remain outside it. The primary problem created by the 
treaty in relation to partition was the vagueness of the proposed Boundary Commission, 
to redraw the border of Northern Ireland. The extent of the realignment of the boundary 
by the proposed commission was ambiguous and left open to personal interpretation. This 
was to cause many problems when the Boundary Commission was eventually set up. The 
actual wording of the treaty in relation to the Boundary Commission is reproduced below, 
to illustrate its ambiguous nature.
A commission shall determine, in accordance with the 
wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with 
economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries 
between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for the 
purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of this 
instrument, the boundary o f Northern Ireland shall be such 
as may be determined by such commission.66
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It can be argued that because the provisions for a Boundary Commission 
were left so vague and open to personal interpretation, this was instrumental in ensuring 
the acceptance of the treaty by the majority of people in Ireland. Initial reaction in the 
Cavan and Monaghan region was overwhelmingly in favour of ratification of the treaty. 
People of the region firmly believed that the Boundary Commission would quickly 
restore Tyrone. Fermanagh and large tracts of south Armagh to the Free State. Divisions, 
however, soon became apparent at both governmental level and within the republican 
movement. The Irish cabinet was split by the treaty, with four votes in favour of it, and 
three, including de Valera against it. Some extreme republicans were against the treaty 
but Collins' support of it, ensured that it was accepted by a majority.
Public bodies in Cavan and Monaghan, without exception, strongly urged 
ratification of the treaty. At a special meeting of Cavan urban council the following 
resolution was passed:
That we place on record our high appreciation of the terms 
of the treaty entered into by our nations plenipotentiaries 
and while recognising the great services rendered, by the 
members of An Dail who are in opposition, we 
unanimously request them for the sake of our dear country 
to bury their differences, and stand with Arthur Griffith and 
Sean Mac Keon for the ratification o f the treaty.67
Similar resolutions were passed by public bodies throughout Cavan and Monaghan.
Dail Eireann began debating the treaty on 14 December 1921. The debates 
on the treaty are remarkable for their neglect of the subject of partition, 'Ulster and the 
boundary commission were hardly mentioned and there was a virtual concensus that the 
treaty provided a means for making the Northern Irish state unviable.'68 The neglect of 
the question o f partition in the treaty debates is best summed up by Maureen Wall, 'of 338 
pages of debate, nine only are devoted to the subject of partition and of these nine pages
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the deputies for county Monaghan, deputies Blythe. Mac Entee and O' Duffy, contribute 
two thirds.'69
Those who did speak on the subject of partition, worked on the assumption 
that eventual unity was inevitable. This was an extremely naive attitude to hold, and it can 
be said that the treaty debates, were so full of lofty ideologies, rhetoric and 
romanticisation of Ireland's problems that most of the deputies seemed to have no grasp 
on the realities of partition and the Ulster question. Even Sean Milroy, T.D. for west 
Cavan, speaking in favour of the treaty, seemed to have little grasp of the situation. His 
own constituents, and the public bodies of his constituency, had long ago realised that 
partition was a fact of life which could not be changed overnight. In a speech full of 
misunderstandings of the situation and blind optimism, Milroy maintained that:
The fact is that the provisions of the treaty are not partition 
provisions, but they ensure eventual unity in Ireland. But as 
a matter of fact, whether there were partition provisions or 
not, the economic position and the effects on the six 
counties area is this: that sooner or later isolation from the 
rest of Ireland would have so much weight on the economic 
state of these six counties as to compel them to renew their 
association with the rest of Ireland.70
While the debates on the treaty continued, people in the Cavan and 
Monaghan region waited anxiously for ratification of the treaty. Resolutions were passed 
strongly urging ratification of the treaty and the debates were the subject of most public 
meetings in the region. Special meetings were held of both Cavan and Monaghan county 
councils early in the new year to discuss the treaty. The chairman of Monaghan county 
council believed that 'a hundred per cent of the people of county Monaghan were in 
favour of ratification. It was the first step towards freedom, and it was the duty of the 
county council to instruct their representatives to support the treaty.'71 Cavan county
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council were also in favour of the treaty and the following resolution was passed by 18 
votes to 2.
The Cavan county council, whilst feeling that the present 
treaty does not realise all the hopes of the Irish people, 
believe that it safe guards the best interests of the gaelic 
nation, and the alternative is such that acting in the name of 
our constituents we now formally by resolution pronounce in 
its favour.72
One public representative in the region, Sean Me Entee, T.D. for south 
Monaghan, did speak out against the treaty and was ultimately forced to resign his seat in 
the Dail. This was indicative of the overwhelming support for the treaty in his 
constituency. The treaty was finally ratified by the Dail on 14 January 1922 by 64 votes to 
57. It was an extremely narrow margin and illustrated the split emerging, not only in the 
corridors of power, but also in the country at large. The Irish Free State was born but 
started on an immensely precarious footing. Collins became president of the provisional 
government and a general election was called. This election was to be crucial for the 
infant state, and as will be seen in the next chapter, this election confirmed the fact that 
Ireland was slipping towards civil war. This was to herald the start of more troubled times 
for Ireland, and also the Cavan and Monaghan region.
Following the establishment of a provisional government under Collins the 
Belfast boycott finally came to an end in late January 1922. The boycott was officially 
brought to an end by the Collins - Craig pact which was signed on 21 January. The 
boycott had been ineffective at a national level as was admitted by Collins himself.
Mr Collins (Provisional Government minutes 30 Jan 1922) 
pointed out that the boycott was comparitively ineffective, 
and that if it became necessary to fight the Northern 
parliament they could set up an effective tarrif barrier in its 
stead.73
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Collins and Craig met in London on 21 January and signed an agreement 
which became known as the first Craig Collins pact. In this agreement they agreed to 
work together on the boundary issue, the council of Ireland, the railway dispute and the 
question of post truce prisoners. The second point of the agreement brought the boycott to 
an end and stated that:
Without prejudice to the future consideration of his 
government on the question of tarrifs, Mr. Collins 
undertakes that the Belfast boycott is to be discontinued 
immediately, and Sir James Craig undertakes to facilitate in 
every possible way the return of Catholic workmen without 
tests to the shipyards, as and when trade revival enables the 
firms concerned to absorb the present unemployed. In the 
meantime a system of relief on a large scale is being
arranged to carry' over the period of distress.74
The ending of the boycott was welcomed by all sides. It had been a 
complete failure in what it set out to achieve and was in fact counter productive. The 
boycott was the first from of partition witnessed between north and south and severely 
damaged north south relations. While the boycott did seriously hamper the trade of 
certain Belfast firms, it also hit southern firms. 'Southern traders were driven to markets 
where prices were higher and credits shorter than in Belfast. The increased cost was 
passed on to their customers, with the result that the whole southern community paid for 
the upkeep of the boycott.'75 The lifting of the boycott was met with great relief in Cavan 
and Monaghan. The region was one of the few where the boycott was rigourously and 
successfully enforced. People in the region recognised the failure of the boycott in 
achieving its aims and the hardship which it was causing to themselves.
It was obvious that this campaign of attrition could not last 
indefinitely, for while the boycott had sufficient power to 
hamper and irritate those against whom it was directed, yet it
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had not sufficient power to crush them. On the other hand, 
those who directed it were themselves hampered, and 
irritated by the stoppage of supplies from a centre which a
great deal of trade in southern Ireland had been done.76
The boycott had a number of highly significant and far reaching effects on
the Cavan and Monaghan region, which need careful consideration. One of the main 
reasons dehind Dail Eireann's decision to initiate a boycott of Belfast goods, was to force 
Belfast to realise that it could not survive without the trade of southern Ireland. This 
move was totally counterproductive and instead of fostering unity the boycott was 'very 
steadily erecting a new barrier between north and south , it was no more really effective 
towards a union of hearts and minds and interests than an invasion of 'Ulster' by a
southern army would have been, and therefore not conducive to real or lasting peace.'77
The boycott also gave the people of the region their first view of what living in a 
partitioned province would be like. The boycott implanted for the first time partition in 
the minds and consciousness of people in the region. It created hostilities between the two 
states before the border had even been drawn.
In some areas of the region, such as north Monaghan, the boycott had a 
disastrous effect on catholic-protestant relations. In many cases the boycott was used to 
further sectarian divisions, and in conjunction with the Anglo Irish war it created great 
hardship for protestants in the region. In many cases large numbers of protestants moved 
north of the border during this period. Protestant businesses were especially hit in 
Monaghan, Newbliss and Ballybay. The boycott also saw mass destruction of goods and 
property and 'in a time of high prices and slackened production, Ireland could not afford, 
any more than any other country to have such a campaign of destruction carried on.'78 
The boycott hit consumers in the region very badly and it would seem that some 
shopkeepers and ’wholesalers utilised the exclusion of Belfast from the southern market 
as an opportunity to put up prices.'79 The inspector general reported for September 1921
94
that in Cavan 'their is no doubt that the boycott is being made use of by greedy and 
unscrupulous traders to bring custom to their own shops.'80 There were numerous reports 
in the Northern Standard that consumers were being exploited, one report stating that 'in 
a small place like Ballybay where only a limited number of traders are engaged in the 
different branches of business it is only natural in the case of a boycott to find the 
consumers exploited when half the sources of supply are cut off or blacklisted.'81
The boycott hit the pockets of people in every-' walk of life in the region, 'in 
the town of Monaghan the working men who observed the Belfast boycott had to pay 5s 
per week more for his living than he might have paid if the boycott had not existed.'8- 
The inflated prices in existence during the period of the boycott also severely hit farmers 
in the area. Overall it is fair to say that the boycott had serious effects on the region 
which were not envisaged by Sean Me Entee T.D., when he proposed the boycott in 
August 1920.
The ratification of the treaty and the ending of the boycott brought new 
hope to the region as evidenced by the following editorial in the Dundalk Democrat on 28 
January 1922.
There is here, we think, the genesis of a new spirit of mutual 
good feeling and toleration which may easily grow to 
friendship, and from that to complete understanding and full 
partnership between the Irish of the north and of the south.
They are one people, with common interests. Their 
seperation is like the Belfast boycott a purely artificial thing, 
repugnant to both and injurious to both and it can only be 
maintained by artificial means. Remove these and the two 
parties will come together and stay together.
Despite the lifting o f  the boycott relations between North and South 
quickly deteriorated as both countries plunged towards crisis as the so called 'border wars' 
commenced in 1922, which would have a dramatic effect on Cavan and Monaghan.
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THE BORDER WARS AND CIVIL WAR, 
1922-1923.
MAP SHOWING CONCENTRATION OF PROTESTANT 








Source: based on 1918 general election results, taken from North East Boundary Bureau, 
Handbook o f the Ulster Quest/on(Dublin,1923).
The start of a new year in January 1922 heralded a new era for the people 
of Cavan and Monaghan. There was much cause for optimism and hope for a fresh start 
for a people who had witnessed an immensely turbulent and bloody passage of history 
over the previous years. The treaty had been ratified by the Dail on 7 January 1922 and 
promised a return to normality and stability for the Cavan and Monaghan region. The 
signing of the Craig - Collins pact gave much cause for optimism and it appeared that 
North and South would live in harmony and peace. It was believed that the Boundary 
Commission would quickly restore large tracts of south Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh 
to the Irish Free State. This would mean that Cavan and Monaghan would no longer have 
a border with the Northern state and would, it was hoped, bring stability to her border 
regions. This new feeling of optimism was mirrored by the local press.
There is here, we think, the genesis of a new spirit of mutual 
good feeling and toleration which may easily grow to 
friendship, and from that to complete under-standing and 
full partnership between the Irish of the north and the Irish 
of the south.1
This was to prove a false dawn as relations between North and South 
steadily deteriorated. This chapter explores the most serious ramifications of the partition 
settlement in politicial terms. The short period studied in this chapter proved a very 
significant one for the border regions of Cavan and Monaghan. With the ending of the 
Belfast boycott some elements of the I.R.A. began to focus their attention on attacking the 
new Northern state. Following the ratification of the Treay by the Dail. the realisation that 
partition was now a fact of life began to dawn on the I.R.A.. Therefore attention was now 
turned on destabilising the new state by attacking its borders. This period had a number of 
severe repercussions for the region. The border regions of Cavan and Monaghan became 
the scene of great violence and hostilities between opposing forces north and south of the 
border.
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This period which lasted until the onset of the civil war in June, became 
known as the 'border wars'. It was clear by mid January that relations between North and 
South were becoming increasingly fraught during negotiations between Craig and 
Collins. Tensions were also mounting in the border areas, as the newly reformed Specials 
and the l.R.A. faced each other over the borderline. Both forces were inspired by a mutual 
hatred of each other and were anxious to settle old scores. This made it virtually 
impossible for Collins and Craig to control their respective forces in the border regions, 
who more often than not operated on their own initiative and without sanction from 
headquarters.
This had economic ramifications for the region. During this period there 
was virtually no economic interchange over the boundary line. This had serious effects on 
market towns such as Belturbet, Ballyconnell and Clones which were dependent on 
northern customers. The decision of the Northern authorities to close many of the border 
roads leading into Northern Ireland in an effort to curb l.R.A. raids across the border 
caused great difficulties in the region. Farmers and traders in the border regions were 
severely hampered by the closure of the border roads and communications with the 
Northern state diminished alarmingly during this period. The impact of these events was 
profound in both economic and political terms. This period caused untold damage to 
relations in the border regions North and South.
The incident which sparked hostilities North and South occurred on 21
January 1922 when the Monaghan G.A.A. team was stopped and many of the players
arrested while on their way to play the Ulster gaelic football final in Derry. Fearing that
they might be held up by the railway strike, the players left for Derry in six motor cars.
When the team reached the village of Dromore in county Tyrone, they were stopped by
the special constabulary.2 'Many of the Monaghan players were l.R.A. men and as the
border had barely begun to exist, they travelled armed with their usual revolvers.'3 The
party included a prominent member of the I.R.A., Dan Hogan, who had initiated many
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attacks on the specials during the Anglo-Irish war. Ten of the men were arrested and at a 
special sitting of Omagh district court they were charged with having arms and 
ammunition. The men were later interned in Derry jail and this caused outrage and 
furious protests in Monaghan. The chief of staff of the l.R.A. Owen O Duffy was 
incensed and protested to the British authorities. He stated that he had 'taken the matter up 
with the British authorities and unless the men are released forthwith, I will take my own 
action.'4
Tensions in the border regions increased further when negotiations 
between Craig and Collins reached a deadlock over the boundary question. Collins and 
Craig had decided to resolve the boundary question between themselves, under the 
conditions of the Craig - Collins pact. Collins however insisted that 'under the Treaty, 
readjustment of the boundary meant the cession to southern Ireland of the whole of 
Tyrone and Fermanagh, together with large areas in Derry, Down and Armagh.'5 It was 
impossible for Collins to give way on this issue, as to do so would turn public opinion in 
Ireland against him. Craig was also in no mood to cede large tracts of the six counties to 
the Free State. A further conference was held on 2 February 1922 between Craig and 
Collins and at this conference it became clear that compromise on the boundary question 
was impossible, and the following statement was released after the conference:
Owing to the fact of Mr Collins stand on the Boundary 
Commission and the Irish delegations agreements with Mr.
Lloyd George, that large territories were involved in the 
Commission, and not merely a boundary line, as Sir James 
Craig was given to understand privately by several British 
ministers and from statements of Mr. Lloyd George in the 
House of Commons, no further agreement was reached and a 
very serious situation has consequently arisen.6
Further conferences were held at Downing Street in the following days but failed to 
resolve the issue and in a letter to the Prime Minister, Craig informed him that 'we cannot
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consent to any alteration of our boundary except by mutual agreement, failing which in 
respect of any territory' in dispute the boundary to stand as defined in the Government of 
Ireland Act. 1920.'7
The following day witnessed the opening of the British parliament and 
Lloyd George seemed willing to wash his hands of the boundary7 question in public. In a 
speech punctuated with considerable laughter, Lloyd George attempted to make light of 
the growing tensions in the border regions over the boundary question.
Do let us have a little patience. Do not let us rush to the 
conclusion that because there is one failure at a meeting that, 
therefore, the whole thing is over, and that we must start 
drawing our swords and attacking each other for the sake of 
peace in Ireland (laughter). They are two Irishmen 
(laughter). I have seen Irishmen bargain.... one puts forward 
demands of so preposterous a character that the other cannot 
accept them.... Let us have more patience, and proceed more 
deliberately.8
The tensions which had been building in the border regions reached a new 
height on the night of 8 February 1922. Flying columns of the I.R.A., based in Monaghan 
'invaded' the six county area and carried off 43 hostages from the northern state. The 
hostages included numerous prominent unionists living in the six counties and also 28 
members of the special constabulary along with a member of the R.I.C.9 The men were 
captured partly as a reprisal for the internment of the Monaghan footballers in Derry jail, 
and also because of the breakdown of the Craig - Collins pact which failed to secure the 
release of republican prisoners in the six counties. The raids caused much terror in the 
border regions and left the residents of the border regions living in fear of intimidation 
and reprisals. Much of the fighting on the night of 8 Febraury, occurred around the 
Clones region, and many people witnessed the attacks by the I.R.A. on the Specials. At 
Wattlebridge, near the border, a party of I.R.A. men met a crossley tender carrying A
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specials, whom they called upon to stop.10 The specials opened fire and in the ensuing 
skirmish the crossley tender along with arms and ammunition were captured by the 
I.R.A..11
Two specials were killed in a further encounter with the I.R.A. between 
Clones and Newtownbutler. Numerous homes of unionists in the border regions were 
raided and prominent loyalists kidnapped and taken to Monaghan. The situation 
considerably worsened when another serious confrontation occurred between specials and 
the I.R.A.. The incident occurred when a party of eighteen specials were travelling from 
Newtownbutler to Enniskillen to strengthen three platoons which were engaged in 
patrolling the border on 11 February. The specials who were armed, had to change trains 
at Clones station. As soon as they reached Clones, word was sent to the local I.R.A. 
commandant. Matt Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick decided to arrest the men and ordered them to 
put their hands up. Fitzpatrick was, however, shot dead by one of the specials, which 
prompted the I.R.A. to open fire using a machine gun. In the ensuing melee five specials 
were killed and six were wounded. Five of the specials were held prisoner by the I.R.A.12
This incident had a disastrous effect on an already fraught situation in the 
six counties. Tensions in Belfast were extremely high and the shooting of the specials in 
Clones station precipitated the outbreak of fresh violence in Belfast. In the week 
following the incident at Clones station 34 people were wounded and 100 injured in 
Belfast.13 The people of Clones were also living in fear and terror as they awaited another 
serious confrontation between the specials and the I.R.A.. Following the incident the 
people of Clones were fearful of reprisals and as the following report vividly illustrates, 
the situation in Clones was akin to that of a war zone.
The town lighting was extinguished, and in shops and 
private houses the order was given 'lights out'. The streets 
and approaches of the town were put under control by the 
I.R.A., who came flooding in from other parts of county 
Monaghan as well as from Fermanagh and Cavan. The
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greatest excitement reigned in the town during the night, and 
nothing could be heard but the march of armed men and 
sharp military orders.14
Frantic negotiations took place between Churchill and Collins in an 
attempt to bring the region back from the brink of chaos and violence. In addition to 
attempting to secure the release of all hostages taken in the border region, Churchill was 
anxious to placate public opinion in London. Churchill was concerned that rifles and 
motor transport supplied to the provisional government from R.I.C. stocks had been used 
in the recent border raids.1- Collins moved quickly to reassure Churchill on this matter 
and relations between Dublin and London quickly improved on this issue. Both men were 
also anxious to secure the release of the Derry footballers and the hostages taken by the 
I.R.A. in the border raids. Collins assured the British government that he would do his 
utmost to secure the release of the hostages and as an act of good will immediately 
secured the release of fifteen of the civilian hostages.
In the House of Commons on 15 February, Churchill spoke of improved 
relations between London and Dublin concerning violence in the six counties. He also 
spoke of his concern at the
attitude of mutual suspicion which has been growing up on 
both sides of the border. There is a great apprehension in 
Northern Ireland that there may be some violent incursion, 
and a great suspicion that large numbers of the I.R.A. are 
accumulating and concentrating in the villages of county 
Monaghan. On the other hand, there is a considerable 
movement of armed constables taking place north of the 
line, and, similar apprehensions are entertained by those in
the south.16
With this in mind Churchill proposed to both northern and southern governments that a 
border liaison commission should be set up. This commission would consist of
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several British officers and officers from the forces on either 
side of the border and that those two liaison commissions 
should move about on either side of the frontier, and that 
they should be in constant communication with each other 
and interchange information constantly in order to allay
suspicions which might easily arise.17
The setting up of the commission and the concurrent release of hostages 
by the I.R.A. did have the effect of calming the situation on the border. A Dundalk 
Democrat editorial on 25 February entitled 'peace on the border' reported that all hostages 
held by the I.R.A. had been released. The Monaghan footballers were also released. The 
editorial however expressed the concerns of the residents of the border regions and was 
pessimistic about the 'makeshift arrangement of border patrol.' In a somewhat prophetic 
article the gravity of the situation was vividly expressed.
The frontier of the six counties divides people who are at 
bitter enmity. It is plain that so long as the division of 
Ireland continues, there will remain the constant danger of a 
flare up along the border, and the further danger of the 
conflagration spreading to the sea at either side.
The impact of the border liaison commissions on relations between north 
and south and tensions in the border region has been neglected in secondary sources. 
Primary material on the commission is virtually non-existent, save for reports made by 
the commission which were documented in the local newspapers. It is fair to say that the 
commission had little impact on improving North-South relations or tensions in the 
border region. The reports of the commission which were documented in local 
newspapers, are however useful for accounts of the difficulties experienced by residents 
living in the border region, and deserve analysis. It was reported to the commission on 20
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February that 'forty of fifty people had fled [from Monaghan] across the border into the 
north east for safety.'18
The reports of the commissions show the increase of enmity and hostility 
in the border regions of Cavan and Monaghan during March. Movement across the border 
was virtually non - existent and this caused great inconvenience for farmers and residents 
of the region. It also had severe effects on business in border towns such as Clones and 
Swanlinbar. It was now unsafe to cross the border as patrols of specials on the northern 
side, and the I.R.A. on the southern side made interchange between the two areas 
extremely dangerous. On 3 March, a bread van owned by Messrs. E. Brady and Co. was 
shot at, when it failed to stop at a specials checkpoint at Castlesaunderson, near 
Belturbet,resulting in gunshot injuries being received by the driver. As a result o f this 
incident 'Messrs Brady and Co's men have all given notice that they will not risk their 
lives any longer by crossing the border.'19 The Northern Standard reported that 'no 
neighbourly dealings are transacted between the opposing parties, nor is there any 
likelihood of ordinary relations being renewed until some agreement is reached. 
Commercial intercourse is also interrupted and farmers and others are greatly 
inconvenienced.'-0
Commercial intercourse between North and South was severely impinged
upon by the policy of the northern government of cutting communications between North
and South. The Anglo Celt reported that early in March 'trenches were cut over the six
county border in county Fermanagh at Swanlinbar on the Kinawley and Derrylin roads,
and another 400 yards over the border at Ballyconnell. Specials are reported busy along
the roads, and farmers in the Fermanagh district going to the markets at Ballyconnell have
been questioned as to why they go into Free State territory,-1 Similar incidents were
reported along the Monaghan-Fermanagh border, with all by-roads between Fermanagh
and the Free State being trenched and bridges blown up. The main roads were left
unharmed, but as these were extensively patrolled by specials, they were effectively
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closed to traffic from the Free State. It was reported that 'Fermanagh is now isolated from 
the Free State. Farmers who formerly patronised Clones market and fair are said to be 
arrranging a fair and market for their own use at Newtownbutler.'22
The situation along the border was rapidly deteriorating and the people of 
the border regions were facing ruin. The local newspapers were full of stories about the 
horror and gravity of the situation as 'the residents on either side have now learned to 
restrict their dealings to their own area, and armed men face each other with rifle in hand, 
with complete distrust if not defiance. This serious condition exists all along the frontier, 
the situation being a truly terrible one.'23 The hopelessness of the people of the region can 
be gauged from letters sent by businesses to the provisional government about the gravity 
of their situation.24 Complaints were sent in to the government by traders in the region 
whose trade had been severly damaged by intimidation from the special constabulary. 
Edward Brady, baker, whose drivers refused to travel inside the six counties owing to 
intimidation suffered at the hands of the specials, sought compensation from the 
provisional government. The provisional government considered 'the suggestion that we 
should take the matter up with Belfast impracticable' and that he should 'lodge a claim 
against the county council under the Criminal Injuries Act. If the people of the six 
counties find the lawlessness of the specials results in a charge on the rates, they may 
discourage the activities of the latter.'25 Replies such as these only served to increase the 
feelings of despair, frustration and isolation of the people living along the border regions 
of Cavan and Monaghan.
Farmers and businessmen along the border were the hardest hit by the 
escalation of tensions between the specials and the I.R.A.. It was reported by the Anglo 
Celt that:
Business trading is at a standstill on either side and 
merchants in Clones, Rosslea and Newtownbutler say there 
is nothing doing and they might as well close their shops.
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The situation is ruinous and becoming desperate. As it is 
farmers along the borderline for a score of miles or more are 
not going to take the risk of going into the fields to till or put 
in a crop. The whole affair reads like a page from the story 
of Mexican border life instead of a sober story of what is 
happening in Ireland.-6
Trouble was also brewing on the Monaghan-Tyrone border, as specials 
began blocking by-roads and destroying bridges leading into the Free State. This was 
authorised by the Northern government in an attempt to halt incursions by the I.R.A. into 
the six counties. A more sinister development occurred when about 500 I.R.A. men 
arrived in the region and took up positions along the border between Aughnacloy and 
Caledon. There were also reports of 'heavy rifle and machine gun firing in the region.'-7 
The sniping resulted in the death of a 65 year old protestant farmer, Robert Scott, from 
Caledon.28
The situation made it impossible for residents to get on with day to day life 
and 'along the border efforts were made by many farmers to remove their stock from the 
danger zone, and some of them had narrow escapes from being shot when engaged in this 
w ork.-9 This period had a very severe impact on commercial and agrarian life. The 
concerns of the farming community were voiced at a meeting of the Irish Farmers Union 
in Ballybay. A protest was made against the shootings in Belfast and along the border, 
which if not stopped, 'civil war must break out on our borders, to the destruction of the 
farming community north and south.'20 Matters were also made worse by a noticeable 
growth of sectarianism in attacks made by the specials and the I.R.A. This was severely 
complicated by the nature of the boundary which left isolated areas of catholics in the six 
counties, such as was the case in the district around Clones which contained large 
concentrations of catholics in the six county area, isolated from their natural hinterland of 
Clones. The growth of sectarianism in the campaign of terror carried out by opposing
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forces along the border can be seen from the following statement contained in a Dundalk 
Democrat editorial on 25 March.
For many miles north of the town Clones is the market 
centre. However, the Specials have seen to it that the usual 
frequenters of Clones fairs and markets will no longer pass 
from Carsonia into the Free State. This vast area from 
Smithboro to Newtownbutler and along the foot of the 
Carnmore mountains, wholly nationalist in feeling, is 
isolated from Clones, by the destruction of the highways, 
and the inhabitants generally subjected to every 
inconvenience and insolence that the specials can devise.
This sectarianism was not one sided, and numerous reports abound of 
protestants being forced out of the Free State by the I.R.A. In late March three protestant 
men were ordered out of Clones 'on the grounds that their movements had created 
suspicion.'31 Some of these protestants who were ordered out of the Free State by the 
I.R.A. applied to the Northern government for employment. One instance of this was a 
solicitor, Louis de Montfort, who lived in Drumully, who made the following statement 
to the northern government.
I am a solicitor and land agent having an office in Clones.
This afternoon [25 March] when leaving my office, I was 
accosted by two men in uniform ( I suppose I.R.A. ) and 
informed that orders had been issued for me to clear out.32
Attached to this statement was a letter from the Divisional Commissioner 
in Belfast urging the Northern government to 'consider giving assistance to refugees from 
across the border, many of whom are without means of livelihood and living at the 
moment on charity.'33 A further serious confrontation took place between specials and the 
I.R.A. near Culloville on the Monaghan-Armagh border. The affray resulted in the deaths 
of two special constables from Crossmaglen.34
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As the violence along the border and in Belfast escalated, theer were 
numerous calls from public figures in the region for a re-imposition of the Belfast 
boycott. The I.R.A. in the region were burning goods and attacking goods trains from 
Belfast. This led the South Monaghan Comhairle Ceanntair to unanimously call for a 
reimposition of the boycott.35 The reimposition of the boycott was discussed extensively 
by the provisional government throughout March as violence in Belfast escalated. This 
was the subject of four separate meetings of the provisional government and it was finally 
decided on 4 April that 'resolutions regarding the Ulster boycott be dealt with on the basis 
that an agreement having being arrived at with the Northern government time must be 
given to see if that agreement would be honoured.'36
At the end of March, Churchill had called both Collins and Craig to 
London for negotiations and a second Craig - Collins pact was signed on 31 March. 
Under this pact 'both governments agreed to co-operate to restore peace in the North, a 
special 'mixed' police force would police 'mixed' districts in Belfast; fair trials were 
guaranteed, refugees would be settled and the release of political prisoners negotiated... 
and fresh attempts would be made to resolve the border issue without reference to the 
boundary commission.’37 The provisional government, and notably Collins' policy with 
regard to the situation in the six counties and along the border, has been discussed at 
length in numerous secondary sources notably by both Ronan Fanning and David 
Fitzpatrick.38 These secondary sources are supplemented by looking at cabinet records 
and also the minutes of the provisional government.39
As violence in Belfast continued, the Craig - Collins pact soon became a 
dead letter and it became increasingly obvious that the provisional government could do 
nothing to help catholics in Belfast. The government were virtually powerless to avert 
tensions along the border as well as in the six counties. Various schemes were put 
forward to Collins as regards policy towards the Northern government. At an official
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level Collins adopted 'schemes of non-cooperation with, and obstruction of the Belfast 
government.40
On an unofficial level it is widely recognised that as the violence in the six 
counties continued from April. Collins cooperated with the anti - treaty forces in 
supplying arms to the north. 'The treatyites were getting arms from the British but they 
did not want to send these north, because they could be traced by their serial numbers, so 
they exchanged some consignments of British guns with the anti Treaty units, for 
unmarked or captured ones.'41 The North East Advisory Committee, which was set up by 
Collins to advise him on policy towards the north east, were calling on a policy 'of 
destruction o f  ways of transport, to so tie up roads and avenues of communication as to 
completely block up their [northern government] transport system.'42 The tense political 
situation in the twenty-six counties, as the country was on the verge of civil war, served to 
limit the energy which Collins could devote to the northern issue. If anything, it has been 
put forward by some historians that it was Collins eagerness to avert civil war that urged 
him to provide the northern anti - treatyites with arms, in order to focus their attention 
towards the north.42
Although it was reported that the border region was quiet, following the 
publishinment of the terms of the Craig - Collins pact, tension was soon running high 
again as sniping in the region continued. The Northern Standard reported that three 
separate incidents of border violence occurred on the evening of the signing of the pact. 
'At a late hour some hundreds of rounds of rifle and machine gun ammunition were fired 
at the police quarters at Emyvale road station.'44 Further incidents were reported near the 
Monaghan Tyrone border, when a specials patrol from Aughnacloy was fired at, and the 
house of a prominent unionist Vaughan Montgomery, J.P. was fired at near the border.'45 
The following week a resident of Emyvale wrote to the press about the difficulties 
encountered by farmers living in the border region.
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At present work here in this agricultural district is at a 
standstill, as gunmen on the six county side of the border 
have not ceased firing and catholic farm houses are their 
principal objective. On the Tyrone side, where the catholics 
are in a minority, there are eight catholic families who have 
been expelled from their holdings by specials and who have 
sought refuge in county Monaghan These are all extensive 
farmers, who have reluctantly left their horses and cattle
untended.46
These incidents, which all occurred within a week of the signing of the 
second Craig- Collins pact, illustrate the difficulties both leaders had in controlling their 
respective forces. Despite both leaders making protestations to London about the failure 
of the other to control his forces, the startling reality was that neither leader could 
effectively control their own forces. Attacks along the border were inspired by deep 
seated hatred, sometimes overtly sectarian, and attacks were more often carried out on 
personal initiative and motivation.
As relations between North and South plummetted, sniping and 
ambushing of patrols in the border region continued unabated. An extraordinary incident 
that occurred on the Monaghan-Tyrone border on 21 April highlighted the lawlessness 
which existed in the border region. This episode involved the ambushing of a joint 
meeting of the border liaison commission at Cullamore, about two miles from Clogher. 
The border liaison were on the whole ineffective in their aim of fostering better relations 
in the border regions, but repeatedly strove to emphasize the fact that conditions on the 
border were gravely exaggerated by the press, and were in fact not that bad. The gravity 
of the situation was, however, highlighted by an attack on them by the I.R.A. The 
commissioners meeting was held up by twenty four armed I.R.A. men 'and a valuable 
Vauxhall car and a Sunbeam car, which were flying the customary blue and white flag of 
the commission were carried off into county Monaghan.'47 The commission broke down 
in the following days, amid mutual accusations of non cooperation from Michael Collins
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and Sir James Craig. The breakdown of the commission was followed by numerous 
attacks on the special constabulary as they were in the process of cutting communications 
between north and south.
As the troubles wore on in the six counties, particularly in Belfast, a 
further problem presented itself for the border towns. By early June, hundreds of refugees 
from the north were arriving in the border towns and it was difficult to find 
accommodation for these. At Newbliss the old R.I.C. barracks was provided to house 
some of these refugees.48 The problem was more acute in Clones, where it was reported 
that:
Refugees continue to arrive at Clones daily from the 
Northern area, and houses in some cases are being 
commandeered for their use. Very expensive premises in the 
Diamond, Clones recently purchsed, and which formerly 
belonged to Dr. Gillespie, have been taken over.49
This problem was discussed by Clones Urban Council, when the clerk
stated 'as there were no available housing at Clones, and as the local workhouse was
utilised by the Dail troops he sent the refugees application on to the Minister for Home
Affairs, who in reply wrote that Castleblayney vacant workhouse was being put in order
for that purpose.'50 There was also a considerable number of refugees in Dublin, and at a
provisional government meeting on 9 June 1922, it was decided to grant a sum of
£10,000 to meet the immediate needs of these 1,500 refugees. It was also decided that the
British government should be held responsible for all expenditure incurred.51 As the
country was on the verge of civil war it was also decided by the provisional government
that 'a policy of peaceful obstruction should be adopted towards the Belfast government
and that no troops from the twenty six counties, either those under official control, or
attached to the executive should be permitted to invade the six county area.'52 This was,
as explained by Ronan Fanning, 'a step back from the brink as I.R.A. units had moved
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into the Beleek 'triangle' (in Fermanagh) a few days before and British troops were to 
occupy the adjoining village of Pettigo (parts of which were in Donegal) in order to 
dislodge them on the following day: the crisis was averted.'53 At a further provisional 
government meeting on 9 June 'it was arranged that the Minister of Defence should obtain 
daily reports from every post on the twenty six county side of the border, and that 
particular care should be taken to ensure that there would be no border conflicts.'54
The situation did not improve in early June, as the Free State approached 
crisis point. The I.R.A. as well as the Dail were split down the middle over the treaty. The 
Irregulars or anti treaty forces were already in possession of the Four Courts in Dublin, 
while sectarian attrocities in Belfast and throughout the six counties continued. It was 
only with the outbreak of civil war in the south, following the shelling of the Four Courts 
on 27 June that the border situation was pulled back from the brink. The attention of most 
of the northern units were removed to the civil war and the crisis was averted. The threat 
of open warfare between the forces of the North and South, along the borders of Cavan 
and Monaghan, vanished almost overnight.
The civil war was a cataclysmic event in Irish history and its repercussions 
were both long lasting and deep rooted. Its first impact was to once again to bring a state 
of war and violence to Irish soil. Moreover the civil war was far more brutal than any 
campaign waged against the forces of the crown. In what has sometimes been termed 'the 
delirium of the brave’ brother fought against brother and Irish towns, villages and indeed 
families were torn apart by the conflict. It is important to emphasize that the civil war was 
not fought on the issue of partition. Partition had, as demonstrated, become largely 
irrelevant in the treaty debates. Rather the motivation behind the civil war was the refusal 
of de Valera and the anti-treatyites to take an oath of allegiance to a foreign monarch. It is 
doubtful at any rate if many of those who fought and died in the struggle fully realised 
what they were fighting for.
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The civil war was a disaster as far as partition was concerned. By the time 
the civil war had ended in 1923, partition was copper fastened. The struggle also robbed 
Ireland of many fine politicians and statesmen, notably Michael Collins and Arthur 
Griffith. Cavan's representative in Dail Eireann. Collins who died in an ambush in his 
native Cork, has been seen by many historians as the one man who could have overturned 
partition. This view is a controversial one but is held by many emminent historians, such 
as Tim Pat Coogan, who believed that;
The importance of Collins's death to the partition issue only 
became generally known long afterwards...Collins, in his 
capacity as head of government, commander in chief of the 
Free State Army, and possibly more importantly, head of the
I.R.B, had used the 'stepping stone' as a base for undeclared 
military actions against the north., he abhorred partition and 
intended using the treaty to end it either by fair means or 
foul.55
While this is mere supposition and speculation, it is a widely 
acknowledged fact that the civil war was a massive boost for the northern state. With the 
energies of the Free State government tied up with a struggle from within, Collins and his 
cabinet were powerless to act on the northern situation. This gave the much troubled 
northern state the breathing space it needed to consolidate and reinforce its borders. The 
boundary commission was put on hold and the threat of border conflicts or invasions 
virtually vanished overnight.
On a local level the immediate impact of the civil war was to bring a large 
measure of relief to the much beleagured inhabitants of Cavan and Monaghan. It is fair to 
say that the impact of civil war in Cavan and Monaghan was minor, as the region was 
away from the main centres of fighting. The people of the region were kept informed of 
events unfolding through the national and local newspapers but by and large believed that 
the struggle was pointless. It was felt in the region that the civil war was averting
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attention away from the crucial question of readjusting the border through the boundary 
commission. Monaghan, the more northerly of the two counties in the region witnessed 
very little in the way of bloodshed or violence in connection with the civil war. The local 
historian Peader Livingstone confirms this.
The civil war did not upset the life of Monaghan very much, 
nor did the Irregulars fight a vigorous campaign. Some of 
the anti treatyites. like P.J. O Daly of Carrickmacross and 
Pady Corrigan of Lisdoonan, withdrew from the I.R.A. 
altogether rather than take up arms against their former 
comrades. Many of the other activists were quickly arrested
and detained.56
There were a number of incidents in the county, such as a raid on 
Monaghan town on 18 August 1922, when a party of about 60 Irregulars seized a number 
of buildings and attacked the barrack of Free State soldiers.57 An officer of the national 
forces. Lieutenant Gillanders, was shot dead, and it was reported by the Irish Times that 
'during the attack there was intense excitement in the town. Nothing could be heard but 
heavy firing, the crash of broken glass, and the screams of women.'58 Incidents such as 
this were however few, and by and large Monaghan on a whole came out unscathed from 
the horrors of civil war.
Cavan also escaped much of the terror of destruction wrought by civil war, 
but a number of incidents in the county brought home the terrors of the campaign. These 
incidents also served to keep the conflict very much to the forefront of peoples 
consciousness. The first civil war related incident came very early in the campaign when 
in early July, Bailieborough barrack was raided by Irregulars. 'When the Irregulars were in 
position, bombs were hurled at the building and fire was opened on the barrrack.'59 This 
incident caused great excitement and brought out great crowds to the town, motivated 
more by curiosity than anything else.
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At about six p.m. large numbers of National troops arrived 
in lorries and a fleet of motor cars, and great enthusiasm was 
manifested by the townspeople. The soldiers went to the 
Knockbride district, where they arrested seven men. Large 
crowds assembled outside the barrack on the return of the
troops with the prisoners.60
Other barracks in the region were also attacked, including Ballyjamesduff 
barrack on 14 July 1922. and an unsuccessful attempt was made to capture Cavan barrack 
on 2 October 1922. Two incidents occurred in the region which did bring home some of 
the civil war to the people of Cavan. The first incident occurred in mid November 1922, 
when a young man named James Martin was shot dead in his home while 'saying the 
rosary' with his family. This happened near Killeshandra and caused great shock and 
outrage among people of the region.61
The most horrific civil war related incident occurred in the village of 
Ballyconnell in west Cavan, near the borders with Fermanagh and Leitrim. 'Two men 
were killed, and one was seriously wounded - all three in particularly brutal 
circumstances - shops were wrecked and looted, and the villagers were terrorised.'62 This 
raid was carried out by about 50 Irregulars, as a reprisal for the death of an Irregular 
during a previous raid, and occurred in February 1923. The raid caused widespread shock 
and revulsion among the residents of Ballyconnell. It was the subject of a discussion in 
the Dail, and Sean Milroy, T.D. for Cavan stated that:
a gang of 80 armed men swept down upon the little town of 
Ballyconnell, and proceeded to engage in one o f  those 
exploits that were o f  common occurance in the days of the 
'Black and Tans', before the treaty put an end to their 
terrorism. Two civilians were shot dead and one was so 
injured that his life was in jeopardy. Business houses were 
destroyed, a bank was raided, and wild panic among the
inhabitants followed.63
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The civil war had by early Spring 1923 reached its climax and the country 
witnessed a return to normality. This return to normality allowed the government to divert 
its attention back to the northern question. The death of Collins undoubtedly left a huge 
void in government policy towards the northern state. Cosgrave, who became head of the 
government, following the death of Collins ended the governments policy of non 
recognition of the northern state. Cosgrave actually met Craig in London on 10 November 
1922, which gave the clearest indication that the policy of non recognition was dead.
The Irish Free State officially came into existence on 6 December 1922 
and on the following day 'the Northern parliament duly availed o f its rights under the 
treaty to petition the king that the powers o f  the Free State should not extend to Northern 
Ireland. Thus was partition reaffirmed.'64 The firmest action taken by Cosgrave's 
government on partition was to set up the North Eastern Boundary Bureau to produce 
propaganda on the Northern question. The North Eastern Boundary Bureau produced a 
weekly bulletin and a much larger publication The Handbook o f  the Ulster question.65 
The bureau collected detailed information on the wishes of inhabitants and the 
geographical and economic conditions, which were set down by the treaty as the criteria 
for realignment of the boundary line. The bureau continued to function throughout the 
period up to the boundary commission and was finally dissolved in 1926.
Although the work of the bureau was heavily biased and was motivated 
by an attempt to influence the Boundary Commission, its maps on the 'wishes of 
inhabitants’ and 'economic conditions' are indispensible for a consideration of the 
problems wrought by partition. Other pamphlets and propaganda was also produced by 
the government, including a pamphlet by Cavan T.D. Sean Milroy entitled The Case o f  
Ulster: An analysis o f  four partition arguments,66 This pamphlet contained the by now- 
traditional southern misrepresentation of the partition issue. It is little wonder that the
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southern government had little chance o f  solving the issue of partition when the following 
was the depth of their understanding of the issue.
The fact is there that the root source of present conditions in 
this corner of Ulster is nothing more or less than an 
antiquated medieval tradition of religious ascendancy and 
bigotry projecting itself into the political, social and 
economic life o f  this section of Ireland today.67
This was the sum of the Cosgrave administration's attempt to adress the 
boundary problem until early 1923. This had given the Northern state the breathing space 
it required to strengthen its position, hold elections which by a complex process of 
jerrymandering ensured a unionist majority at all government levels.
The civil war had also lessened tensions in the border regions. Although 
some sniping continued over the borderline, and passage between the two states remained 
hazardous, a more pacifying attitude was discernable along the border. This is evidenced 
by looking at the local press. The Northern Standard reported in October that 'there was a 
general state of peace in the border regions.'68 In the following weeks headlines such as 
'The friendly border' and 'Border fraternity' were printed, something which seemed 
unthinkable only a matter of months previous.69 It was now evident that some form of 
peace and normality was returning to the border regions after many years of tension and 
hostilities, which have been documented in previous chapters.
It is somewhat ironic that the civil war, which left such a violent and 
bloody birth scar on the Irish Free State, helped bring a return to peacefulness for the 
residents of the border regions. Although peace had returned to the region, the border was 
now a fact of life, a realization which had by now dawned on the inhabitants of the 
region. The following chapter considers the economic problems which partition imposed 
on the lives of the people in the border regions of Cavan and Monaghan. These derived
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in no small measure from the imposition of the first customs barrier by the Irish Free 
State on 1 April 1923, which marked the beginning of economic partition. Other 
problems such as smuggling, the closing of the border roads and the changes in 
population along the border regions are also considered.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE IM POSITION OF THE CUSTOMS BARRIER AND THE 
FINDINGS OF THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION, 1923 - 1925.
Map Two: The market areas of certain border towns before partition.
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Source: Map taken from North East Boundary Bureau, Handbook o f the Ulster 
Qtyesf/on(Dublin,1923).
By early 1923 conditions had returned to a degree of normality for the 
inhabitants of the Cavan-Monaghan region. The sectarian violence and border warfare 
which had engulfed the region in previous years had abated. This heralded the start of a 
new phase in the history of Cavan and Monaghan. People began to come to terms with 
the fact that the region was now a borderland with the new northern state. This position 
was to cause much hardship and inconvenience for residents of border areas. This chapter 
examines the ramifications of a new form of partition, which derived from the setting up 
of a customs barrier between the states by the Free State government on 1 April 1923. 
The effects of the customs barrier and economic partition on the lives of inhabitants in the 
border regions of Cavan and Monaghan will be studied in depth. Following on from this 
the work of the Boundary' Commission will be considered. The findings of the 
Commission which were directly relevant to the region under study will be discussed. 
How these findings would have benefited the region will be discussed.
Secondary sources are virtually non existant on the customs barrier and the 
problems wrought by partition for those who were most directly affected by it. There is 
one notable exception to this, and this is the work of the emminent economic historian 
D.S. Johnson. In his article 'Partition and Cross border trade in the 1920's' Johnson 
examines how partition affected cross border trade between north and south.’ Although 
this work gives a good background to the topic by examining trade between the two 
states, it does not examine the specific areas which were most affected by partition. There 
is an impressive amount of primary source material available. As usual the three local 
newspapers the Northern Standard, Dundalk Democrat, and Anglo Celt provide a wealth 
of information on the effects of partition and the customs barrier on life in the region. 
This information is supplemented by the Irish Times which documented the problems 
imposed by the customs barrier in a series of articles on 2-4 July 1930. The Irish Press
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also undertook a study of how life in Clones was affected by partition.- The Anglo Celt 
also carried out a similar study on how life in Clones was affected by partition.3
The records of the Free Sate government are also a rich source of 
information on the customs barrier and other problems wrought by partition. The Dail 
debates highlight some of the problems which residents of the border regions brought to 
the attention of their local T.D.'s.4 The records of the Department of An Taoiseach and 
the Department of Finance are also very useful. The records of the Northern government 
are also very significant, especially the records of the Ministry for Home Affairs for the 
closure of border roads, and other concurrent boundary problems.5 The records of the 
Boundary Commission are a unique and indispensable source for painting a picture of 
how the customs barrier and partition impinged upon life in the border regions.6 The 
Boundary Commission which toured the border region during 1924 gives a unique 
picture, told by inhabitants of the region, of how day to day life was affected by partition 
and the imposition of the customs barrier.
By early 1923 the civil war had effectively ended although it was not until 
27 April that de Valera ordered a cessation of republican activities. The Free State 
government headed by Cosgrave had from late 1922 begun to put in place the machinery 
of government and bodies necessary for the functioning of the infant state. As the country 
emerged from the shadows of civil war, attention turned to the functioning of the Free 
State. It was also becoming increasingly obvious that the Free State government would 
impose some form of economic partition. This was at the time an extremely controversial 
decision, especially among unionists who blamed the Free State government for 
reinforcing partition.
Thus in March 1923, Craig told a meeting of the Belfast Wholesale
Merchant and Manufacturers Association that a fiscal frontier was 'a great error of
judgement.... For partition was nothing; there was no such thing as partition if they [the
Free State government] did not erect a customs barrier between north and south.'7 It was
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realised in the south that some from of fiscal barrier was required to determine the 
income of the Free State. Although a customs barrier was a necessary part of the Free 
States protectionist policy and was also necessary' to accurately measure the Free States 
trade, the government had an ulterior motive in erecting a customs barrier. The 
imposition of the customs barrier was clearly part of the Free state governments policy on 
Northern Ireland. In a memo entitled 'Customs Imperial Preference and the North East' 
the customs barrier was seen as one of the cards held by the Free State 'which if used with 
full effect will in my opinion produce far reaching effects.'8 It was considered by 
Cosgrave that ' What the future position of the six counites will be for the next decade, 
whether they will cut off more and more from us or tend to seek a closer relationship with 
us will depend very largely on our wise and careful use of the valuable cards we hold in 
our hands during this period.'9
It was considered by the government that the ideal situation would be that 
rates would be lower in the Free State than in Northern Ireland. This would, it was hoped 
'stop automatically and almost completely the large and important retail trade done by 
such border towns as Derry, Strabane, Enniskillen and Newry.'10 It was also hoped to 
'stop eventually the large and lucrative wholesale trade in dutiable articles done with 
Saorstat from the six county towns' and 'to stop ultimately the trade in non dutiable goods 
as well.'11 Even more extraordinary was the governments aim 'to create and foster a great 
smuggling trade along the 240 miles of irregular and impossible border from Saorstat 
Eireann into the six counties, much to the discomfiture and commercial disorganization 
of the latter.'12 All this it was hoped would force the six counties to seek reunification 
with the Free State.
This rather extraordinary policy of using economic instruments to achieve
political goals, by using the customs barrier to cause major discomfort for the trade of
Northern Ireland was a complete failure. The customs barrier, while a necessary part of
the governments accounting machinery created great hardship for residents of the border
126
counties of Cavan and Monaghan. The customs barrier created great difficulties for 
traders in border towns such as Clones. Belturbet and Swanlinbar. Prices in the Free 
State were in fact higher for dutiable goods than in the six counties and smuggling goods 
such as sugar, tobacco and alcohol from northern Ireland became a part of life for people 
living in the border regions of Cavan and Monaghan. This will be discussed at length in 
this chapter.
Residents of the border regions first became aware that a customs barrier 
would be imposed between north and south early in March 1923. The initial reaction to 
the governments decision to impose a customs barrier was one of confusion and great 
anxiety. A good illustration of this feeling is the following resolution passed by a 
representative of the Great Northern Brewery at a meeting of Dundalk merchants and 
manufacturers:
This meeting views with alarm the proposal to set up 
customs barriers, at such short notice, and fears that they 
will result in hopeless confusion and very serious delay to 
goods crossing the frontier and will be most detrimental 
generally to business and lead to further serious 
unemployment.13
This feeling was mirrored throughout the region and special concern was 
voiced as to the future of towns such as Clones and Belturbet which had a good deal of 
trade with people living in the six counties. This predicament was aptly summed up by 
the Northern Standard.
Clones trade is mostly with Fermanagh, and it was just 
recovering from the bad effects of the murders of the 
constabulary of a year ago when this new restriction was 
placed upon the town, and as one dealer said to a 
representative. 'This is the last straw.' A farmer cannot do his 
shopping from Fermanagh in Clones, as the quantities 
permitted to be brought home are so small.14
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A further immediate effect of the news of the imminent customs barrier 
was to create panic buying among residents of the border region, who formerly frequented 
the towns of Northern Ireland such as Enniskillen. Newrv and Armagh. It was announced 
that a duty equal to one third the price of vehicles coming from Northern Ireland would 
be placed on motors imported into the Free State. This had the effect of forcing many 
dealers within the Free State to buy up any cars they could get their hands on. 'People 
within the twenty six counties who had for months or even years, been merely thinking of 
getting cars, suddenly made up their minds. And it was to satisify these requirements that 
scores of cars, of every make and price flitted through the town during the past few 
days.'15
The Dundalk Democrat also reported that traders throughout the region 
accepted mass orders of tobacco and alcohol in the week before the customs barrier was 
imposed. It reported a flurry of bicycles travelling across the border to bring in supplies of 
alcohol and tobacco. There were consignments of whiskey and tobacco which a layman 
would estimate to keep the region going for a twelvemonth, and there were scores of 
other parcels and packages all rushed across the border before the Irish government came 
along for its pound of flesh.'16 This mass panic buying had a number of immediate 
serious implications for the region. The first effect was that the trade of shopkeepers, 
tobacconists, off-licences and motor garages suffered an immediate slump in business. 
This stock piling carried out by residents of the region caused a great recession for these 
businesmen and forced many people to sell up. Another effect of this mass buying was 
that people were disposing of most of their income and some which they didn't really 
have. It was already a time of great hardship for people in the region following the 
turmoil of the previous years of violence, agricultural prices were also extremely low. As 
would be verified by any economist, a lack of money circulating through a region such as
this, when times were already bad was a recipe for disaster.
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The customs barrier came into effect on 1 April 1923 and this placed 
serious inconveniences on the movement of people and merchandise throughout the 
border regions. Lists of dutiable and prohibited articles were published throughout the 
region, (see Appendix II). The main dutiable goods were tobacco, spirits, perfume, tea. 
coffee, motor cars and accessories and sugar. Customs posts were to be set up on 
'approved roads' throughout the region, by which people were obliged to travel on when 
entering or leaving the Free State. Merchandise crossing the land frontier, if not 
conveyed by the railways was also obliged to go by the approved roads. Only fifteen 
roads were approved along the 240 miles of boundary between north and south. Only 







These restrictions on travel created severe difficulties for residents in 
border regions. Another serious problem caused by the customs barrier was the restricted 
nature of the opening hours of the customs posts. People who wished to cross the 
frontier, whether conveying merchandise or not were obliged to do so between 9am and 
5pm, Monday to Saturday, and the border effectively remained closed to traffic outside 
these hours. This again caused great difficulties for border towns and especially for 
merchants who wished to travel between the two states. The Irish Times highlighted the 
following example of a doctor living in Belcoo in county Fermanagh.
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Belcoo is seperated from Blacklion, which is in the Free 
State, by a bridge. The doctor may need to cross that bridge 
every day in the week in order to attend to his patients, and it 
is absurd to expect him to go through the formality of 
securing a pass for every journey. The same applies to 
shopkeepers in border towns who ditribute the necessaries of 
life in areas in the other side of the border.18
Sunday motoring across the border was also strictly prohibited by the customs regulations 
and this again caused serious implications for border residents.
Businesses and trade in general throughout the border region suffered 
immensely during the first months of the imposition of the customs posts. The great 
difficulties caused by the infrastructural changes brought about by the customs barrier had 
a massive impact on the socio-economic life of the region. It is obvious that the customs 
barrier affected people from all walks of life in the region. Business people and merchants 
travelling between the two states found the delays very irksome and time consuming. The 
working class people of the region who had frequented markets in the six counties for a 
lifetime, found the customs barrier bewildering and confusing. At the frontier post, the 
customs officer would stop travellers and ask them to declare their dutiable goods. In 
order to do this they must enter these goods on special forms, and many people found 
these technical difficulties too much trouble and patronised less convenient towns in their 
own territory. This fact was illustrated by a study of ordinary' folk using the customs posts 
carried out by the Northern Standard. 19 The study found that the forms which had to be 
filled in were 'very confusing to the semi illiterate country folk who have an inherent 
dislike to filling in an official document.'20
Although farm produce was free to be carried by any route and at any time 
without restrictions or customs duties the border severely hampered farmers living along 
the border. Many farmers who had parts of farms in one state and part of a farm in the 
other found it virtually impossible to travel between their farms. This was a frequent
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complaint made to the boundary commission on its tour of the Monaghan and Cavan 
border. One farmer, Mr. Andrews from Clogh on the north Monaghan border with 
Tyrone, had a farm totally in Northern Ireland and a farm in the Free State in 
Bullogbrean. He explained to the commissioners that he found it hard to get to it as the 
road was blocked off. He lost a crop in the Free State the previous year due to this 
inconvenience.-1 Further complaints were made by Monaghan farmers living near Clones 
in May 1923 a road was closed near Clones at Anny Bridge which led into northern 
territory. This was a great inconvenience to Monaghan farmers as they needed the road to 
be open so that they could pass through a portion of Fermanagh to their bogs. Fermanagh 
farmers also needed the road open so that they could sell bog to Monaghan farmers.-2
The case of Drumully Salient is an example of the difficulties encountered 
by farmers who had land in both states, and also the difficulties of reaching their former 
market towns.23 Drumully was a loop of county Monaghan which was almost completely 
surrounded by county Fermanagh. The area was connected to the Free State by a narrow 
cordon through which there was no road. The people of the region could therefore not 
reach their natural market town of Clones without passing through northern territory. 
Securing direct access to Clones would involve bridging the Finn river from Annaghraw 
to Clonfad, and to also construct a road. This however was blocked by the Special 
constabulary. Apart from this, the road to Clones formerly used by farmers in Drumully 
was trenched by the Specials during the border wars in 1922. This forced farmers in the 
region to take their produce and cattle to Newtownbutler in county Fermanagh which 
involved travelling a considerable extra distance.24 This was one of the primary 
grievances made by inhabitants of county Monaghan to the Boundary Commission.
The example of Drumully Salient also illustrates how border towns.
Clones in this instance, were adversely affected by the border when parts of their
catchment area were cut off by the border. The border did severe damage to certain towns
near the border which formerly had catchment areas in both the Free State and Northern
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Ireland. Map One vividly illustrates this point for both Clones and Castleblayney in 
county Monaghan. Thomas Smith, a farmer from Kinavvley in county Fermanagh told the 
boundary commission that Ballyconnell and Belturbet were sorely hit by the customs 
barrier. In the course o f  his evidence Smith contended that 'Ballyconnell was sore hit by 
the border as it is a bit of a drawback for fairs.- When a dealer buys a number of cattle, 
there is no money in the bank at Ballyconnell, it is only a branch bank and you have to 
have a cheque and go to Enniskillen to get it cashed.'25 The Free State government were 
also made aware of the effect which the customs barrier had on the border town of 
Belturbet in county Cavan, which prior to the border, practically 75% of the business of 
the town was done with the people of Fermanagh. This hinterland is now completely cut 
off and business has suffered accordingly'.26
The story of Clones since 1922 is a vivid illustration of the effect of 
partition on the border region of Cavan and Monaghan. The effect of partition on Clones 
has been the subject of two excellent articles, by Tom Carron and Darach Mac Donald.27 
The position of Clones was also foremost on the agenda of the boundary Commission as 
it was finalising its report on the readjustments to the boundary. The immediate effect of 
partition was aptly summed up by Carron.
The coming into being of partition in 1922 had a profound 
effect on Clones. Cut off from its natural hinterland in the 
North, the people, and more particularly the business life of 
the town, endeavoured to adjust as best they could to the 
new, unfavourable situation. While it continued to be a 
market town for a catchment area on both sides of the 
border, the imposition of customs controls and the 
intermittent outbreak of the political troubles meant that the 
town had to compete in an adverse economic climate.28
The implications of being cut off from its catchment area have continued 
since and as contended by Mac Donald 'In particular, the once bustling town of Clones
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became a victim, cut off not only from an economic hinterland, but from its parish.'-9 
Clones was undoubtedly the town in the Cavan-Monaghan region which was most 
severely affected by partition and the customs barrier. The effect of partition on Clones 
was the subject of numerous reports made by the North Eastern Boundary Bureau which 
was commissioned by the Free State government to intluence the findings of the
Boundary Commission. While the findings of this bureau have an inherent bias due to the
motivation and control of the bureau, their reports on Clones can be verified by 
consulting local newspapers and the secondary sources mentioned above. The Bureau 
conducted a tour of the Clones region to examine the effects of partition on the town and 
its environs in September 1923. In a document entitled 'The effect of the fiscal barrier on 
neighbouring market towns' presented by the bureau to the Free State government it was 
stated that Clones was;
The only important town in our area which has lost heavily 
on balance as a result of fiscal seperation. It seems likely 
that in non dutiable articles as well as in dutiable articles the
county Fermanagh peasant has largely ceased to shop in
Clones.30
Clones was further disadvantaged by the fact that five of the eight roads 
which led from the town went almost immediately into northern territory. Only one of 
these roads was an approved route and the remainder of the roads leading into the six 
counties had been rendered impassable by the Special Consabulary. This caused many 
problems for the town of Clones, as it was extremely difficult for farmers or traders to 
bring their produce to Clones. It was also extremely difficult for customers who had 
previously patronised Clones to get to the town. This was the subject of frequent 
representations made by residents of the Clones catchment area to both the Free State 
government and also the Boundary Commission.
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The area of Bunnoe which was just inside the Northern State was severely 
hampered by these road closures. The people o f  Bunnoe got their turf from a bog in 
county Fermanagh but to gain access to this they had to cross into Free State territory. 
The direct route to their bogs was via the Annv Bridge which had been barricaded by the 
Specials using trees and stones. The residents of the region, however, endeavoured to 
overcome this difficulty by fording the river Finn just beside the bridge. The ford was 
blocked on the Fermanagh side early in July 1923 by Specials using barbed wire. As 
reported to the North Eastern Boundary Bureau this forced Bunnoe farmers to 'make a 
journey of about 20 miles via Clones and the approved road which is not obstructed in 
order to obtain a load of turf from a bog about 7 miles distant.'31 As turf was classified as 
farm produce, under the customs regulations, it was alllowed to be exported or imported 
by any road and at any time. There was, therefore, no fiscal justification for the actions of 
the Specials in blocking the Anny Bridge and this caused anger and resentment among 
farmers in Bunnoe.
It is clear that Clones suffered immensely from the imposition of the 
customs barrier, a fact which was highlighted during the Boundary Commissions 
deliberations. 'With the small county Donegal village of Pettigo, Clones had been singled 
out as the town most likely to suffer from the adverse social and economic effects of the 
border it now found on its very doorstep.'32
The situation in Swanlinbar brought about by partition and the customs 
barrier has not been documented at all in secondary sources. At the time of the imposition 
of the customs barrier it seemed that by way of contrast on balance Swanlinbar benefitted 
from fiscal separation as it brought additional retail trade to Swanlinbar as a local market 
town. It can be seen from Map Three that the catchment area of Enniskillen extended 
across the border and into large tracts of west Cavan. With the imposition of the customs 
barrier, Swanlinbar lost about one third of its previous customers who lived in county
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Fermanagh. As against this the customs barrier diverted to Swanlinbar some of the retail 
trade which formerly went from county Cavan to Enniskillen.33
Although it would seem that Swanlinbar on the whole gained from 
partition, traders and farmers in the region who formerly frequented the larger market of 
Enniskillen suffered great inconveniences. It was now much more difficult for farmers to 
send their produce to Enniskillen or to receive produce from Enniskillen. A lot of further 
difficulties were encountered by farmers and traders living in the Swanlinbar region, due 
to the closure of roads leading into the six counties by the Special Constabulary. In March 
1922, at the height of the border troubles the Specials under orders from the Belfast 
government blocked roads in county Fermanagh leading into counties Cavan and 
Monaghan. Various bridges were also blown up in an effort to stop kidnappings of 
prominent unionists and Specials living in Northern Ireland by the I.R.A. operating from 
the Free State side of the border. This caused great inconveniences for farmers and 
merchants in the west Cavan region, and also cut off pockets of communities in the north 
from their former market place.
Swanlinbar was only a local market town with about 600 inhabitants, 
about 12 miles from Enniskillen, upon which it was dependent both for supplies to local 
merchants and also as a market for their goods.The main Swanlinbar - Enniskillen road 
was one of those which had been obstructed by Specials in March 1922. While this did 
cause inconveniences the problem was surmounted as vehicular transport between the 
towns was possible via a mountain by road which circumvented the obstruction. The 
Swanlinbar - Enniskillen road was one of the roads approved by both the Free State 
government and the Northern government after the imposition of the customs barrier. 
However on the 16 June 1923 the by road bridge was destroyed by Specials. This 
rendered the situation intolerable for Swanlinbar merchants.
The problems caused by the closure of this approved road from
Swanlinbar to Enniskillen is well documented in primary sources. Local people felt very
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angry and resentful about the situation and various representations were made to the Free 
State government about the situation. From the government files on the situation it can be
seen that the Free State authorities viewed the situation with great concern. Letters were
sent to the British government outlining the inconveniences caused to local people and 
the Free State government was concerned that this situation could lead to a renewal of 
animosities and conflict in this border region.The problem was outlined by the Free Sate 
governmenmt as follows:
Practically all the Swanlinbar merchants buy their goods 
beer, stout, spirits, meal, flour, groceries.... from wholesale 
houses in Enniskillen. Similarly agricultural produce, mostly 
eggs, butter and poultry is either sold by Swanlinbar 
merchants to Enniskillen merchants or shipped from
Enniskillen station. Goods from Enniskillen are now brought 
on Enniskillen lorries to the broken bridge and then
transhiped to Swanlinbar lorries or carts. Whereas formerly 
Swanlinbar merchants sent their own lorries for them all the 
way. This profits the owners of Enniskillen lorries.34
To reinforce the argument that great damage was done to Swanlinbar by 
the closure, the local customs officer supplied figures to the North Eastern Boundary 
Bureau which illustrated the effect of all this on the volume of trade through the customs 
post at Swanlinbar. They estimated that in the first two weeks of June exports were in the 
region of £870 whilst imports amounted to £585. In the last two weeks of June exports 
had fallen to £394 and imports to £482.3:1
The Free State government made strong representations to the British 
customs authorities to have the bridge repaired and for this approved road to be reopened. 
The Free State government was very aware of the fact that they would have to tread 
carefully in this matter as it was 'econmically most convenient that the Swanlinbar - 
Enniskillen route should be an approved road and any change in that respect would have a
bad political effect on the people in the Swanlinbar district.'36
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Local farmers also suffered in another way from the closure of this 
important route. Swanlinbar had a separating station for milk which was supplied with 
milk from both sides of the border. One Fermanagh milk carrier was actually arrested by 
the Specials for helping to repair the broken bridge on the approved road. What little milk 
which still came from county Fermanagh now had to be transhipped at the bridge and this 
again caused immenses inconveniences. Further hardship and expense was incurred by 
farmers owing to the fact that the separating station in Swanlinbar formerly sent its cream 
to the central creamery at Kinawley in county Fermanagh, about 7 miles away. This 
cream was now sent to Killeshandra in county Cavan, 30 miles away from Swanlinbar.
The above case studies illustrate the different ways in which border 
communities were affected by partition. Clones lost a great deal of its commercial 
hinterland and was devestated by fiscal seperation, from which it arguably has never 
really recovered. It can be said that Swanlinbar on the whole gained from fiscal seperation 
by gaining customers in west Cavan who would have normally patronised Enniskillen. 
However the town paid a heavy price for this and both traders and farmers suffered 
immense difficulties from losing its lifeline to Enniskillen. Swanlinbar had for decades 
been dependant on the large markets in Enniskillen. To lose this lifeline for the region 
was a massive blow. In the process of researching this chapter interviews were conducted 
with residents in the Swanlinbar area, who remember these times of hardship, who concur 
that Swanlinbar had suffered great difficulties from partition, and more specifically the 
imposition of the customs barrier in April 1923.
The case of Swanlinbar also illustrates how border communities suffered
from the closure of border roads. The towns of Ballyconnell and Belturbet were also cut
off from former Fermanagh customers who now had to turn their attention to markets in
the six counties. An excellent study of this problem was the representations made to made
to the North Eastern Boundary Bureau by two local T.D.'s Mr. Cole and Mr. Baxter on
the question of having the road from Belturbet to Enniskillen made an approved road,
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This representation was made to the bureau on behalf 'of the town of Belturbet and the 
people of the Derrvlin district of Fermanagh who formerly were in the habit o f  marketing 
in Belturbet.'37
Derrvlin was a small rural district less than five miles from Belturbet in 
county Cavan. Derrylin had traditionally been closely linked to Belturbet and with the 
closure of the main Enniskillen - Belturbet this link was severed. Derrylin contained a 
considerable number of small country shops, which acted as collecting centre for much of 
the agricultural produce of the district, of which eggs would have been the most 
important. Before the imposition of the customs posts these shops would send their 
produce to merchants in Belturbet where they would in turn purchase wholesale 'a 
considerable portion of the goods they retailed, and in any case, whether sold to Belturbet 
merchants or not the goods they had for sale would be sent off from Belturbet station.'38 
Under the customs regulations there was of course nothing to prevent Derrylin farmers 
from bringing their produce to Belturbet, but they could only bring back 'small domestic 
supplies of non dutiable goods' from Belturbet.
If any farmer or shopkeeper from Derrylin wished to bring any 
considerable quantity of merchandise from Belturbet to Derrylin, he would have to make 
a detour of 30 miles by Swanlinbar or Clones. As this was totally impractical, the net 
result was that the inhabitants of Derrylin ceased to use Belturbet as their market town. 
This of course was a great inconvenience to themselves but also had a disastrous effect on 
Belturbet and Messrs. Cole and Baxter reported to the North Eastern Boundary Bureau 
that 'in consequence of this certain Belturbet merchants are threatened with bankruptcy. 
Belturbet is only 2 miles from the border and it grew up supplying the wants of a large 
area, a considerable portion of which it has now suddenly been deprived of.39
All representations to have the road reopened as an approved road
ultimately failed as the revenue commissioners for the Free State believed that 'on
investigation of the case the commissioners were not at all satisfied that the volume of
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traffic on this road would justify its approval.'40 The failure to have this road opened as 
an approved route caused considerable damage to the town of Belturbet. and along with 
the fact that two of the approved roads in the region; that of Clones and Swanlinbar to 
Enniskillen, had been rendered impassable, the customs barrier caused immense 
inconveniences for this region.
The west Cavan and north west Monaghan regions had already borne the 
brunt of much of the violence which encapsulated the region in the early twenties, and 
now suffered immensely from a loss of trade from which it never really recovered from. 
To illustrate just how extensive the closure of border roads was, a list o f border roads 
closed in the Cavan-Monaghan region is contained in Appendix III.This list shows the 
border roads and bridges which where rendered impassable by the Specials during the 
border troubles, in county Fermanagh and county Tyrone. It was not until December 1925 
after the Boundary Commission and the disbandment of the A Specials and the 
withdrawal of border patrols that the Northern government moved to reopen these roads. 
The roads and bridges in question had been closed for almost three years and caused 
untold damage to the economic life of this already poor region. Farmers, traders, 
shopkeepers and people of all walks life in the region were greatly inconvenienced by the 
closure of these roads and it proved disastrous for the region.
Great inconveniences were undoubtedly caused by the imposition of the
customs barrier but the people of Cavan and Monaghan who lived in the border regions
strove to overcome at least some of these problems. The people of the region were very
resilient after years of hardship and were also very resourceful. In time they got used to
the inconveniences caused by the customs posts. As the border became part and parcel of
every day life for the people of the region they began to try and get around paying
customs duties, by smuggling goods which were cheaper in Northern Ireland into the Free
State. This caused a great headache for the Free State customs officers as it proved very
difficult to patrol such an irregular frontier. This fact was readily admitted by customs
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men. In the course of his evidence to the Boundary Commission P. O Golain, a Free State 
customs officer, admitted the difficulty of patrolling the border ; 'Whenever a road 
crosses a frontier it presents a problem from a customs point o f  view. If you approve it, it 
is an expense; if you do not yo have to watch it or close it.'42
The Irish Times survey on the border line also highlighted the difficulties 
of preventing smuggling. This report carried out seven years after the customs posts were 
in place pointed out that 'Smuggling had almost disappeared on the main road, but there 
were the fields and the by roads between the two states, over which people could come by 
foot.'43 There was also a number of anomalies along the frontier where the borderline 
passes through shops or houses. Two such 'kinks' in the line between Dundalk and 
Castleblayney were highlighted in the Irish Times survey. One of these places was 
Jonesboro in county Armagh, 'a hamlet of a few houses, one of which has its front in the 
Free State and its rear portion with some land in Northern Ireland. The owners of that 
particular house run a small shop, and from a customs point of view, it is impossible to 
supervise what may pass from one side to the other.'44 The village of Cullaville on the 
Monaghan - Armagh border also posed similar problems. Here Northern Ireland territory 
juts into Free State area in a 'V' shape. Through this 'V' a public road ran which takes 
people through Northern Ireland and back into the Free State. In the village of Cullaville 
itself there were two public houses over which the Free State customs official had no 
authority, but those who had no pass into Northern Ireland were not permitted to stop 
there.
It is of course, extremely difficult to quantify the level of smuggling which
went on between Northern Ireland and the Free State. There are no facts or figures for this
contraband traffic to illustrate what harm smuggling had on local economies or otherwise.
Secondary sources on the subject are sparse, again D.S. Johnsons work proving to be a
notable exception.45 Oral sources on the subject are readily available, but with the
scarcity of other primary sources to back them up it is difficult to separate fact from the
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legends that have grown up in border regions concerning smuggling. Local newspaper 
reports are indispensible for cases of those who had been caught smuggling and the 
penalties imposed on them by the courts. At any rate, it cannot be denied that smuggling 
in the early years of the customs barrier existed in the Cavan and Monaghan. Two types 
of smuggling can be discerned when looking at this subject.The first kind being that 
which was of a petty nature, involving a bottle of whiskey or other such articles. 
Prosecutions in these instances were extremely rare and the extent of this is very hard to 
quantify. Smuggling of a more organized and serious nature was at times attempted and 
local newspapers abound of cases involving customs prosecutions in these instances.
By 1925, it w'as recognized that smuggling of a petty nature was rife in the 
border regions. Border residents had nothing to lose by trying to evade the customs 
duties, for even if they were caught with dutiable goods on an unapproved road, no crime 
was committed unless they attempted to conceal the dutiable goods. If they were caught 
they just had to pay the duty they would have had to pay at the customs post. Thus 
smuggling had become a recognized game in the border region by the time the Boundary 
Commission began its tour of the border in 1925.46
Soon after the customs posts came in to existence the Northern Standard 
carried out an interesting study o f smuggling along the Monaghan border.47This study 
however concentrates on attempts to smuggle in dutiable goods past the customs posts 
without paying the duty, and as the border residents became familiar with the customs 
posts and the other ways of smuggling goods into the Free State, this practice almost 
completely died out. Numerous attempts were however made in the early years of the 
customs post to smuggle small quantities of spirits, tobacco, tea and sugar across the 
frontier. 'When interrogated the smugglers innocently assert that they haven't anything to 
declare. Nevertheless, a search of their carts or market baskets often results in the 
discovery of dutiable goods.'48 The duty would subsequently be paid with a very bad 
grace.
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These early attempts to evade the customs duties caused considerable 
amusement to the customs men. The following story', told by a customs officer on the 
north Monaghan border, bears testimony to this fact.
The other day a man was caught earning a large bottle.
'What's in the bottle?' inquired the officer. 'Shure it's me 
medicine what I got from me dhoctor.' replied the man.
However; when the cork was drawn the officer charged him 
9s duty on it. It was whisky, of course.49
Numerous more organized and serious attempts at smuggling were often 
made and this caused more severe problems for the Free State government. Indeed at one 
stage the Northern Whig reported that 'drastic action was being contemplated by the Free 
State authorities, including 'barbed wire entanglements' on cross border roads. 
Furthermore bacause of the embarrassment caused to customs officers, the use of female 
searchers was being contemplated.'50 P. O. Golain informed the Boundary Commission 
that smuggling motor cars was a widespread phenomenon in west Cavan at Swanlinbar 
and Aghalane.51 This was due to the way in which the roads ran adjacent to the border. 
There was quite a wide road from Enniskillen and motor cars were smuggled into the 
Free State from Enniskillen by this route.
Any other records which do exist of smuggling on a larger scale are found 
in local newspapers. These reports however were based on the results of court cases 
which means that the offenders were caught. There is however no records of those who 
evaded the customs duties and got away with it. It is clear that at the beginning of the 
customs barrier security was a lot tighter and a high percentage of perspective smugglers 
were caught. In any case as time went by the likelihood of conviction for smuggling was 
minimal. As D.S. Johnson contends 'whereas in 1923 there was one conviction for every 
4.5 seizures of goods, by 1929 only one of every 74 seizures of dutiable goods resulted in 
a successful state prosecution.'52
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In the early years of the customs barrier those who were caught and 
convicted of attempted smuggling suffered severe penalities. The three local newspapers 
abounded of cases of attempted smuggling before the local courts, where severe handed 
down. In the majority of cases these fines were handed dow n to act as a detterent to other 
residents of the border regions who might attempt large scale smuggling. One o f the first 
customs prosecutions in the Cavan - Monaghan region occured at Clones district court on 
28 July 1923 when a motor garage owner, George Robinson was charged with importing 
a Ford motor car on which the customs duty had not been paid. Robinson was found 
guilty of the charge and was fined £70 and also had the car forfeited.53
Castleblayneys first serious smuggling case came the following week and 
aroused much public interest. The case involved a farm labourer named Patrick Collins of 
Mullyash, who was charged with 'removing and carrying certain dutiable goods, viz. a 
quantity of cigarettes and tobacco from Northern Ireland into Saorstat Eireann with the 
intent to defraud the customs officers of Saorstat Eireann.'54 When stopped on an 
unapproved road by customs officials, the accussed was found to be concealing under a 
sack of potatoes 'a quantity of dutiable goods, 45lbs. lOozs. weight of tobacco, 10,000 
Woodbine cigarettes and 7,000 Player's cigarettes.'55 The man was found guilty of 
smuggling and was fined the maximum amount of three the value of tobacco and the 
customs duty, a total fine of £169 4s 3d or in default of payment six months in jail. This 
was an extremely large amount of money for a farm labourer to pay and the fine was 
obviously expected to act as a detterent to other border residents.
By December 1923 the fines for smuggling became less severe and at 
Castleblayney district court, Mr. Keenan solicitor stated 'it was the desire ot the 
commissioners to let it be known that the [previous] prosecutions were by way of 
warning, and a different attitude could be taken in regard to future cases.57 By 1930 it 
was admitted that a regular trade in smuggling had grown up all along the border and the
customs regulations were being defied under the very noses of the preventative officers.
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The preventative officers themselves were also disillusioned with the process and one 
customs officer labelled the border a 'farce':
'I have been five years on the border and the only conclusion 
1 can form is that the whole thing is a farce. Very few, 
except those immediately concerned, have any idea how it is 
upsetting and injuring the trade of the country' ....Asked, if 
the people were getting used to the regulations, his reply was 
an emphatic 'No'. 'Even after seven years, the border gives as 
much trouble as it did at the outset. The people do not seem 
to be able to grasp it.'58
It is evident that the border caused immense difficulties for the people of 
Cavan and Monaghan. It can also be seen from the above passage that this trouble had not 
abated after seven years. The people of the region still did not see the necessity for the 
forms to be filled in at the customs post and detested the long delays suffered in travelling 
across the border by approved routes. However in 1924 and 1925 the people of the region 
held high hopes that the Boundary Commission would recommend a realignemnt of the 
borderline and make life much easier for residents in the region.
The Boundary Commission was provided for by Article XII of the Treaty 
between Great Britain and Ireland. It was to determine in accordance with the wishes of 
the inhabitants so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the 
boundary between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland. Secondary sources on the 
subject are plentiful and the story of the Boundary Commission has been studied in depth 
by numerous historians.59 It is not the purpose of this work to add to the debate on the 
failure of the Boundary Commission. However the findings of the Commission which 
were directly related to the borders of Cavan and Monaghan with the Northern state will 
be analysed as they are directly relevant to the issues being discussed in this thesis.
Residents in the region were anxious to have the Commission set up so 
that the problems caused by the border could be rectified. However it was almost three
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and a half years after the signing o f the Treaty before the Commission finally met. A 
number of reasons contributed to this long delay which benefitted the Northern state. The 
fact that Northern Ireland had been functioning for over three years meant that it was 
difficult to foresee large changes in the boundary line. The Boundary Commission finally 
met for the first time on 6 November 1924 at Clement's Inn London.60 The 
commissioners were Eoin Mac Neill, representing the Free State government, J.R. Fisher 
who had been appointed by the British government on behalf of Northern Ireland. 
Richard Feetham, a judge of the supreme court of South Africa was appointed chairman 
of the Commission.
The residents of the border regions of Cavan and Monaghan were relieved 
when the Boundary Commission finally met. Opinion in the region was however divided 
as to the extent of alterations to the boundary line which the commission would 
recommend. Most people hoped that the Boundary Commission would bring about a 
settlement which would bring about a more friendly feeling between North and South. 
This in turn would bring about conditions more conducive to economic interchange 
between North and South. The feelings of people in the region was very aptly summed up 
in the following editorial in the Dundalk Democrat after Fisher had been appointed to the 
Boundary Commission.
Some people do not expect much from [the commission]
Some even expect acuter trouble. But at least let us give this 
tribunal, provided by the Treaty for the settlement of this 
vexed boundary, a fair chance. It may disappoint some, it 
may even - and very easily- displease all parties by its 
decisions. But it will complete one stage towards the 
eventual reunion, which every good Irishman on either side 
of the border hopes for.61
The great controversy which was to surround the deliberations of the 
Boundary Commission, was the interpretation which the chairman, Justice Feetham
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would take from Article XII. It has already been shown in this work how the Colllins - 
Craig negotiations broke down over the interpretation of Article XII. The Irish Free State 
interpreted Article XII to mean that large tracts of Northern Ireland, including the entire 
counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh would be transferred to the Free State. The Northern 
goverment believed that modifications to the boundary would be slight. Craig believed 
that the commissions purpose was merely to adjust glaring anomalies on either side of the 
boundary.62 Feetham was given the unenviable position of choosing which one of these 
interpretations he would use. Feetham eventually chose the latter interpretation. 'His basic 
proposition was that Northern Ireland should remain the same provincial entity, capable 
of maintaining a parliament and government, and that the onus of proof lay with those 
who wanted to change the border.'62
The commission began its enquiries and investigations on the wishes of 
inhabitants in November 1924 and used three elements to reach their conclusions. The 
returns of the 1911 census were used as the fundamental guide to the wishes of the 
inhabitants. These figures were used on the traditional interpretation that protestant equals 
unionist and catholic equals nationalist.64 They also carried out their own study of 
economic and geographic conditions with the aid of a permanent staff in London. Finally, 
on the 28 November 1924 the commission decied to issue an invitation for 'written 
representation from public bodies, associations, or individuals resident in Ireland with 
reference to the work with which the commission is charged.’65
In February 1925, the commission decided to proceed on a tour of the
border regions, with the purpose of holding sittings to hear evidence from those who had
submitted representations. The sittings were held in March, and residents of Monaghan
got a chance to put forward their claims at the sitting held in Armagh from 3 to 7 March
1925. Representations from residents in the border regions of Cavan were made at the
sittings held at Kellyhevlin, Enniskillen, from 22 April to 6 May. Claims made to the
commission were broken into two catagories, positive and negative. Positive claims were
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those made by people in favour of changes of jurisdiction, while negative claims were 
against such changes of jurisdiction.66 A number of claims were made in relation to the 
border regions of Cavan and Monaghan.
The first claim in relation to the Cavan Monaghan region was before the 
Commission on 4 March 1925. and was made by 'a group of inhabitants of Glaslough and 
the adjoining district of county Monaghan which borders on county Armagh.'67 The first 
representation was made by unionist inhabitants of the region who wished to see the area 
of Glaslough transferred to Northern Ireland. This representation was headed by Rev. 
John Ritchie a presbyterian minister from Glennan in Glaslough.68 Reverend Ritchie 
complained to the commission that his parish included ground on either side of the 
existing border and he wished to see all of his parish in the one county. Further evidence 
was given by Mr. Skelton, a land agent for Sir John Leslie in Glaslough, on behalf of the 
unionist inhabitants of Glaslough. Skelton pointed out that feeding stuffs were dearer in 
Monaghan than in Northern Ireland. He also contended that taxation was 5/6 in the Free 
State and 4/6 in Northern Ireland. Skelton stated that the 'principle points I have to make 
are those of taxation and cost of living and of course I would much rather be under the 
Union Jack.'69
A highly significant trend was therefore emerging in the motivation behind
such claims and counterclaims put forward to the Boundary Commission. It was
becoming increasingly clear that although economic and geographic conditions were put
forward in support of claims, the main motivation was political. This was especially true
in north Monaghan, where as we have previously seen, there was a large concentration of
unionists. The memories of the sectarian warfare and tensions which engulfed the region
during the early part of the decade were obviously still very much alive in the region.
There is little doubt that these memories had a massive influence on the representations
made to the commission by rival groups. A counterclaim to the evidence put forward by
the unionist inhabitants of Glaslough was made to the commission by the nationalist
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inhabitants o f  Glaslough. As was the case with the unionist deputation the nationalist 
deputation was also headed by the local clergyman. Rev. J. Marron P.P.70 Reverend 
Marron stated that the vast majority of residents in his parish were rigorously opposed to 
any transfer to the Northern state. Further evidence was given by business people in the 
region, including two directors of Mullan Mills. Although the directors Me Kenna and 
Me Cluskey admitted to the inconveniences caused by the border, he contended that the 
business people in the region wanted to remain in the Free State.
Mullan Mills, which was a boot factory in north Monaghan, also wrote to 
the secretary o f  the commission contesting claims that the area should be transferred to 
the Northern State. Mullan Mills claimed that transference of the region to the northern 
state would be disastrous for the factory. However a political motivation can be seen 
throughout the letter sent to the commission.
It has come to the knowledge of the directors that the 
'Glaslough unionists' who have claimed before your 
commission at Omagh in the Northern area seem to think 
that because in one particular corner of the Free State 
boundary they happen to be large landowners they speak for 
the 'Glaslough district' which includes a large area and 
several electoral divisions, in which about 90% are
nationalists and all opposed to joining the northern area.71
It can be seen that political tensions were still very much alive in north 
Monaghan, three years after sectarian conflict had ceased in the region. This fact was 
further in evidence in Armagh on 7 March 1925 when the committee of inhabitants of 
Mullyash district came before the Commission.72 Again economic factors were to the 
forefront and the secretary o f  the committee Samuel Stoops highlighted the higher costs 
of living in the Free State. This list illustrating the differences in cost of living between 
the two states is reproduced in Table four. It is clear that the cost of living was higher in 
the Free State and the residents of border regions had every justification in seeking
148
transference to the northern state. However it was unionists who put forward these 
arguments while nationalists were anxious to remain in the Free State. Reverend Canon 
T.G. Rudd, canon and rector of Castleblayney, in the course of his evidence on behalf of 
the Mullyash unionists highlighted this point. Canon Rudd came to the conclusion that:
a very large number of Roman Catholics here are now very 
strong unionists in the Free State. I have several instances of 
it. If they found it expedient to express their views publicly, 
they would state that. In conversation with people, they of 
course state their mind on the subject, but would not care to 
state it publicly. A great many people are not quite satisfied 
with the financial position of the Free State.73
It is very difficult to assertain if the nationalists living in the border regions 
of north Monaghan did actually feel this way. although it would seem highly unlikely that 
they did. This viewpoint is corroborated by a petition organised by Clones Urban District 
Council claiming that the majority of people in the Clones and Drumully region wished to 
remain in the Irish Free State. The petition, while admitting the economic difficulties of 
residents in Drumully Salient due to the position of the border, stated that the people 
wished to remain in the Free State, the petition stated that
We and the majority whom we represent desire to remain in 
Saorstat Eireann. Firstly, because the system of government 
and institutions of Saorstat Eireann commend themsleves to 
us and we are happy under its constitution, no discrimination 
on account of religious or political views being made in 
Saorstat Eireann while in Northern Ireland, catholics are in 
practice though professedly not in theory under grave 
dissabilities. In Saorstat Eireann minorities are protected by 
P.R. while in Northern Ireland all protection is withdrawn 
from the minority by the abolition of that P.R. which existed
prior to partition.74
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The contending views of residents which were presented to the Boundary Commission 
were undoubtedly political in motivation and this is again vividly illustrated in the case of 
Drumully. The motivations behind this desire to be transferred to the Northern State 
highlighted the fact that the feelings of distrust held by unionists, first engendered during 
the border wars, was still very much alive. The unionist inhabitants of Drumully were 
adamant that they should not be turned over to the 'misrule of men who had always been 
their enemies.'75
The position along the Cavan border with Northern Ireland as regards the 
Boundary Commission differed markedly from that of County Monaghan. The Boundary 
Commission was undoubtedly much less contentious for the Cavan region for a number 
of significant reasons. There were no groups in county Cavan which petitioned the 
commission for transference to Northern Ireland. There was however a petition made by a 
number of unionist residents of the district electoral division of Castle Saunderson for 
transference to the Northern state. Castle Saunderson was a small district electoral 
division near Belturbet and close to the Fermanagh border. It consisted almost entirely of 
the former estate of a wealthy unionist landlord. It had a large majority of protestants and 
their claims for transference had no geographic or economic basis. This claim was 
therefore based purely on political grounds.76 This claim was countered by Belturbet 
Urban Distict Council who protested to the commission against this claim. Apart from 
this isolated case no other representations were made to the Boundary Commission by 
Cavan residents seeking transfernce to Northern Ireland.
The explanation for this can be based on the three terms of reference upon
which the Boundary Commission was to deliberate. The first o f these was the 'wishes of
inhabitants'. In contrast to much of north Monaghan the border regions of Cavan were
bereft of large concentrations of unionists. With the exception of Castlesaunderson the
Cavan Fermanagh border had a majority of nationalists living along it. On the Fermanagh
side there was also a high concentration of nationalist residents whos wished to be
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transferred to the Irish Free State. Unlike the eastern section of county Fermanagh which 
bordered on county Monaghan the southern section of the county had a significant 
majority of catholics. Therefore on political grounds any claims which were made about 
the Cavan Fermanagh border, were in relation to having certain portions of county 
Fermanagh transferred to the Free State.
It can also be argued that many protestants who were living in the border 
regions of Cavan moved to Northern Ireland during the period of sectarian hostilities. 
This is verified by a private census of protestants who had moved to Fermanagh during 
the period 1920-25. This list was supplied to the Boundary Commission by James Cooper 
and sons, solicitors from Enniskillen, and is the only such documentation which charts 
population movement from the Free State to Northern Ireland during the period under 
study.77 It is extremely difficult to accurately trace population movement between the two 
states during this period from the census returns. This is mainly due to the fact that there 
was a fifteen year gap between the 1911 and 1926 census'. Household returns are 
unavailable for the 1926 census and it is therefore extremely difficult to calculate 
population movement during this period. The relaibility of the above list is also open to 
debate but was probably a good indication of the migration of protestants from the Cavan 
and Monaghan region.
Geographic conditions also played a crucial part in the lack of 
representations to the boundary commission. The Cavan Fermanagh border for many 
miles consisted of a natural frontier. The boundary followed a natural line of northern 
foothills of Slieve Rushen. Any areas which were disadvantaged by the boundary line 
were in county Fermanagh. The final consideration which was taken into account by the 
Boundary Commission was economic conditions. On the larger scale it was northern 
residents who formerly patronized the markets of Swanlinbar who were more severely 
handicapped by the position of the borderline.
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Following its tour of the border the commission returned to London to 
begin its deliberations. By October the commissioners were reaching agreement and the 
new borderline was decided upon in a series of meetings from 13 to 17 October 1925. 
The commissioners approved a first draft o f the terms of the award and agreed to call the 
governments into consultation.78 On 7 November an extremely accurate report and map 
of the new borderline was published in a London tory newspaper the Morning Post. 
Cosgrave later described this journal as 'an English newspaper which has been 
consistently and fiercely hostile to Irish nationality, to Irish sentiment and to Irish 
existence generally.'79 It is widely believed that Fisher precipitated this leak. The report 
showed that the changes recommended by the Boundary Commission were minute and 
consisted merely of correcting the glaring anomalies thrown up by the border. The south 
was to gain 31,000 people and 281 square miles, losing 7,500 people and 78 square miles. 
More importantly the borderline would have been shortened from 280 to 229 miles.80
The report however was met with fury in the Free State. The report gave 
little land to the Free State and even took some land away. This had not been 
contemplated by the Free State government, which had always rejected any possibility of 
losing territory. This view was also held by the chairman of Monaghan County Council 
who held that 'the Boundary Commission had no right to interfere with Free State 
territory. As their representative he intended to resist to the last any attempt to interfere 
with the boundary of Monaghan, Donegal or any other Free State county.'81 The leaking 
of the report caused a major crisis for the Dublin government as people throughout the 
border regions felt cheated by the report. People in east Donegal and parts of north 
Monaghan were furious that part o f their territory would be taken from them. With this in 
mind Monaghan County Council passed the following resolution:
We the County Council of Monaghan, hereby pledge 
ourselves to resist to the last, and to the utmost, the attempt, 
if such be contemplated, to dismember our county, and to
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bind in perpetual bondage, in defiance of the wishes of the 
inhabitants... We call upon the President and the executive 
council to stand with us and with the people, and show the 
forces hostile to us that the people and the government will
never acquiesce in the refusal of the hearts desire of our
people in disregard of their economic interests, and in 
ignoring geographic relations.8-
A public meeting was also called in the region to protest against any 
infringement of Free State territory by the Boundary Commission. The meeting was held
in the small village of Emyvale in north Monaghan on Sunday 22 November 1925.
However matters had changed markedly between the calling of the meeting and the day it 
was to be held. On 20 November Eoin Mac Neill, the Free States representative on the 
Boundary Commission, in an attempt to undo the damage caused by the report resigned 
from the commisssion and ultimately from the Government. Therefore all attention was 
now very much centered on the tiny village of Emyvale for the meeting. Indeed the 
importance of the meeting can be gauged from the fact that president of the executive 
council, Cosgrave arrived 'uninvited and unexpected.'83
In the course of his speech Cosgrave pointed out, as he had done in the 
Dail debates, that it had always been the view of the executive council that the Boundary 
Commission had no right to take away any Free State territory. He also went on to say 
that 'if the terms of reference contained in the Treaty were properly interpreted and effect 
given to the wishes of the inhabitants, this question could never arise.'84 He believed that 
no boundary line could possibly be drawn consonant with the terms of Article XII 'which 
would infringe Free State territory even if in the abstract such power did in fact exist.'85
Cosgrave laid the blame at the door of the commissioners who 'did not 
place a value of impartial justice, who did not respect the considerations which had been 
laid down for their guidance and direction, and who were prepared to allow themselves to 
be swayed from the path of judicial rectitude by out side considerations.'86 Doctor Mac
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Neill, according to Cosgrave, had proved himself exonerated and an honourable man by 
resigning from the commission. Cosgrave urged the people of Monaghan to exercise calm 
and restraint in this grave situation. He expressed the hope that damage would not be 
done to the good relationship which had been built up between catholics and protestants 
on both sides of the border in recent times. He stressed that the Free State government 
would do everything in its power to 'prevent the infliction of injustice upon our people.'87
The meeting broke up with promises that the people of Monaghan would 
not stand by while part of their territory was transferred to Northern Ireland. This meeting 
was highly significant for a number of reasons. Firstly it highlighted the determination of 
the people of Monaghan to resist the transference of any part of their territory to the 
Northern state.The univited presence of Cosgrave also highlighted the growing crisis 
w'hich surrounded the Morning Post leak. Cosgrave's calls for the people of Monaghan to 
exercise calm and retraint proves that a highly volatile situation had arisen. Partition had 
been especially dificult for people in the region but a return to the sectarian violence of 
the early years of the decade would have spelt economic as well as political disaster for 
the region. It is important to note here that there was no such protestations against the 
leaked report in county Cavan. No land had been taken from the county and the crisis 
which followed the Morning Post leak did not even make front page or headline news in 
Cavan. It was far down the list of priorities for the county.
In the aftermath of the Emyvale meeting Cosgrave tried desperately to
rectify the situation. He demanded an immediate conference between the leaders of the
three states. Cosgrave was deeply worried that the two remaining commissioners could
press ahead and release their report which would be binding. Negotiations were held at
Chequers, the country residence of the British Prime Minister. The Free State was
represented at these negotiations by Cosgrave and Kevin O Higgins. Agreement between
the three governments was reached on 3 December 1925. It was decided that the report of
the Boundary Commission would be suppressed. Indeed it was not released until 1968
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and then only as an historical document. The border was to remain unaltered and all 
powers of the council of Ireland relating to Northern Ireland under the 1920 act were to 
be transferred to the Northern Ireland government.
The agreement was undoubtedly a huge blow for the Free State 
government and nationalists throughout the country. The Boundary Commission, which 
so much hope and expectation had been placed on. had now failed to deliver a united 
Ireland. The border remained as it was and north south relations were virtually at a 
standstill. No longer was there provision for a council of Ireland but Cosgrave tried to 
appear upbeat about the outcome of the Chequers agreement He believed 'that this 
agreement, signed in the spirit of goodwill which prevailed between all parties lays the 
foundation of a new era in Irish history, an era in which North and South will make a 
united effort for the betterment and development of the country as a whole.' 88
Turning back to the Boundary Commission and the Cavan - Monaghan 
region, it now remains to examine the changes the Boundary Commission made for the 
region and how these if implemented would have effected the region. It is ironic that the 
changes recommended by the Commission would have actually hepled the region. The 
anomalies thrown up by the existing boundary would have been alleviated, and the border 
shortened considerably. The border proposed by the Commission's report would have 
been a much more natural frontier line.
The first border area in the region to be considered by the Commission
was the border of west Cavan and south Fermanagh. This region of west Cavan and
notably the towns of Ballyconnell, Swanlinbar and Belturbet had suffered immense
economic damage due to partition. In this region the report of the Boundary Commission
would have benefitted the west Cavan region immensely. The Boundary Commission
recommended the transference of parts of the district electoral divisions of Cuilcagh.
Derrylester, Kinawley, Springtown, Doon, Aghyoule and Crum to the Free State.89 This
area consisted of 16,167 acres of land with a population of over two and a half thousand
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people.90 This transference would have restored large tracts of the former market areas of 
Swanlinbar, Ballyconnell and Belturbet and would have beneffitted the area considerably.
The next part o f the region to be considered was the east Fermanagh north 
Monaghan region. Of specific interest to the Commission in this area was the devestating 
effect which partition had on the economic life of partition, and this is reflected in the 
changes proposed. The Boundary Commission recommended the transference of an area 
consisting of over 30,000 acres and 3.000 people to the Free State.91 This region included 
large tracts of the former market area of Clones and would have benefitted the town 
enormously. The Commission also recommended the transference of an area south of 
Newtownbutler consisting o f  787 people to the Free State. This area had prior to partition 
traditionally patronized the markets of Belturbet and Clones, and again would have been 
a boost for the economy of the region. The Commission did however recommend the 
transferal of Drumully salient to Northern Ireland. This region was as all but seperated 
from the Free State by northern territory. It consisted of an area of 336 acres, mainly of 
bogland with a population of just 51 people, the loss of this territory was to be expected 
under the three terms of the Commissions deliberations. The first of these terms was the 
wishes of the inhabitants and the area had 38 protestants as opposed to 13 catholics. The 
region had no geographical link with county Monaghan. The third term was economic 
considerations, and the loss o f  Drumully salient would in any case have had no economic 
reprecussions for the Free State. The north Monaghan - Tyrone boundary was to be left as 
it stood as there was 'no practicable method by which the wishes of the catholic 
inhabitants could be gratified without including considerable areas from neighbouring 
which show protestant majorities.'92
The final series of boundary changes recommended by the Boundary
Commission affecting the region to be made were those on the north east Monaghan
border with Armagh. This area saw the most controversial recommendations in the
Monaghan border region. The Commission here recommended the transferral of portions
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of the district electoral divisions of Mullyash, Chuch hill and Carrickaslane from 
Monaghan to Northern Ireland. The area did have a significant protestant majority but the 
main considerations here were geographic. The transferal of this area would have 
shortened the Monaghan - Armagh border by some considerable distance.93 However it 
would have meant that the town of Castleblavnev would have been deprived of some of 
its former market area. In any case the vast majority of people in Monaghan refused to 
consider the possibility of the Free State losing territory' to Northern Ireland.
In this region the Free State stood to gain a significant amount of territory 
which would have far outweighed the territory it stood to lose. The Commission 
recommended the transfer of the district electoral divisions of Tynan. Middletown and 
Derrynoose, an area of 8.928 acres. The Free State would also have gained 2.000 people 
1,764 of whom were catholic. This would have benefitted the market areas of both 
Glaslough and Monaghan town. Whereas the Free State would have lost 995 people, two 
thirds of whom were protestant, it would have gained 2,000 people. In south Armagh 
Monaghan was also to gain Crossmaglen and its hinterland which would have involved 
the transferal of about four and a half thousand to the Free State.94 This would have been 
of immesurable advantage to the region as a whole. It would have restored to the people 
of east and south Monaghan their former market town of Crossmaglen. This would also 
have been of great economic advantage to county Monaghan.
In any case the above arguments were rendered hypothetical by the 
agreement on 3 December 1925 to leave the borderline as it was. Monaghan nationalists 
in their indignant protestations over the loss of about 6,500 acres of land, which in any 
case had a large protestant majority failed to see what they would have gained. The 
Boundary Commission's recommendations for the Cavan Monaghan region would have 
benefitted the region enormously. As it was the border regions of Cavan and Monaghan 
fell into further decline, especially in the period of the economic war from 1932 - 38.
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The ending of the Boundary Commission did close the chapter on a very 
disturbing period in the history of both counties. Faced with the finality of the borderline 
people in the region struggled to get on with day to day life and to make the best they 
could out of a bad situation. Partition had always been hard on the market towns of the 
region such as Swanlinbar. Belturbet and Clones and continued to be so. It is hard to 
quantify how many people migrated out o f  the region in these difficult times, but it is very- 
probable that this was the option chosen by many during this difficult period.
158
ENDNOTES:
1. Johnson,D.S., 'Partition and cross border trade in the 1920's' in Roebuck,p.(ed.) 
Plantation to />ar//7/OA7(Belfast,1981). pp.229-246.
2. MacDonald. Darach. 'Clones - what partition did to life in one border town' in Irish 
Press. 5-6 November 1985.
3. Carron. Tom. 'Clones has survived epic challenges' in O'Hanlon. J (ed.) Anglo Celt 
150th Anniversary Souvenir Supplement(Ca\an. 1996). pp.79-80.
4. Dail Eireann, Debates, vol. i -xxxiii.
5. Consulted in P.R.O.N.l.
6. N.L.I.. Boundary Commission Papers.
7. quoted in Johnson, op.cit., p.232.
8. N.A. Department of Taoiseach Records. S 1955A. Memo entitled 'Customs Imperial 





13. Dundalk Democrat. 3 March 1923.
14. Northern Standard, 6 April 1923.
15. Dundalk Democrat. 31 March 1923.
16. Dundalk Democrat. 7 April 1923.
17. Anglo Celt, 31 March 1923.
18. Irish Times, 16 May 1923.
19. Northern Standard. 27 July 1923.
20. ibid.
21. N.L.I. Boundary Commission papers, CAB 61 /39, evidence of Mr Andrews.
22. Dundalk Democrat, 19 May 1923.
23. A Salient is definined as a projecting part of a front line. In geographical terms a 
salient occurs where a portion of the border of one country juts into another country in a 
'V' shape. It is therefore completely suurounded by the territory of another country. This 
makes access to it extremely difficult.
24. N.A. Dept, of Taoiseach Records, S 2027 Northern Ireland boundary secret 
documents based on report by Mr Me Cartan on visit to Clones to N.E.B.B., 17 July 
1923.
25. N.L.I. Boundary Commission papers, CAB 61/133. Evidence of Thomas Smith, 
farmer Kinawley.
26. N.A. Dept of Taoiseach Records, S 1955A, Customs barrier between Irish Free State 
and Northern Ireland.
27. Carron, op.cit., pp.89-90.
Me Donald, op.cit.,
28. Carron, op.cit., p.89.
29. Me Donald, op.cit.,
30. N.A. Dept of Taoiseach Records, S 3161.Border Incidents 1922-3.
31. ibid.
32. Me Donald, op.cit.,
159




37. N.A. Dept, of Taoiseach Records, S 3161. N.E.B.B. report on the question of having 
the road from Belturbet to Enniskillen made an approved road. 2 November 1923.
38. ibid.
39. ibid.
40.N.A. Dept, of Taoiseach Records. S 3161, Office of the Revenue Commissioners to 
N.E.B.B., 17 December 1923.
41. P.R.O.N.I. Ministry' of Home Affairs Records. HA /5/1923. 'Reopening of roads 
closed under the Civil Autnorities Act and R.O.I.A.
42.N.L.I. Boundary Commission papers, CAB 61/76, evidence of P. O Golain.
43. Irish Times. 2-4 July 1930.
44. ibid.
45. Johnson, op.cit.,
46. N.L.I. Boundary Commission papers, CAB 61/76. evidence of P. 0  Golain.
47. Northern Standard, 27 July 1923.
48. ibid.
49. ibid.
50. quoted in Johnson, op. cit.. p.240.
51. N.L.I. Boundary Commission papers, CAB 61/76, evidence of P. O Golain.
52. Johnson, op.cit., p.240.
53. Dundalk Democrat. 4 August 1923.
54. Northern Standard, 27 July 1923. Dundalk Democrat, 11 August 1923.
55. Northern Standard, 27 July 1923.
56. Dundalk Democrat, 8 December 1923.
57. Irish Times, 3 July 1930.
58. ibid.
59. The workof Geofrey J. Hand, Report o f  the Boundary Commission, 1925 (Shannon, 
1965) , 'Eoin Mac Neill and the Boundary Commission', in Martin, F.X. and Byrne. F.J.. 
The Scholar Revolutionary: Eoin Mac Neill, 1867-1945 (Shannon, 1973), is authoritive, 
in depth and an excellent study of the Boundary Commission. Michael Laffan. The 
Partition o f  Ireland 1911 - 1925. (Dundalk, 1983), also examines the setting up of the 
Commission and its ultimate breakdown. David Fitzpatrick, The Two Ireland's 1912- 
1939. (Oxford, 1988), and Ronan Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983), also 
study the period and these are both extremely useful sources.
60. Minutes and Proceedings of the Irish Boundary Commission. Consulted on Microfim 
in N.L.I. Pos. 6509 -32.
61. Dundalk Democrat, 25 October 1924.
62. Laffan, op cit., p. 101.
63. Quoted in Laffan, p. 101.
64. Hand, op. cit., p.xvi.
65. ibid, p.8.
66. ibid, p .15.
160
67. ibid. p .19.
68. N.L.I B.C. Papers. CAB 61/70.
69. ibid.
70. N.L.I B. C. Papers. CAB 61/71.
71. N.L.I. B C Papers, CAB 61/110.
72. N.L.I. B C Papers. CAB 61/111.
73. ibid.
74. N.L.I. B C Papers, CAB 61/42. Petition ofClones Urban District Council.
75. N.L.I. B C Papers, Cab 61/13. Memo on Drumully salient.
76. Hand, op cit., p. 16.
77. N.L.I. B. C. Papers CAB 61/65. List of Protestants who have come into county 
Fermanagh in the last five years. List provided by J Cooper and sons, Solicitors, 
Enniskillen.
78. Hand, op cit., p. 16.
79. Anglo Celt, 28 November 1925.
80. Laffan, op cit., p .103.
81. Dundalk Democrat, 21 November 1925.
82. ibid.





88. Irish Times, 5 December 1925.
89. Changes affecting the Cavan Monaghan region are laid out in Appendix IV.
90. Hand, op cit., p. 109.
91. See Appendix IV.





The aim of this thesis was to assess the impact of partition on Cavan and 
Monaghan in the period 1914-1926. This work has illustrated the ways in which partition 
impacted on the Cavan-Monaghan region in political, economic and social terms. The 
Government of Ireland Act and the imposition of partition in December 1920 ushered in 
an era of great political and economic uncertainty for the people of the region. Partition 
was a very divisive force in the Cavan-Monaghan region. Different religious groups 
reacted differently to the imposition of partition, laying the seeds for the sectarian 
animosities which engulfed the region in the following years. The period immediately 
before the outbreak of World War I was immensely turbulent. The Ulster Volunteers and 
the Irish Volunteers faced one another in an uneasy standoff as the country was on the 
verge of Civil war.
The period 1919-1921 saw the imposition of the partition settlement and 
was a very bloody period in the history of Ireland as a whole. The War of Independence 
also contributed to provoking sectarian animosities in the Cavan-Monaghan region. By 
mid 1920 much of the region was embroiled in open sectarian hostility. It was a very 
bloody period which left a deep scar on the region. Sectarian divisions between unionists 
and nationalists were deepened and it would take a long time for the region to recover 
from the violence and sectarian hostilities which erupted. Moreover, the Belfast boycott 
which took place in tandem with these events further inflamed sectarian animosities, 
especially in areas such as north Monaghan which had a high concentration of protestants. 
In north Monaghan the boycott became openly sectarian as nationalists refused to trade 
with unionist traders or businesses. This had severe economic reprecussions for 
protestants in the region. The boycott also had a severe effect on the economy of the 
region as a whole. The region traditionally had close economic links with Belfast and 
North East Ulster which were not severed. Basic everyday items such as bread which had
traditionally come from Belfast now came from Dublin, which added to the expense.
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The border regions of Cavan and Monaghan suffered immensely during 
the period of the border wars in 1922-1923. The borderline between the region and 
Northern Ireland became a battleground. Raids across the borderline by both the I.R.A 
and the B Specials became a common occurance as people lived in fear of attack and 
reprisals. This period also had devestating economic effects on the region. Commercial 
intercourse between North and South was severely hampered. This was especially the 
case after the Northern government, in an attempt to curb I.R.A. incursions, cut off border 
roads between North and South. This did untold damage to border towns in the region 
which were previously patronised by northern customers. It was only with the outbreak of 
the civil war, which left such a violent and bloody birth scar on the Irish Free State.which 
helped bring a return to peacefulness for the residents of the border regions.
Although peace had returned to the region by 1923 the border was now a 
fact of life for residents of the region. A new form of partition was initiated by the setting 
up of the customs barrier between north and south on 1 April 1923. This new form of 
partition had a profound impact on the economy of the region. It severely hit border 
towns such as Belturbet, Swanlinbar, Ballyconnell and Clones. These towns had 
traditionally drawn a lot of customers from the six counties. With the imposition of the 
customs barrier and the concurrent restrictions on movement between the two states, 
much of this was lost. The economic reprecussions of this were immense.
The final act in the history of partition came with the setting up of the 
Boundary Commission in November 1924. The Boundary Commission papers and the 
recommendations made by the Commission for the Cavan - Monaghan region are 
important on two levels. The representations made by residents of the region to the 
Commission highlighted the fact that sectarian bitterness and mistrust still existed in the 
region. Although all the representations made to the Commission from people in the 
region stressed economic conditions as their main motivation, political overtones were
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easily discernable. This highlighted the fact that certain amounts of sectarian feelings still 
existed in the region.
The findings of the Commission which were directly relevant to the Cavan 
- Monaghan region are also highly significant. If the findings of the Commission had been 
allowed to stand they would have enormously benefitted the region. The Commission had 
restored the market areas of Swanlinbar, Belturbet and Clones. The breakdown of the 
Commission and the subsequent agreement to leave the boundary line as it was concludes 
this period of history.
This period had a profound effect on the subsequent history of the region. 
On a political level the animosities which arose between nationalists and unionists did 
eventually cease. Unionists either migrated out of the region or came to terms with living 
as a minority in the Free State. Unionists continued to sit on the county councils and by 
and large became involved with the functioning of local government. By the start of the 
1930's sectarian animosity in the region was non existant. On the national political stage 
the failure of the Boundary Commission had a major impact on North South relations.
Cosgrave hoped that the agreement to leave the boundary as it was would 
usher in an era of co - operation between North and South. This was to prove a false 
aspiration. The transference of the powers of the Council of Ireland to the Northern 
government meant that there was no longer even the machinery- in place for cross border 
co-operation. Cosgrave's government, or any subsequent Irish government had no real 
effective Northern policy. For forty years following the Chequers agreement ' what passed 
for the northern policy of the Dublin government consisted of little more than inveighing 
impotently against the evils of partition.'1
It was the economic ramifications of partition in the period under study 
which had a longer lasting effect on the region. The border and in particular the customs 
barrier severly impinged upon the economic life of the region. The closure o f  border
roads caused much hardship and continued to be a controversial subject in the region.
1 6 4
Fanners and traders suffered immensely from the closure of these border roads, some of 
which remain closed to this day. Indeed it was not until March 1999 that the main 
throughfare between Enniskillen and Belturbet was reopened. Part of the main road was 
Aghalane bridge which from the period of the border wars was intermittently closed and 
reopened. The last of these closures came in the early 1970's and the bridge remained 
closed for nearly thirty years.- An article in the Anglo Cell dated 1 April 1999 summed up 
the devestating effect of the closure of border roads. The article which could have been 
written at any time in the previous 75 years stated that:
The re- opening of the bridge is a real boon to the town of 
Belturbet which lost approximately one quarter of its 
hinterland when the central arch of the Aghalane bridge was 
demolished.. The most striking effect locally was that the 
communities on each side of the border were physically 
divided and contact was severely curtailed. Many 
landowners owned land on both sides of the border and to 
get from one part of land to the other involved a trip of up to 
40km instead of 1km.3
It is important to re-emphasize the fact that this article was written over 75 years after the 
period under examination in this work. This fact alone vividly illustrates the problems 
encountered by residents of the border regions of Cavan and Monaghan. Arguably the 
border towns studied at length throughout this work never really recovered from partition. 
To cite the example of Clones, Darach Mac Donald wrote in 1985 that Clones.
on the front line of partition, that episode had implications 
which have continued since. In particular, the once bustling 
town of Clones became a victim, cut off not only from an 
economic hinterland, but its parish.4
The Cavan-Monaghan region as a whole suffered immensely from partition and 
continued to do so. The region was severly hit by the Economic War between Great
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Britain and Ireland from 1932 -1938. Smuggling became a massive industry during this 
period as the region further slumped behind the rest of the country. It is therefore difficult 




1. Fanning, Ronan, Independent /re/i/w/(Dublin.l983). p.92.
2. The bridge was reopened as the 'George Mitchell Peace Bridge' in March 1999.
3. Anglo Celt, 1 April 1999.
4. Irish Press, 5 November 1985.
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APPENDIX I: Belfast Boycott Castleblayney Black List. Posted up in 
Castleblayney 31 October 1921.
The following Mecrhants. etc., in Castleblayney and District are still trading with 
Belfast firms, their agents and distributors;




William J. Fleming. do.
Hope Arms Hotel. do.
James Gray & Co. Muckno Street.
Andrew Wilson, do.
Robert Watson, do.
John Me Kee, do.
Thomas Campbell, do.
James Leathern, do.
James Me Clelland. do.
Mrs. Stewart, do.
George Higgins, Market Square,
Mrs . Parkes, do.
Michael Me Ardle, Clorbane,
F. Carragher, Broomfield,
William J. Hill, Craighanroe,
J.B. Martin, Drumacrib,
Bernard Lynch, Blacksmith, Castleblayney,
A list of those who patronise any of the above houses will be published repeatedly as also 
a list of those dealing with Belfast Banks.
Source: Dublin Castle, Colonial Office Records, CO 904, Part V. William O' Conell (head Constable, 
Carrickmacross) to County Inspectors office, Monaghan.
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APPENDIX II: Principal dutiable aticles on customs frontier between 
the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland:
The principal dutiable aticles were:
Tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, spirits, liquers, perfumery, beer, tea, coffee, chicory, dried 
fruit, cocoa, chocolate, sugar and confectionery, molasses and glucose, sacharrine. wine, 
playing cards, matches, mineral waters and cider, motor cars and accessories, motor 
cycles, parts and accessories, musical instruments (including gramaphones), 
cinematography films, clocks and watches, gramaphone records, wireless valves, vacuum 
tubes, metallic tungsten, compounds of thorium, synthetic organic chemicals, optical 
instruments, optical glass, scientific glassware, scientific instruments, gauges, arc lamp 
carbons, hosiery latch needles, analytical reagents and other fine chemicals, laboratory 
porcelain, ignition magnetos, permanent magnets (including gramaphones).
The principal articles prohibited or restricted on importation are:- Extracts of tea, coffee, 
chicory and tobacco, foreign reprints of registered copyright works, including music, dogs 
(unless covered by a licence issued by Ministry of Agriculture), arms, ammunition and 
explosives (unless covered by licence), prepared opium, cocaine, morphine, ecogime, 
diamorphine (heroin), and raw and medicinal opium (except under a licence issued by the 
Ministry of Home affairs).
Attempts to evade the prohibitions or restrictions render offenders liable to severe 
penalties.
Sou rce:  A n g l o  C e l t ,  31 March 1923.
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APPENDIX III: Border roads closed in counties Fermanagh and Tyrone 1922-1924. 
BORDER ROADS CLOSED IN COUNTY FERMANAGH:
Road Class Bridges, Iron,TownIand. Impassable* Authority for Remarks.
Steel, etc. (yes/no). closing it.
2nd Class Drumully yes C.S.P.A 1922 
& R.O.I.A1
Trench in centre of road.
1st Class Stonework Mullaghbane yes do. Centre Stonework of bridge 
removed.
1st Class Stonework Glass-
drummond
yes do. Locally known as Spring­
field bridge.
2nd Class Stonebridge Springtown yes do. Locally known as 
Caldragh bridge.
2nd Class Stonebridge Greaghvocka yes do. Partly damaged.
2nd Class Wooden footbridge Derrylea yes do.
2nd Class Stonebridge Legaduff yes do.
2nd Class Stonebridge Keenaghan yes do. Road not much used.
1 st Class Gortanedden yes do. Trench cut.
2nd Class Stonebridge Mucknagh yes do.
2nd Class Stonebridge Rushinbane yes do. Temporarily repaired 
for light traffic.
2nd Class Stonebridge Movarren yes do. do.
2nd Class Stonebridge Innisclin yes do. do.
3rd Class Stonebridge Drumbogena yes do. Border bridge, Newtownbutler.
2nd Class Stonebridge Anaghmullen yes do. Border bridge, over Finn River.
2nd Class Hermitage yes do. Border trench.
2nd Class Stonebridge Moleña no do. Border bridge, over Finn River.
2nd Class Stonebridge Clonfad no do. bridge over Ulster canal.
1st Class Drumrainey yes do.
1st Class Stonebridge Lackey yes do. border bridge, Rosslea.
1st Class Stonebridge Mullina-
hinch
yes do. border bridge on main 
Clones road.
2nd Class Stonebridge Rathkeevan yes do. known as new bridge.
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1st Class Stonebridge Cloghmore yes do. Temporarily repaired for 
light traffic.
1st Class Relian yes do. border trench.
2nd Class Stonebridge Tattymore yes do. border trench.
2nd Class Stonebridge Derryvolan yes do. border trench.
2nd Class Stonebridge Cregawarren yes do. border bridge.
2nd Class Stonebridge Corragunt yes do. border bridge.
2nd Class Stonebridge Mullaghfad yes do. border bridge.
2nd Class Stonebridge Mullynavale yes do. border bridge.
3rd Class Stonebridge Mullynavale yes do.
* Impassable- whether rendered impassable by material damage (yes or no)
Source: Report entitled 'Reopening o f  roads' Northern Ireland Ministry o f  H om e Affairs, HA /5 /1923 .  P .R.O.N.l.
Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922. Restoration o f  Order in Ireland Act.
BORDER ROADS CLOSED IN COUNTY TYRONE.
Road Class Bridges,Iron, Townland. Impassable Authority Remarks.
Steel,etc. (yes/no.) for closing it.
Stone Single Fymore yes verbal by Durlass White Bridge
Arch conference 1924. 300 yards east of f ymore
Lough.
2nd Class Cullamore yes do. Trenched since tilled up.




yes do. Longhill Derrynascrabble 
road.
2nd Class ------------------- Aghindaragh yes do. Trenched.
2nd Class Lough-
blayneybane
yes do. Clogher Monaghan 
road.
Stone Single do. yes do. Clogher Monaghan
Arch road.








Culvert Stone Annaghroe yes




Two arch stone 
bridge
Ballagh yes
2nd Class Ballagh yes
2nd Class Ballagh yes
Single stone arch Ravella yes
Stone Lismore yes
Single stone arch Mt. Forest yes
2nd Class Stone culvert Clady yes
4th Class Stone Culvert Dunnygowan yes
2nd Class Stone Bridge do. no
4th Class Stone Culvert Lisdoo yes
3rd Class Stone Culvert Innisclan yes
3rd Class Trench Ballyfoliard yes
3rd Class Trench Priestsesagh yes
3rd Class Trench Froughlough yes
3rd Class Stone Culvert Kilclean yes
3rd Class Stone Culvert Pollyamon yes
3rd Class Stone Culvert Pollyarnon yes
3rd Class Stone Bridge Camoughter yes
3rd Class Stone Culvert Garvagh yes
3rd Class Stone Culvert Laughtmorris yes
4th Class Stone Culvert Laughtfoggy yes
4th Class Stone Culvert 4th Corgary yes
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Verbal 1 Caledon - Glasslough road
do 22/2/22 Remakit -Glannan road.
do May 22 Over Blackwater. since
repaired.
do 21/1/22 Bums bridge. One arch
partially destroyed.





Specials Strabane Clady road.
do. at Clady Creamery.
do over Finn river.
do.
do.
do. Strabane Casllederg old
road.
do. Castlederg Clady road.
do.
do. East Moneygall bog.
do. North Moneygall bog.
do. West Moneygall bog.





4th Class Trench 5th Corgan,' yes do. Near Croagh Bridge.
4th Class Stone Culvert 6th Corgary yes do. Near Croagh Wood.
4th Class Trench 6th Corgary yes do. On border.
4th Class Trench Tullynashoe yes do. Near River Derg.
4th Class Stone Culvert Tievanmenta yes do. O ld e r  Pettigo road.
3rd Class Stone Bridge Meena- yes do. On Castlederg -
clogher Pettigo road.
S ou rce:  Report entit led 'Reopening o f  roads' Northern Ireland Ministry o f  H om e A flairs. H A / 5 / 1923. P R O . N.I. 
' 21 /2 /22  Verbal from Colonel Miller.
APPENDIX IV: Findings of the Boundary Commission which affected
the border of Cavan and Monaghan.
Section C(iv).




(Transferred to Irish Free State.)
D.E.D. Catholics. Non-Catholics. Area.
Cuilceagh* 40 15 1,619.
Derrylester* 186 28 1,562.
Kinawley* 568 112 2,775.
Springtown* 276 18 1,852.
Doon* 249 8 1,779.
Aghyoule* 707 145 4,994.
Crum* 196 43 1,586.
Total 2,222 369 16,167.
* Portion of.
Section C(v).
Five areas in Eastern part of County Fermanagh mainly in the District Electoral Divisions 
of Clonkeelan, Magheraveely and Rosslea.
County.
FERMANAGH
(Transferred to Irish Free State.)
D.E.D. Catholics. Non-Catholics. Area.
Crum* 14 3 237.
Derrysteaton* 608 161 4,651.
Newtown
butler* 9 2 71.
Clonkeelan* 392 226 2,986.
Magheraveely* 71 9 268.
Magheraveely* 21 7 151.
Magheraveely* 8 8 37.
Dresternan* 243 8 1,041.
Rosslea* 1,781 237 9,181.
Total 3,147 661 18,623
* Portion of.
Section C(vi).
Area in County Monaghan forming part of District Electoral Division of Drummully.
(Transferred to Northern Ireland.)
County. D.E.D. Catholics. Non-Catholics. Area.




Area in County Armagh comprising parts of District Electoral Divisions o f  Tynan, 
Middletown and Derrynoose.
(Transferred to Irish Free State.)
County. D.E.D. Catholics. Non-Catholics. Area.
ARMAGH Tynan* 23 10 205.
Middletown* 896 247 4.215.
Derrynoose* 845 79 4,508.
Total. 1,764 336 8,928.
* Portion of.
Section E(ii).
Area in County Monaghan comprising parts of District Electoral Divisions of Mullyash,
Church Hill and Carrickaslane.
(Transferred to Northern Ireland.)
County. D.E.D. Catholics. Non-Catholics. Area.
MONAGHAN Mullyash* 262 552 5,336.
Church Hill* 58 102 814.
Carrickaslane*: 15 6 129.
Total. 335 660 6,279.
* Portion of.
Section E(iii).
Area in Southern part of County Armagh including greater part of former Rural
of Crossmaglen and adjoining portion of that of Newry No. 2.
(Transferred to Irish Free State.)
County. D.E.D. Catholics. Non-Catholics. Area.
ARMAGH Lower Greggan 1,245 29 5,238.
Moybane 854 10 3,027.
Crossmaglen 1,931 113 4,769.
Cloghoge 530 155 2,961.
Cullyhanna 630 26 3,008.
Lisleitrim* 456 93 2,484.
Dorsy* 1,192 53 5,039.
Newtown
hamilton* 2 6 40.
Camly* 206 31 1,447.
Ballybot* 312 3 1,007.
Killevy* 1,547 14 4,973.
Jonesborough 1,741 101 6,018.
Latbriget 1,344 6 5,764.
Forkhill 1,507 114 5,737.
Camlough* 339 55 2,021.
Belleek* 23 8 161.
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Total 13.859 817 53.694.
* Portion of
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